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26 June 1985

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ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ASALA MEMBERS REPORTEDLY DRIVEN OUT FROM SYRIAN TERRITORY

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 10 May 85 p 1

[Article: "Syria Expels Members of the ASALA from the Country"]

[Text] MILLIYET correspondent Mehmet Ali Pirant reports from Damascus that the Syrian Government has taken an important step in the direction of improving its relations with Turkey by declaring that it has put an end to all ASALA activities on its territory, by shutting down training camps and prohibiting any and all work or training.

According to Western diplomatic circles, Damascus quietly implemented this order in order to please Ankara, because it is keenly aware of how disturbed Turkey could become at the happenings beyond its southern border. It is reported that, following the Israeli withdrawal, ASALA has now returned to Beirut, with some members relocating to Tehran.

Although there is no official confirmation, reliable sources report that the Syrian Government has communicated with the Armenian Church, Armenian organizations, and all organs, warning them against any armed actions against Turkey and against any kind of related activities. The Syrian authorities have also given Turkish officials a guarantee to that effect and have stated that "henceforth no anti-Turkish activities shall be tolerated on Syrian territory."

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CSO: 4605/170

EGYPT

CAIRO ANALYSIS OF U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS

NC281050 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1000 GMT 28 May 85

[News analysis by 'Adilah 'Abd al-Nasir on U.S.-Cuban relations]

[Text] By suspending the emigration agreement signed between Cuba and the United States in retaliation for Washington's beginning broadcasts from an anti-Cuba station, Havana has thus abandoned the only diplomatic agreement it has signed with the Reagan administration. This agreement was signed last December, after months of negotiations, and resulted in the resumption of a partial bilateral emigration operation. In accordance with this agreement, Cuba began to get back undesirable Cubans who illegally emigrated to the United States by boat in 1980. In return, Washington agreed to accept approximately 2,000 Cubans annually.

The U.S. radio directed against Cuba began transmitting on 20 May. It is called Radio Marti, named after Jose Marti, the Cuban poet and hero who took part in Cuba's struggle for independence from Spain. It transmits from Florida, which faces the Cuban shores. President Reagan insisted that the radio start transmitting despite the objections of officials of local U.S. radio stations.

It is noted that this new deterioration in Cuban-U.S. relations comes in the wake of Cuban President Castro's initiative last February to improve bilateral relations, which have been in a cold war state since he assumed power in Havana in 1959. He then followed his initiative by withdrawing military advisers from Nicaragua. But Washington has not met this Cuban initiative in kind. It demanded a more effective Cuban move, particularly in the sphere of what it termed Cuba's sabotage activities in Latin America. In addition it demanded the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and other African areas.

CSO: 4500/123

EGYPT

AL-AHALI CRITICAL OF MUBARAK SPEECH

PM171310 Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 8 May 85 p 1

[Editorial: "A Critical View of the President's Speech"]

[Text] It is difficult to discuss President Husni Mubarak's May Day speech calmly and objectively in this frenzied atmosphere created by the media whose job is to praise, applaud, and flatter any ruler.

However, it is also difficult to ignore this particular speech which lasted about 3 hours and during which the president tried to present a comprehensive picture of his policies and to discuss his views and thoughts regarding several important issues.

A first reading of the speech clearly shows that there is a host of subjects that need to be discussed. We would be content to discuss one basic issue which occupied a major part of the president's speech, namely the economic question which has raised many controversial points and left several others unclear. The president insists on using the terms coined by enemies of the Nasirite 23 July revolution, namely the "closed-door" [inghilaq] policy and the "open-door" [infitah] policy. These are unscientific expressions, have no economic meaning, and do not correctly describe the two eras to which they refer, the era of the sixties (up to 1974) and the al-Sadat era respectively. The true description of what is termed "closed-door" is the period of national, economic, and social independence, of the beginning of planning, and of the state shouldering the basic responsibility for industrial and agricultural development after it has been established that Egyptian capital over 60 years (1900-1960) failed to play any effective role in development or national economic independence. Egyptian capitalism failed to align itself with the majority of the popular forces, the poor and low-income people, against the exploiting minority. The true description of what is called "open-door" is to stop development and to open the door to the parasitic foreign, Arab, and Egyptian capital in order to plunder the country's wealth and drown us in a whirlpool of consumer goods consumption so that Egypt will drown in debts, inflations, and spiralling prices which will all lead to the redistribution of the national income in favor and landlords and employers and to the disadvantage of workers. Egypt will thus lose its economic independence and return to the position of subordination.

The president spoke about the economic and social achievements that have been accomplished as the world looked at him with appreciation and respect. He also warned against those who intentionally or unintentionally view the situation through dark glasses.

It is not a question of a few people wearing dark glasses or not but of salient facts. The open-door policy which successive governments since 1974 and to this day have been following and which the president, in this speech in particular, stressed the government's adherence to on the same basis that existed during al-Sadat's rule, created for Egypt and its people a crushing economic crisis from which there is no way out except by immediately abandoning it.

Facts and figures do not err, cheat, or cover things up, as the president himself said. These facts and figures show us that we are still experiencing all the phenomena of collapse and economic crisis.

There is a depression in commodity output (that is industry and agriculture) and a trend toward increasing investment in the services and distribution sector by around 60 percent.

The services in which investment is made are not health, education, culture, or social services but rather the banking, insurance, and imports services, the opening of boutiques and supermarkets, and the building of luxury housing. The end result is an increase in prices and cost of living and a reduction in exports. All of which has led the World Bank to say that among the developing countries Egypt depends most on external resources.

In addition to economic stagnation we depend on the sale of exhaustible raw materials such as oil, Suez Canal revenue, and the remittances by Egyptians abroad and also on foreign loans.

In addition to all this there is the increase in private and public consumption which in certain years has reached 34 percent. This increase does not reflect a rise in the level of public consumption but mostly an increase in consumption by high income categories and in unfettered imports.

There is also the deficit in the balance of payments and the increasing dependence on external sources for food, the increasing foreign debts, the deficit in the state budget, the collapse of the rate of exchange of the Egyptian pound, and the widening of social differences between classes as a result of the increasingly unfair distribution of wealth in favor of the rich and to the disadvantage of the workers.

In the light of these facts the president's claim that he is with the poor and with the rich who invest their wealth in the interest of the poor seems irrelevant; in practical reality this is alignment with the rich and meeting their demands. All the policies and decisions in force serve the interests of the so-called business people and big merchants. Suffice it to say that these people were able to abort the government's modest measures adopted last January in order to check the collapse of the Egyptian pound and to

control imports and, consequently, check the increase in prices. After 3 months of implementing these measures the government backtracked and met all their conditions.

In his speech the president tried to explain the reason why the 3 January decisions were issued and why they were abrogated on 6 April, but he avoided the real issues in adopting these decisions and abrogating them. We do not know who issued these decisions and what their purpose was. Why did the government backtrack so humiliatingly, and in whose interest was this backtracking? The president was content with general statements, stressing that the issuing of the decisions and their abrogation was in the public interest and that nobody can influence the president's decisions.

The president's reply to those who criticize the economic situation and the prevalent chaos that is unlike any world economic system said: The image of our economy is not vague, distorted, or unique. There is no longer in the world purely socialist systems or purely capitalist systems.

In fact development has not abolished the clear differences between the socialist system that is based on public ownership of the means of production and planning and the capitalist system that is based on individual initiative motivated by profit.

The tragedy is that the economic and social system prevailing in Egypt at present, although capitalist in essence, ignores the development in the capitalist countries including the United States. The system is based on speculation, plundering, and brokerage and yet we call it a "socialist democratic" system. It is therefore our right to call it a "unique," distorted, and vague system.

It is in the interest of neither the president nor the NDP to ignore all these facts. It is in the interest of all of us to see the reality as it is and to revise the policies that have led us to this crisis.

CSO: 4500/123

EGYPT

VARYING APPROACHES TO ISLAMIC LAW EXPLORED

East Burnham ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English May 85 pp 78-79

[Excerpt] After last year's elections flurry, the Sharia codification issue entered a new stage. All the campaigning parties called for the implementation of Sharia (the ruling National Democratic Party, the Wafd, SLP, and the National Gathering Party). Party manifestos and political rallies paid great attention to the matter, for two major reasons: first, the Wafd and Muslim Brotherhood alliance, which increased the momentum for Sharia among the Wafdis and also influenced other parties to advocate the same message. Second, the significance of the Islamic electoral weight in Egypt had been sensed by all parties. The influence of the Islamists in the history of the country has been clear, the 1981 assassination of Sadat being just one extreme manifestation of an otherwise ubiquitous influence.

However, this widespread and popular move towards Islamic legislation which is reflected by party politics is countered by the lack of political consensus between the parties who raise this very same banner. At variance is the method and the degree of application, each of the five parties advocating Sharia having its own economic, social and political vision of implementation.

Since the early 1970s when discussion on Sharia began, a number of views have been expressed by Egypt's intelligentsia. These views revolved around such questions as has a suitable time come for Sharia? And how should it be applied?

Three points of view can be distinguished in this respect. First, that the implementation of Sharia should be preceded by the settlement of all the questions it raises. *Al-Ahram* columnist Ahmad Baha'uddin wrote of this view in

the March 10, 1984 issue of the Egyptian daily where a number of alternative examples of Sharia in practice were mentioned: the Saudi model and the Iranian, Pakistani and Sudanese examples. He called for the prior specification of a model by the intending party, not the claim "to think about it after assuming political authority." Among the details which should be decided upon in advance are:

- the possibility of forming religiously-based parties;
- the attitude towards banking transactions, investment bonds and insurance companies;
- women's dress: hijab;
- whether the theft punishment should be applied for fraud or forgery as well as for plain theft, robbery or burglary.

Second, the view that society should first be prepared for the application of Sharia, which must be gradual. This view was also expressed in *Al-Ahram*, on March 13, 1984 by Ahmad Bahjet, who wrote that those who feel it is impossible to implement Sharia are like those who call for its immediate enforcement against the petty thief who steals a loaf of bread. He added that "ijtihad (juristic reasoning) should precede implementation, gradualness of application being an Islamic objective in itself," and that he built his opinion on the fact that the Prophet spent 13 years in Makkah professing the principles of Islamic faith before the application of Sharia laws in Madinah.

Three days later and again in *Al-Ahram*, Dr Mustafa Mahmoud confirmed this view and held that "the social, artistic, political and economic fields can not be

reformed overnight." Sheikh Omer al-Telmesani also supports this contention, believing that "Sharia should be implemented slowly and in harmony with the dictates of foreign and internal circumstances." A more detailed view of Sheikh Telmesani was published in *Al-Ahram* (March 12, 1976) under the heading "Before we apply Sharia," where he stated: "When Sharia is applied no hand amputation shall take place against a

thief until all his needs as a Muslim subject are satisfied. No flogging or stoning for fornication and adultery until the ruler protects the subject against the abundant obscenity, both audible and visual."

The third and last prevailing view on Sharia maintains that it should be immediately applied, believing that such application is itself a means of reforming the ailments in the society. The prominent advocate of this view is Sheikh Salah Abu Ismael, whose statement during his last visit to Sudan — that "there will no longer be any excuse for not applying Sharia by any Muslim ruler" — has been much quoted. Other supporters of this view also argue that the integration between Sudan and Egypt requires legislative harmony, as outlined by Sheikh Mohammed Al-Matrawi, MP and Director General of the Preaching and Dawa Department in

Azhar University.

Alongside the multiplicity of theoretical views on Sharia, the judges run their own debates on the practical obstacles. Most of them think that there will exist a dual system where positive law provisions would contradict with the Sharia rules; the other view holds that Sharia shall prevail because it is God's law and is binding as such on the Muslim judge and, secondly, because Article (2) of the Constitution also furnishes another ground for this preference. In this respect even parliament, some argue, is not needed for the implementation of Sharia.

In the light of this background and the present state of affairs of this important issue, the renewed May debates on the implementation of Sharia are not expected to result in any practical steps, at least in the foreseeable future.

CSO: 4500/124

EGYPT

ASSASSINS' MOTHERS SEEK SONS' GRAVES

East Burnham ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English May 85 pp 12-13

[Text] On March 21, the day celebrated as Mother's Day in Egypt, five grief stricken mothers made a moving appeal to President Hosni Mubarak to disclose to them the whereabouts of their sons' graves. They included the mothers of Khalid Islambuli, Abdel Hamid Salem, Hussain Abbas, Ata Tayel, and Muhammad Abdel Salam Faraj, who were executed by the Egyptian government on April 14, 1982 after the assassination of Anwar Sadat.

The appeal was signed by Khadira Ali Yusuf, the mother of Khalid Islambuli. The mothers have pointed out that after the execution of their sons the government has not only refused to hand over the bodies to their families but has also buried them in total secrecy. The mothers have protested that their efforts over the last three years to discover the whereabouts of their sons' graves have fallen on deaf ears and this has caused them immense anxiety.

The Islamic Council has condemned this act of the Hosni Mubarak government, calling it neither Islamic nor civilised. The Council has appealed to international voluntary organisations to appeal to President Mubarak to end the agony of these innocent mothers and tell them where their sons are buried.

CSO: 4500/124

EGYPT

EFFECT OF AFRICAN DROUGHT ON NATION REVIEWED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 15 May 85 pp 44, 45

[Article by Muhammad Barakat: "The Coming Water War: What Does the 'Water Famine' in Egypt Mean?"]

[Text] In a conversation of his published by the newspaper HERALD TRIBUNE, Dr Butrus Ghali, minister of state for foreign affairs, said, "The coming war in the region will be over Nile water, not over political or ideological struggles."

These words almost exactly summarize the true nature of the problem which has faced Egypt for 6 years and whose specter began to weigh on the spirits of 50 million Egyptians some months ago like a massive nightmare casting its grave black shadow over the length of the valley, from one end to the other. The name of this nightmare is drought.

Africa has been afflicted with drought for 6 years. This drought reached its peak last year, destroying civilization and exposing millions of people to death from hunger in the midst of the worst crisis Africa has experienced in the modern era.

More than 30 African countries have been subjected to this crisis, but Egypt has been spared it, so far, because of the High Dam.

Behind this dam stands the greatest manmade lake in the world, Lake Nasir. The filling of this lake with Nile water began in 1964 and tremendous amounts of water have been stored behind it from that time to now. Therefore the West calls this tremendous lake the great water bank, since it extends for a distance of 500 kilometers and an average width of 12 kilometers -- that is, the area of the surface of the lake is about 6,000 square kilometers of fresh water.

Over the course of these 20 years the lake's reservoir has performed the greatest development activity in the modern history of Egypt, since, as Dr Jamal Hamdan says, it has guaranteed Nile water for the first time in the Nile's long history, protecting Egypt first of all from the high floods which used to threaten it with inundation and destroy hundreds of villages,

thousands of people and hundreds of thousands of feddans in its path, while, on the other hand, which is more important, protecting Egypt again from the low floods which used to threaten Egypt with drought and its land with infertility.

Twenty years ago, that is, in 1965, the High Dam protected Egypt from the greatest flood which reached it in this century, estimated at more than 128 billion cubic meters of water.

Ten years ago, that is, in 1975, the High Dam once again protected Egypt from the worst flood to reach it in 70 years; that was a very low flood and came to more than a mere 40 billion cubic meters of water.

However, none of this can be compared with what the High Dam has done for Egypt the past 10 years. These were years of drought, or lean years, which caused Africa pain and dealt it a blow in terms of food and water, striking it with one of the greatest catastrophes of the 20th century.

In the course of these 6 terrible years, less than 40 billion cubic meters of water reached Egypt each year, although Egypt consumes more than 55 billion cubic meters of water a year. Last year just 35 billion cubic meters were brought to Egypt by the flood -- the lowest flood level to occur in this century.

Egyptians did not feel the blatant nature of the catastrophe which caused Africa suffering, and no one felt that the water that had been received had been reduced by more than half, because Egypt, during these years, withdrew enough from the "water bank," that is, the reservoir of the dam, to cover this deficit.

In 1979, the year the drought started in Africa, we drew 7.2 billion cubic meters of water from the lake; in 1980, 5.5 billion cubic meters were withdrawn; in 1981, 10.5 billion cubic meters; in 1982, 14.8 billion cubic meters; in 1983, we withdrew 12.5 billion cubic meters; and last year, 1984, less than 25 percent of the flood water reached Egypt, that is, one quarter of the quantity of water which must come in, and we were then compelled to draw out 20 billion cubic meters of water.

As a result of the constant withdrawal during these years, the lake's water level declined and its reserves dropped to the point where they now no longer exceed 70 billion cubic feet of water, of which we will withdraw 25 billion by the end of next July. Forty-five billion will remain and of this it will be possible to withdraw 15 billion to make up for the shortage in the coming flood, if this flood turns out to be low the seventh year running.

At that point, we will reach the zero level, or the point of utmost danger, since there will be only 30 billion cubic meters of water left in the lake, which will bring the level of the lake to 147 meters above sea level, which is dead storage! What does "dead storage" mean?

It means that if the water level in the High Dam reservoir is below 147 meters, we cannot withdraw a single drop from it. This is the lake's dead

capacity. In addition, the existing agreement does not permit withdrawal from the lake below that level. What is more dangerous, the turbines of the High Dam will not work to generate electricity below this level, because they will then be exposed to what is called the phenomenon of "cavitation," or creation of an air vacuum, which will expose them and the tunnels to danger.

This, in the language of technicians, as the Egyptian minister of irrigation, Eng 'Isam Radi, calls it, means that it will be impossible for us to draw from the lake's dead storage.

That is the danger which is threatening Egypt now.

The High Dam and Lake Nasir protected Egypt from drought and the threat of famine which swept over Africa for 6 years running, and it can protect us for the seventh year, so that the seven lean years may thereby run their course, but the dam and the lake together cannot offer Egypt more than this. What danger will threaten Egypt if the drought continues and the water continues to arrive at less than its normal rate, God forbid, for years to come?

That is the question -- the nightmare -- which casts its shadow over everything in Egypt now.

Egypt, in a word, is the Nile. The lives of 50 million Egyptians are connected to the drops of water, exactly as they are connected to blood, because Egypt gets 95 percent of its water requirements from the Nile River. This high percentage goes for agricultural purposes, since 7 million feddans are irrigated, from Aswan to the Mediterranean. It also goes for purposes of industry, since it operates and cools the machinery of 3,000 factories in which 8 million workers in Egypt are working, and for purposes of human consumption, most important of which is drinking. On top of that, the source of all Egypt's electricity is water.

This means, in other words, that the most serious form of security in Egypt is not political security, economic security or even military security, but, precisely, security of water.

This is where this critical historic moment which Egypt is going through now as it awaits the coming flood with unlimited anxiety comes in.

The continuation of the water shortage for a seventh consecutive year will bring the water in the lake to a point where it will not be possible subsequently to make withdrawals from the lake. What that means is a serious effect on agriculture in Egypt, which calls for a review of the crop composition of Egyptian agriculture on the one hand and a review of the irrigation methods used and existing drainage methods on the other.

A drop in the water level below 147 meters will put the massive turbines of the High Dam out of operation, and therefore the reservoir's electricity will be cut off, so that it will become necessary to generate the electricity required for industry and human consumption from oil. Oil in Egypt today

accounts for one of the most important income sources in the country. The revenues from it have perhaps been the second source of exports in Egypt. The generation of electricity by oil rather than water means a decline or interruption in Egypt's oil exports, which will subject the heavily burdened Egyptian economy to unlimited dangers.

Western businessmen and experts say that if the drought continues 2 more years that will lead to catastrophe as far as tourist revenues in Egypt go, because the water of the Nile, in the event of drought, will not be fit for navigation by tourist river boats, and a severe water shortage will be produced in luxury hotels in Egypt, leading to a total suspension of tourist activity, although that constitutes the fourth source of income for the Egyptian economy.

The strange thing, following all this, is that water in Egypt has no price and is not sold. People irrigate their land, operate their factories and consume 55 billion cubic meters of water a year without paying anything for it. An American official working in Egypt says, "Even the garden in my home is irrigated with Nile water, free of charge."

Providing water at no charge in Egypt has created a most wasteful pattern in water use.

Official figures show that in reality we consume only 40 percent of the volume of water we use and that 60 percent of all this water represents a terrible waste, which is lost.

This pattern of uncontrolled water consumption has been the reason up to now for the failure of consumption guidance campaigns which the concerned agencies in Egypt have carried out and are carrying out.

However, there is no longer any way to avoid such necessary guidance of the level of water use throughout Egypt. This constitutes the guidance of agricultural, industrial and household consumption. The right to use water must be recodified and evaluated in economic terms. The mere provision of irrigation water as a commodity at no charge has resulted in the absence of economic control governing its consumption by peasants and farmers. In addition, it is necessary to study the most beneficial use of water for farming and correspondingly it is necessary to review the price of water used for human consumption in homes, since it is sufficient for us to know that the government sustains a cost of 65 milliemes in purifying a cubic meter of water and sells it to people for no more than 12 milliemes. Even the waterworks now lose more than 50 million pounds a year, which the government pays out as a subsidy for the cost of water.

Officials in Egypt state that it is necessary to set out a comprehensive national plan for the guidance of Nile water use for the foreseeable future; suffice it to say that figures tell us that Egypt's population in just 15 years will come to 80 million. The river water which Egypt receives from its stipulated share in the Nile basin will not be enough alone for the terrifying quantity of people because the Nile does not just serve Egypt -- nine African countries live off it, and Egypt is one of those.

The Egyptian scientist Jamal Hamdan says that the drop in the flood which is occurring now is a "water famine" by every standard. It is a famine which is putting Egypt on the threshold of danger for the first time in its modern history.

Two weeks ago a "prayer for rain" was held, perhaps for the first time, in the mosques all over Egypt, which number 40,000. The next day the papers published the news that rains had started to fall on the Ethiopian plateau which supplies the Nile with water.

Joyce Starr, in the newspaper HERALD TRIBUNE, stated "If the drought continues for additional years it could expose millions of Egyptians to death by starvation."

Eng 'Isam Radi, the minister of irrigation in Egypt, states "Indications assert that Egypt will not be exposed to the threat of drought and that the Nile flood the coming water year, which starts on 1 August, will be higher than last year's. Going by the theory of probability, the flood cannot assume such an extremely low form for 2 successive years. Therefore, next year's flood will be 55 percent above normal."

Dr Butrus Ghali, the minister of state for foreign affairs and top expert on African affairs, says, "The problem cannot be solved by the old traditional means. Without political skills and creative powers, Egypt will become another Bangladesh, with one difference, which is that the inhabitants of the new Bangladesh will live on the shores of the Mediterranean and will be separated from the rich population of the north by a distance of only half an hour by airplane."

However, what is more dangerous than anything else are the words with which Dr Ghali began this conversation, predicting that the next war in the region would be the "war of water!"

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CSO: 4504/352

EGYPT

BRIEFS

OIL EXPORTS TO ISRAEL--AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM has learned that competent [Egyptian] authorities have issued instructions to the petroleum sector to review all the agreements on marketing oil that have been concluded with international marketing companies, especially those agreements that deal with the export of oil to Israel. This is in order to assess the losses sustained by the state as a result of some junior petroleum officials acting as intermediaries in selling Egyptian oil to Israel at prices below world prices in return for large commissions from the legal adviser of the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. The latter had set up a fictitious oil marketing company in his brother's name with the aim of getting Egyptian oil and selling it to Israel at cheap prices. The affair is known as the scandal of marketing Egyptian oil. AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM was the first to expose the manipulation in marketing Egyptian oil on terms favorable to Israel and the magnitude of Egypt's losses in its oil exports to Israel--exports that totaled 80 million Egyptian pounds in 1984. [Text] [Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 30 May 85 p 1 GF]

CSO: 4500/123

ISRAEL

ISRAELIS HIRED AS 'MERCENARIES,' BODYGUARDS ABROAD

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 5 Apr 85 pp 16-17

[Article by Aryeh Egozi: "Israeli for Hire"]

[Text] Yosi knows almost all the casinos and plush restaurants in Europe. He is also thoroughly familiar with two marinas in the Riviera. He has not participated in games at the roulette tables and has not chosen expensive wines at laden tables at expensive restaurants. But in each of these places someone took care to see that he enjoyed smooth entry, even though it was clear that the suit that he wore was not sewn by a prestige tailor.

Until a year ago, Yosi (an alias) was a soldier in an elite unit in the Israeli army. Training and patrols in Lebanon comprised the backbone of his army routine. The other portions of his military service will not be permitted out by the censor for many years. Hours of backbreaking training turned the shy, average-sized youth into an efficient "war machine."

As his discharge grew near, he enrolled at the university to study economics, but a chance meeting at a Tel Aviv cafe changed his plans. His former commander in the elite unit came over to the table. "I have an interesting proposal," he said.

The next morning, in an office in the commercial center in the southern part of the city, over a cup of coffee in a plastic cup, things became clearer. "We are connected with a security firm in France, and they are looking for good people to work for them."

Assistance with an apartment, a good hourly wage, and plane tickets to the "City of Lights" were big enticements. No agreement was signed. Everything was agreed to with a handshake.

Blue and White

Today, 2 months after that meeting, "Yosi" is a blue and white Israeli export commodity--a part of a growing export area which is a by-product of the situation in which we live. They do not appear in the Yellow Pages and they do not advertise in the newspapers. In place of a chance meeting at a cafe, there is sometimes a telephone call inviting you for a friendly

chat with an old acquaintance or with the acquaintance of a friend. Secrecy is one of their tools. But, in spite of this, whoever needs them finds them without difficulty.

They do not always use their real names in telephone calls or in telexes. If someone has a dual citizenship, he turns into a true "find." Israelis are in demand, but the passport bearing a seven-branched candelabra does not always serve well in this special calling.

Outside of Israel they are called "bodyguards." Israelis prefer the term in use in Israel, "security personnel," and there are those who relate to them as "experts in self-defense." Designations aside, there is no doubt that Israelis today occupy one of the most respected positions in the international security business.

Almost no one has heard of the "billionaires club." Even those who are members know that their sole contact with that exclusive "club" is several telephone numbers which they carry with them wherever they go. The "club" was started out of necessity: conventional insurance companies refuse to insure the superwealthy, whose assets total billions of dollars. These--some 80 people--the "club" insures, in exchange for a very high premium. And this on the condition that the insured reports to a special center on every journey--long or short--to destinations labeled "risk destinations."

And here is where the Israelis come in.

When about a month ago a rich German industrialist left his villa near Frankfurt for a resort in France, his wife sat next to him in the front seat of their Mercedes 500. And in the back seat, Yosi. The night before he received instructions from his superior at the "club." For the next 6 days, the young Israeli turned into the shadow of the German industrialist and his wife. Only once was there cause for suspicion: when he noticed a young couple in a shabby commercial vehicle, which trailed the Mercedes at a distance on a side road. Otherwise, the days passed without special incident. No one attempted to kidnap or harm the rich German.

At the same time, but thousands of kilometers from the French resort, other Israelis were involved in a different type of security task. Explaining the mission was simple, but not its execution. The person who took upon himself the task of organizing the protection of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos knew that there would be need for sophisticated means to prevent an attack on the ruler, who has many enemies. Exactly how the request was referred to Israel, I was unable to ascertain. There are many theories, as is the case in everything regarding personal security matters.

Philippine Ranchers

Mordelhay Rahamim, the former El Al security guard who killed a terrorist at Zurich Airport and who was the late Golda Me'ir's bodyguard, together with a partner, today runs a private investigation office in Tel Aviv.

According to him, in the past he was connected with security affairs outside of the country. As to what goes on today in this regard, he is not prepared to comment. Rahamim says that, according to the best of his knowledge, Israelis today protect the wealthy ranchers in the Philippines. It appears that the reputation of the Israelis reached Marcos' palace and that when he decided to establish a small private army to protect his life, he turned to Israeli security circles and requested their assistance. Another possibility is that the request was made through Israeli concerns which deal in security consulting and in the export of security equipment to African and Asian countries.

The form of the request is not clear, but the rumor spread like wildfire. Soldiers in uniform and reserve soldiers were fired up by news of the proposal. A few of them who went on a "study tour" in the Philippines felt repulsed by the nature of the work, but others were enthusiastic about the high salary and the fringe benefits. Today, even though no Israeli official is willing to comment on the subject, the fact is that Israelis serve in key posts in the personal security force of President Marcos.

In contrast to Israelis who carry out security missions in Europe and who for the most part are prevented from carrying live ammunition, the Israelis in Manila are equipped with the best weapons and support equipment produced in Israel. Automatic weapons such as the "mini Uzi," the miniature version of the famous Israeli submachine gun, Galil rifles intended for snipers, flak jackets, mobile communications units, and night vision equipment all assist in strengthening the protection of the president of the Philippines.

City of Gambling

Beni Tal, the head of a security firm carrying the name "International Security," admits that, in the past, he took on security assignments outside of the country. In my conversation with him, he too would not reveal details, there being no doubt that the subject is sensitive and as a businessman Tal does not want to endanger one of his sources of income. Beni Tal says that Israeli security agents are in demand because of their professional qualifications, but also because of their "naivete and loyalty."

Mercenaries--and Israelis working as security agents outside the country are sometimes so called--from other countries are not known for their reliability. "Israelis after discharge from the army display adherence to goals and absolute loyalty, and this of course spurs the demand for them," says Tal. He also tells of an Israeli who carried out security assignments in South America and at least twice escaped by the skin of his teeth when the people he was protecting found themselves on the wrong side of the fence on the day that the revolutionary upheaval broke out.

Israelis protect businessmen in El Salvador, Venezuela and Mexico.

David Dor, one of the veteran private investigators in Israel, says that, according to his best knowledge, most of the Israelis who deal in security outside the country today do so as consultants. "Israelis have a problem getting involved in the operations part of security outside the country

today do so as consultants. "Israelis have a problem getting involved in the operations part of security outside the country because of their inability to carry weapons legally. I know of cases where Israeli security agents went out on assignments with fake weapons and gas guns," says Dor, who also admits that in the past he too engaged in "a bit of this kind of work."

When I pushed a bit, he told me that he has several clients outside the country who still turn to him when they need protection. "They telephone and tell me where and when they need the man. I have a pool of security agents. I find out who is free and send him there."

For personal safety, clients pay between \$35 and \$50 an hour in addition to all of the expenses of the bodyguard, including airfare.

Israelis also protect the big "Sun City" casino in Bophuthatswana, the homeland country within South Africa. A city of entertainment and gambling is a potential source of trouble, and Israelis keep a watchful eye on what goes on at the gaming tables and clubs. Israelis also protect the president of the protectorate state, Ciskei, which has become the latest paradise for Israeli investments. Both Bophuthatswana and Ciskei have "embassies" in Israel, and it is apparently through them that the Israelis who serve as the security core in these two protectorate countries were recruited.

A Bolt of Lightning

Not everyone who fears for his life wants a weapons-toting bodyguard. There are those who prefer to rely on the senses of a well-trained dog that is programmed to attack any stranger. In this aspect of the "export industry," Yosi Labuq, who introduced the use of dogs into the Israeli Army, pretty much stands alone. Out of a small Tel Aviv office, Labuq tries to expand the use of watchdogs the world over. What he mainly does today from his office through telegrams and the telephone, he has tried to do in the last few years through long trips throughout the world in order to prove in the field the effectiveness of the dogs that he trains. When he was in Miami, he sold Doberman pinschers to a Nigerian prince. "He came to buy horses, but when he saw what the dogs could do, he bought them and forgot about the horses." Labuq too is not quick to hand over a list of clients, being prepared to say just that "the court" of one of the senior chiefs in Nigeria is protected by "Israeli" dogs that can tear to shreds anyone who tries to penetrate the confines of the palace.

During the past year, Labuq has branched out to the development of sophisticated and inexpensive defensive devices in order to compete with the products currently on the international security market. If you are interested in a limousine whose fenders and windows will be impenetrable to Kalachnikov bullets, Labuq will make up a private "tank" like that for you for about \$20,000, about a quarter of the cost of a similar armored vehicle on the American market. Are you afraid that someone will stop your car and try to kidnap you? Labuq will fix your car up with a device which

will run 50,000 volts through the handles of the car doors. A current like this is not fatal, because of certain technical refinements, but it is enough to send flying anyone who touches the handles when the doors are locked from the inside.

If we add up the details, we get the following picture: the number of Israelis who are involved in overseas security positions comes to many dozens. Some are independents who came to their clients through personal contacts; others through an office in Israel. As a person very close to the field put it: "It is true that money is an important incentive in bringing people into the field, but I have no doubt that for many there is an additional reason. A soldier in an elite unit who leaves the army after a long period of service in most cases looks for a job with a certain amount of tension which will call on at least a part of the knowledge he has accumulated through the years. It's in the blood, and security work outside the country fulfills some of these needs."

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ISRAEL

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AMONG ISRAELI ARABS EXAMINED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 5, 11 Apr 85 p 20

[Article by Yitzhaq Meridor and Muhammed Hulaylah]

[Text] Over 75 percent of all Israeli Arabs are Muslim. In most Arab villages there is not even one Christian family. The great majority of the population in these villages is Muslim. These days, anyone walking the streets of Umm el-Fahm, Kafr Kanna, Baq'a el-Gharbiya, Kafr-Qar'i, Qafr Bara, Kafr-Qasim or Jaljuya, or even the large Arab city of Nazareth, cannot but notice a relatively new phenomenon, somewhat strange, of young men and women whose whole being, mostly their garb, seems to declare: "We are different." The headcover (usually knit white wool), the heavy beards, the large veils and long dark dresses covering women's and girls' heads and bodies, all seem to declare, as if in protest: "Islam means conforming to God's will and deeds, and we, the born again, are determined to adhere to all of the prophet's commands, trivial or otherwise."

The preponderance of religious extremism of "born again Muslims" among Israeli Arabs is a debatable issue. Some say they number several thousand, others think there are only a few hundred. The question of the exact number of these young people is less important than the question of whether religious extremism is not connected with dangerous nationalistic extremism. Is it not part of a larger movement, perhaps even more sophisticated, which may constitute an extension of the core of young, religious, nationalistic fanatics, that was uncovered by the security forces in Baq'a el-Gharbiya 5 years ago? Those young people trained and had arms and explosives. Eventually they were convicted of hostile underground activities.

Some maintain that the religious, nationalistic extremism of some young born again Muslims should be of more concern than the extremism of the Palestinian Villagers and the Progressive National Movement.

In an effort to find some answers to these disturbing questions, the authors conducted many interviews in the Muslim sector in Nazareth, Kafr Qasim, Umm el-Fahm and Baq'a el-Gharbiya. They talked to a prominent religious personality in Nazareth; an Arab activist, member of MAPAM yet observant; they had coffee with a wealthy Nazareth merchant who is active in one of the largemosques in town; they talked with young born again Muslims in Kafr Kanna Baq'a el-Gharbiya and Umm el-Fahm and they presented their findings to Arab and Jewish intellectuals who follow the goings on in the Arab community in Israel.

The first born again Muslims started appearing in Arab villages, here and there, about 10 years ago. It was only with the ascent of the Ayatollah Khomeyni, though, that the phenomenon became prominent. The shocking pictures of the throngs of supporters protesting in the middle of Tehran, with their special garb, had their influence, and the number of those growing beards increased, as did the number of those who imitated the garb which became the norm in that Islamic state.

But Arab society, especially rural society, is rather intimate. Everyone knows everyone else. The "religious" garb did not change the social standing of the born again Muslims and did not erase their past. The transition from the secular routine was, for the most part, drastic and surprising. Many of them had spent long periods in large Jewish cities -- Yafo and Haifa -- and found their place in the outskirts of Jewish urban society. They had close ties with the underworld, with drug dealers, prostitution, theft and other dubious "occupations." Many had been active for years in RAKAH, in the Villagers movement and some had been suspected of associating with one or another Palestinian terrorist organization.

The majority of them do not deny their past. On the contrary, in repeated conversations with born again Muslims they cited the despair and frustration they felt in their secular lives as one of the main motivations to return to the source, to "the real answers." which can be found, they think, only in Islam. Only the principles of Islam can ensure the Israeli Arab "a respectable life, within a decent traditional society, maintaining its values."

Several of those interviewed did not hesitate to define the various groups of born again Muslims as "cancerous growths." Others were more tolerant and said: "They are people who are feeling their way within Islam. It may be that their intent is good and sincere but most of them have not attained the degree of full and in-depth belief that can be found in the Koran -- and this is the real danger that they pose."

The person mentioned as a "revered" religious personality wished to stress that "real Islam is tolerant." The Koran, the source of inspiration for every believing Muslim, considers all members of the major religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) to be brethren. According to him, "Islam rejects any extremism and opposes any dictatorship, violence, the denial of rights, inequality. The Koran demands of all believers in Allah to be tolerant to all. Its principles are not different from what is written in the declaration of independence of the State of Israel."

In his opinion, and that of other intellectuals interviewed, "Israel does a great injustice to itself and its Muslim citizens" by not having organized frameworks for in-depth teaching of Islam: "The religious course of studies in Arab high schools should be encouraged. The Koran should be taught much like the Bible is in Jewish schools, as a subject for matriculation, so as to enable higher studies and prepare a cadre of educated religious leaders,: say these intellectuals.

In Umm el-Fahm and Kafr Qasim the authors heard some positive evaluations regarding various activities of the born again Muslims. In Umm el-Fahm there

is talk about the positive activities in the PTA at one school" "They raised funds and, all on their own, after work, they constructed a new wing. including a mosque, for the school. They had a positive influence on religious studies in the school. They fought form and convinced others to join them, for more in-depth religious studies, and instituted school prayer." It is also said that the born again Muslims do not look down on any community work as being below their dignity. They fixed the school's sewer system and painted the mosque's fence. They even did night work after their daily jobs. The born again Muslims have the knack to enlist a larger number of volunteers than even an experienced well established party like RAKAH.

Part of World Muslim Brotherhood

"Our ideology, that of the born again Muslims, is identical to that of the Moslem Brotherhood, We are part of a world movement. We derive our belief from two sources: the Koran and the Sunnah (the prophet's sayings). We are a religious, social, cultural and also political movement." This is how Fu'ad Mawassi describes himself and his friends. In the past he was an ardent MAPAM supporter. He attended many of their seminars and for a long time was even considered as one of MAPAM's activists in the Arab sector.

"We strive for a Muslim state, conducted according to the Koran and Islam. Here, in Israel, we are a minority and this is why our goal here is not to establish a Muslim regime. Anyone suspecting us of this (and I was investigated several times by the security forces) makes a big mistake. All we want is to live here, in Israel, as Muslims with national and religious rights. This is what we are struggling for and this is what we have been lacking from the time this state was established. We are not influenced by Khomeyni. Why can you not understand that the Muslim Brotherhood was there well before Khomeyni? We simply do not need him. We have no need to learn Islam from him.

"Our movement is not organized as a political movement. But in those places where the born again youths decided to run, such as in the most recent municipal elections, they showed rather impressive results (e.g., in Faradis, or Kafr Bar'a, where they came in first). In any event, we are growing in numbers, thank God and we can have an influence, we can help politically those in whose success we are interested."

"Political extremism of the born again Muslims is accompanied, partially, by nationalistic tendencies. a phenomenon which should not be ignored..."

Says Dr.Yosef Ginat of Hebrew University, who is now assistant to Minister Ezer Weitzmann, planning the new government's policy toward the Arab minority: "In the late fifties, in the early sixties, Israeli Arabs stayed away from religion. The average Arab wanted to appear like an Israeli, in all respects. It was part of being integrated into Israeli society and economy. In recent years there has been a wave in the opposite direction. Thus you can see, especially on Fridays, that the mosques are crowded. Adults, over 50, are making peace with God and are returning to prayer and to the mosque. There is a growth in fundamental movements, like Jewish Hasidism. For example, the large congregation of Shaykh Yasin (in Zeita, on the West Bank), the large organized congregations in Baq'a el-Gharbiya and Jat, congregations on the West Bank and others."

"The group which worries me," continues Dr. Ginat, "is that of religious youths that is very extreme. This group argues with alcohol drinkers, with those who open their shops too early in the day during Ramadan. They are the Muslim counterparts of those in the Jewish community who yell 'Sabbath.' This phenomenon is partially accompanied by nationalism -- not only extreme religion and a tendency toward exaggerated conservatism, but also religious nationalism. It behooves us to pay close attention to this trend, even more so than to local nationalism or even Palestinian nationalism."

[11 Apr 85 p 19]

The Arab public tend to discount the danger posed by the mere phenomenon of born again Muslims. "You consider shadows to be the mountains themselves," they say. To what extent, nevertheless, is there room for concern at the rising power and the growing numbers of young people who prefer the restrictive bonds of fanatic, extremist religion?

The authors summarized the different responses which surfaced in the process of their investigation.

One man, of Nazareth, a wealthy merchant and observant Muslim, voiced a rather bitter opinion, that "the Israeli authorities are not at all interested in cooperation and true coexistence between Jews and Arabs in this country." The whole phenomenon of born again youths is, according to him the dubious fruit of dark elements, a plan conceived clandestinely by people who adhere to the policies of "divide and conquer" of inciting one segment of the Arab population against another. "I believe, to my chagrin, that many in the Jewish community do not totally reject Member of Knesset Kahane's demonic plan -- to load all Israeli Arab citizens on trucks and send them across the border. And what can justify supporters of such a plan more than Khomeyni - like activities in the Arab sector?!"

A different opinion, well weighed and phrased on a more academic level, is voiced by former reporter and now council head of Baq'a el-Gharbiya, Samir Darwish: "Some of the born again Muslims are sincere believers. They are truly looking for a way back to Islam and its teachings. But there is no doubt in my mind that their ranks have been infiltrated by elements for whom religion is but a guise to nationalism. Outwardly it seems that they are closing up, that they refuse to cooperate. They profess a desire to disassociate themselves from the outside world, they disdain and reject any act of friendship with Jewish neighbors." As an example, Samir Darwish cites the case of PTA members in Baq'a, from among born again Muslims, who objected to activities of Nitzaney Shalon, "although everyone knows," laments Darwish, "that their only intention was to foster friendship, coexistence, living side by side of Jews and Arabs."

"There is growing extremism on the Jewish side," the council head of Baq'a quotes the religious youths, "so why, so they claim, should we be ashamed of growing extremism on our side?!"

"Why," they say, "is Jewish extremism condoned, even in the Knesset, and the Knesset forum is open to horrible extremist pronouncements, while we cannot be extreme within our own society?"

Mr Darwish sums up: "We are dealing with a chain reaction of what is happening on the Jewish side. We all know the basic truth. Extremism causes more of the same. I fail to see any signs of dangerous organized activities, at least not here in Baq'a. I do not think there is currently any leader who can channel these youths as he wishes. Obviously one has to keep track of things and see how things develop."

In the process of their investigation the authors did not encounter anyone who could point to the born again youths and say "We are dealing with a political organization, based on nationalistic ideologies and planning subversive activities." The question marks, the doubts, the fears -- from Jews and Arabs alike -- stem from the tendency of the group to be closed, to adopt customs and wear clothes which cause rejection. More than anything they are rejected by the Arab community because of their shallow, simplistic interpretation of the prophet's sayings. Their interpretations are not acceptable to the vast majority of Muslims. Islam, it was repeatedly claimed, especially to the Jewish member of the team, is a religion of life, it considers the need of the believer and strives to make things easy. Islam preaches tolerance, not forceful ways, intimidation or violence.

In Umm el-Fahm, where several hundreds of these youths can be found, in Kafr Kanha and many other Arab villages, they hold religious classes (segregated by sex), they volunteer, they hold fund raisers for public projects, especially for the construction and remodeling of mosques. These activities stand out even more in view of the government's failure to provide adequate funds for these purposes. There is no need to elaborate on what goes on in this area in the Jewish sector. The Christian sector is very astute in managing its vast holdings. Only the Muslim community, whose property amounts to 1/17 of the state's property, has to resort to begging and is very upset with the dependence on Jewish authorities and bureaucrats who determine when, how much and to whom funds for religious purposes are disbursed, "No wonder then," they say, "that what these young people do is appreciated."

It is said in the villages that because of their influence public drinking has ceased, or at least has diminished and that coffee houses and restaurants in Muslim villages are not opened earlier than allowed during Ramadan. Some say that the crime rate has also come down.

RAKAH Main Loser

The authors persisted in trying to find out who the leaders of this movements are. "These groups have no real leadership," they were told. They asked: "To what extent do these groups constitute a potential army, just waiting for a charismatic leader to emerge, be it within the Green Line or from some stronghold of Islamic fanaticism in the Arab world?" The answer was: "Who knows? There have been such cases in history."

Will the Ayatollah Khomeyni or his heirs be able to attain control or real influence over these segments? This, too, tended to be answered in the negative. "The Muslim Brotherhood has leaders of its own," claimed the born again Muslims.

"It does not want the influence of a Shi'ite like Khomeyni." If anyone has to fear the born again Muslims, it is, primarily, RAKAH. Quite a few of those disappointed with the party turn to the mosques.

And what about the state?

"The State of Israel," so they said, "is fully capable of handling this phenomenon effortlessly and stem, at the outset, any subversive activities."

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26 June 1985

ISRAEL

POLL SHOWS CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS

TA101106 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 10 May 85 p 1

[PORI public opinion poll]

[Text] There is a considerably large amount of support among the public for the U.S. proposal to include a Palestinian delegation in a peace conference--and less support for a meeting with 'Arafat--in order to solve the Palestinian problem. This emerges from a nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the PORI Institute and commissioned by HA'ARETZ.

Thirty-seven percent of the total Israeli public currently supports the inclusion of a Palestinian delegation in a peace conference. Findings of a PORI poll, conducted 10 years ago in April 1975, showed that only 15.4 percent supported the participation of Palestinians at the Geneva Conference which was supposed to debate the issue. There has apparently been a significant shift in the public's stand on the subject, and the number of people supporting Palestinian participation in a peace conference has more than doubled.

The view that the Israeli Government should agree to meet 'Arafat in order to discuss a solution to the Palestinian problem is held by 26.6 percent of the Israeli public. In a PORI poll conducted in February 1975, only 16.6 percent supported this view. This constitutes a 10-percent increase in the number of people in Israel who believe in holding a dialogue with 'Arafat himself.

Another 6.8 percent of the public support the participation of Palestinians in a peace conference, and an additional 3.9 percent support a meeting with 'Arafat under certain conditions--namely, "recognition of Israel," "abrogation of the Palestinian Charter," and "halt to terrorism."

The poll was conducted on a representative sample of 1,200 men and women who were individually interviewed all over the country.

CSO: 4400/162

26 June 1985

ISRAEL

REPORT ON ATTITUDES TOWARD SETTLEMENT CONCESSIONS POLLED

TA151111 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 15 May 85 p 13

[Excerpt] In April, the public trend toward opposition to concessions on settlements in Judaea and Samaria was somewhat strengthened. The group of "doves" prepared for concessions dropped to less than 30 percent. On the other hand, the group of "hawks" opposed to any concession over settlements increased to about 65 percent. This emerges from a public opinion poll conducted for MA'ARIV by the Modi'in Ezrahi Research Institute, under the direction of Dr Mikha'el Etgar and with the scientific advice of Prof Yohanan Peres.

Approximately 80 percent of the population are convinced that settlement on the Golan Heights is vital for the Galilee's security, and another 15 percent regard this settlement as a contribution to security. Only 5 percent of the public think that settlement does not contribute anything to security, or even harms it. These data show that almost the entire Israeli public regards settlement on the Golan Heights as a security asset.

In order to examine the public's views regarding Judaea and Samaria, the following questions were asked:

To what extent is the public prepared for an evacuation of the settlements in Judaea and Samaria? And, in return for a peace agreement with Jordan, would it be:

	<u>Apr 85</u>	<u>Mar 85</u>	<u>Jan 85</u>	<u>Nov 84</u>	<u>Oct 84</u>
Prepared to evaluate all the settlements in Judaea and Samaria	7.6	8.3	7.9	8.6	8.5
Prepared to evacuate some of the settlements in Judaea and Samaria	21.9	25.7	24.8	23.1	23.6
Prepared for a freeze on new settlements only	28.3	26.9	26.2	32.1	30.0
Not prepared for a freeze even on new settlements	36.7	31.8	35.4	29.6	31.8
Others	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.4	2.2
No reply	2.5	4.3	2.7	3.2	3.9

The above table follows developments in the public's positions on the issue of Judaea and Samaria from October 1984.

There has also been a slight change in public opinion regarding concessions over territory in Judaea and Samaria. The rate of those who are opposed to any concession has risen to about 50 percent, while the rate of those who support a concession on all of Judaea and Samaria has slightly decreased. At the same time, the number of people interviewed who have no clear views on the subject has decreased.

Are you in favor of a peace agreement with Jordan, in the framework of which Israel would evacuate areas of Judaea and Samaria?

	Apr 85	Mar 85	Dec 84	Nov 84	Oct 84
Prepared to concede all the territory of Judaea and Samaria	14.8	16.6	18.8	17.9	17.7
Prepared to concede certain parts of Judaea and Samaria	33.9	33.6	35.2	35.7	36.0
Not prepared for any concession.	49.4	43.5	43.1	43.4	43.5
No reply	1.9	6.3	2.9	3.0	2.8

Among those who support concessions on territory or settlements in Judaea and Samaria, there is a very high proportion of people of European-U.S. origin, older people (50-59), those with higher education living in low-density places of residence, the secular public, and Alignment voters. Among those who are opposed to concessions there is a very high proportion from those sections of the population who vote Likud, as well as people of North American or Asian origins, young people (18-29), those with only partial or complete high school education, the orthodox, the traditional, and Likud voters.

The settlers in Judaea and Samaria have claimed that a self-defense organization for the settlements is needed, in view of the increase in hostile activity. The public positions on this issue were examined in the following question:

Do you favor or oppose the settlements in Judaea and Samaria organizing to guard their security?

In favor	47.2
Against	39.7
Do not know	11.8
No reply	1.3

The Israeli public is divided over this issue, with those favoring such a form of organization having a certain edge (47 percent compared with 40 percent). Such organization has more support among a public typical of Likud voters: People of North African and Asian origins, those with partial or complete high school education, people working in sales and services, people with medium incomes and high-density places of residence, the orthodox, the traditional, and Likud voters.

The public opposed to such organization contains a greater representation of interviewees who are traditionally Alignment voters: people of Western European origin, the elderly (60 plus), those with higher education, people with liberal and academic professions, the secular, people with higher incomes and lower density places of residence. Thus this public also has a greater representation of previous Alignment voters. It appears that the public's positions on this issue are to a great extent linked with its party identification.

In order to examine the importance of settlement on the Golan Heights as seen by the Israeli public, the interviewees were asked the following question:

Is settlement on the Golan Heights, in your opinion, essential or not for the Galilee's security?

The answers were broken down as follows:

Settlement on the Golan Heights is essential for the Galilee's security	78.7 percent
Settlement on the Golan Heights is quite important for the Galilee's security	14.5 percent
Settlement on the Golan Heights has no influence on the Galilee's security	4.1 percent
Settlement on the Golan Heights harms the Galilee's security	1.0 percent
No reply	1.7 percent

The poll also examined the public's positions on territorial concessions regarding the Golan Heights as part of possible peace agreements with the Syrians. The interviewees were asked the following question:

Do you, in principle, favor or oppose a peace agreement with the Syrians, within the framework of which Israel would have to evacuate parts of the Golan Heights:

I am opposed to evacuating any territory whatsoever on the Golan Heights	63.9 percent
I am prepared for an evacuation of a small section of the Golan Heights	25.6 percent
I am prepared for an evacuation of most of the Golan Heights	4.0 percent
I am prepared for an evacuation of all of the Golan Heights	3.6 percent
No reply	2.9 percent

A majority of the public (about two-thirds) is opposed to any concession on territory on the Golan Heights. About 25 percent of the public is prepared for some concession and about 8 percent are prepared for significant concessions. Here, too, more than 90 percent of the public is not prepared for substantial concessions on the Golan Heights, even within the framework of a peace agreement with Syria.

Among those who are opposed to any evacuation whatsoever of the Golan Heights, there is a greater representation of Israeli-born people from North African and Asian backgrounds, people with partial or complete high school educations, and Likud voters.

Among the group that is prepared for concessions on most or all of the territory within the framework of a peace agreement, there is a high representation of people of European-U.S. origin and Israeli-born people from Western backgrounds, people aged 40-59, people with higher education, independents, people with high incomes who live in low-density places of residence. There is also a high representation of secular people and Alignment voters.

It seems that the public which is prepared for concessions comes from a relatively high socioeconomic class, is older, and identifies with the Alignment.

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ISRAEL

MONEY SMUGGLED THROUGH WEST BANK

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 26 Mar 85 p 23

[Article by Roni Shaked: "\$2.7 Million Found in Sausage"]

[Text] Last Friday a meat merchant from the village of al-'Azarya, on the outskirts of Jerusalem, made his way to Amman over the Jordan River, exactly as he is accustomed to doing every 10 days. But this time he aroused the suspicion of customs officials. In his car, among the piles of meat, were two innocent bags. "It's sausage," the merchant told the customs officials, but a light fingering revealed that inside the bag wasn't sausage, but layers of paper. To the surprise of the customs officials, they revealed tens of thousands of European bank notes, Egyptian pounds, Jordanian dinars, and many dollar traveler's checks in the two bags.

When the counting was completed, the value of the money came to \$2.7 million. Once again it was proven that the declarations of government officials about the [success of] the war against black market money have no basis.

The Jordan River bridges have served and continue to serve as a convenient and common channel for smuggling black market money, but this time the courier ran out of luck. From the interrogation of the meat merchant it emerged that he worked for a number of money changers in East Jerusalem and on the West Bank.

"You Israelis have been fast asleep for a long time," a money changer who preferred to remain anonymous told me. "You are concerned that there not be any weapons smuggling via the Jordan River bridges. Despite the severe economic situation, though, it apparently doesn't concern you that smuggling of millions of dollars goes on over the bridges. You are already resigned to that."

Diplomatic Immunity

Had the meat merchant not been caught, the large amount of money and the traveler's checks would have reached the Amman money market. There, there is someone who sees to it that it is exchanged for greenbacks. The dollars would be transmitted to another courier who would transport them back to the territories.

Dozens of trucks pass over the Jordan River bridges daily without inspection. And if a random check is made without advance information the customs agent is just wasting his time. The trucks return from Jordan empty. The strict security check over the bridge for entering trucks makes it impossible to conceal even one dollar. This is where the heads of the Christian churches of East Jerusalem, who enjoy diplomatic immunity, come to the aid of the money changers in exchange for a reasonable surcharge. They pass over the bridges in their cars, usually filled with every luxury...including dollars...without undergoing any inspection. Millions of dollars are smuggled each year from Israel via the Jordan bridges. The source of a large proportion of this money is tourism. A private businessman in Tel Aviv, Netanya or Bethelem, who deals with tourists, receives foreign currency cash as well as traveler's checks and credit cards for his merchandise. He puts a portion of the money in the bank in order to show tax officials a cash turnover. Another portion makes its way to the money changers, either directly or through the Tel Aviv money dealers. In return for cash, traveler's checks, and international credit card vouchers, the merchant receives greenbacks. In general, he loses about 7 percent of his money in the transaction. But, in fact his losses are minuscule compared with the net gain of 20 or 30 percent that would have ended up in the treasury as taxes.

Allocations from Husayn

The checks, the cash, the credit card vouchers make their way to Jordan. The larger part make their way back to the counters of the money changers and back into the market.

The "black" Israeli shekel which tax evaders use to buy dollars is transmitted to the money changers. They need Israeli shekels in order to supply them to residents of the territories who receive salaries, grants or allocations from the government of King Husayn in Jordanian dinars. They need Israeli shekels to carry out their daily business transactions. In this way, these shekels are passed along to Israeli dollar-holders who exchange them from time to time for Israeli money.

The Jordanian dinars which pile up with the money changers make their way back to Jordanian banks, and return green, with an American fragrance.

Several months ago, at the request of the Treasury, the Israel Police Force carried out a wide-ranging campaign to close down the illegal money changers. Today it is clear that this campaign was just for show and lasted only a few days. A money changer in East Jerusalem or in the territories has not yet been found who closed down his business in fear of the law or the police. Business continues to thrive, unregistered money changers finance their businesses, and black market money totaling millions of dollars flows through the money circuit propelled by the money changers.

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ISRAEL

GENERAL SHARON'S WIFE PROFILED

Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew 5 Apr 85 pp 17-19

[Article by Hannah Calderon: "First of All, His Wife"]

[Text] Lili Sharon, the wife of whom? It's easy to find her enemies. They speak about hypocrisy and feelings of animosity. Her admirers refer to a warm home and the cultivation of loyalty. Most people prefer to keep their mouths shut.

Quote:

"Sometimes when we have to go out to a function I look in a mirror with my critical eye and tell myself: 'Woman, stay home!' But generally I screw up my courage, dress nicely, put on make-up and thus get my confidence back."

Picture:

She walks in the fields. Her hair is gathered up. A well-tended face. Low high heels. A Ubersohn dress. In her hand, a large colorful straw hat. In her mouth, a piece of straw.

The Press:

Three interviews. One with LA'ISHA, one with 'OLAM HA'ISHA and the third with HA'OLAM HAZE on Arik, on being a woman, on plants, on cooking.

Lili Sharon tries as much as possible to avoid exposure. When people hear about mysteries, their curiosity increases. The first chapter in her life, before she married Ari'el Sharon 22 years ago, is hush-hush. She has released only a few fuzzy biographical details--about Lili Zimmerman from Brasov, Romania, a little girl from a religious household. The little girl immigrated to Israel somewhere in the early forties. She had two older sisters. They lived away from home. Lili and her parents settled in one of the townships near Haifa. She went to a religious elementary school and a public high school. In the evenings she studies drawing. In the IDF she served in the paratroopers, in Arik Sharon's battalion. In those days he was married to her sister Margalit, may she rest in peace. After her discharge from the service, she studied painting at the Avni Institute. After her sister Margalit was killed in a traffic accident, she took care of her son Gur and then married Arik. End of the story. Everything else is kept behind a wall of silence. Nearly 30 men and women asked not to talk about, not to refer to, not to touch

the subject of Lili Sharon. Some of them slammed down the telephone receiver as if it were on fire. Some of them took the trouble to warn that that was playing with fire. It should be noted that Lili Sharon, like Arik, has both friends and enemies.

A Day After the Accident

In the news clippings from that time, you can hardly find anything on the story of Margalit Sharon's death. Everything is extremely compact. In HA'ARETZ there is an obituary about Margalit Sharon, may she rest in peace, a day after the accident. It is very short, very much to the point and signed with initials. It said that Margalit studied at the agricultural institute at Magdiel and in the Yarkon school of nursing in Tel Aviv, that she was head nurse in two mental hospitals, in Nes Tziona, which now bears her name, and in Be'er Ya'aqov, that her last job was supervisor of mental health services in the Ministry of Health and that she left behind a 6-year old son.

Rivka Alyashiv of Magdiel was house mother at the agricultural institute adjoining the moshav. Every chord in her soul resounds with memories from there. From a plastic bag where she also keeps her identity card, she pulls out a small picture. In the middle is Olga, Lili's older sister, alongside a sewing machine. In the corner is Margalit with two braids across her chest, ironing. Rivka Alyashiv raised Margalit in her house. She does not call her "a loved and accepted child." Rather she describes her as "a strong girl, full of ambition, who devoted a lot of energy to her studies." Rivka Alyashiv also remembers Sharon from that time. "Arik, whose parents' orchards bordered on the institute's fence, worked for us as a Gadna instructor, and that's how they met. That is a fact which he tries to hide. I really do not understand why he claims at every opportunity that he met her later when she studied in Jerusalem. Actually it all began here in my house." Margalit Sharon continued to visit that house and the institute whenever she was in the area.

Lili Zimmerman was drafted into the service in 1955. Immediately after boot camp she was transferred to Tel Nof, the paratroop battalion under the command of her brother-in-law Arik. She served at his side as draftsman. After her discharge she joined the police, serving as assistant to the police artist for criminal identification on the national staff. Amlia Arbel, the owner of a gallery, was with her: "Lili and I worked together in one room for perhaps 3 years. She was always a pretty woman. When they did a police public relations film, they chose her to be the actress because she was a knockout. She really loved to paint and wasn't at all bad at it. She particularly liked to paint clothes and my legs. I promised her that if I should ever have a gallery, I would hold an exhibition of her work. I am still waiting."

A Collision with a Truck

In those days Lili Zimmerman wanted to be a painter. She enrolled in the regular 4-year course of study at the Avni Institute. Moshe Prufes, her painting instructor, says that "she was quite talented. She painted like everyone. Still-lifes, models, everything that you generally paint."

Acquaintances from that time remember Lili Zimmerman as having a very independent, careerist nature with Bohemian inclinations, who took her painting seriously--but, on the other hand, as one who devoted a lot of energy to nurturing her tie to Arik, through Gur. "She was crazy about the boy. She kept him as close to her as she could. She was a babysitter. She spoiled him. She loved him. And Arik would come to be with him and to take him home to Tzahala from her apartment in north Tel Aviv."

On 5 May 1962, on the road to Jerusalem, the car driven by Margalit Sharon, Lili's sister, collided with a truck coming in the opposite direction. A few months afterward, Lili and Arik got married. She moved to a house in Tzahala, on Joab Street. From then on she was at his side, with him, wherever possible.

In 1964 their older son Omri was born. A year later the family moved to Nahalal for 2 years. Sharon was making strenuous efforts to get out of the icebox into which he was placed after the Mitla battle of 1956. Nahalal, like Tzahala, is a small place. People see everything. They know everything. They gossip a lot, but not with reporters. On the record, for quotation, they say in Nahalal: "A young woman, full of vitality who loved to sing. She helped me plant lettuce. Very busy with cooking and especially with getting dressed up." The men add: "Sexy. Full in all the right places. She knew how to turn heads with her decolletage." Not for attribution, they will tell you in Nahalal: "A snake of a woman. Two-faced. She would make life miserable for the driver with her purchases. The most important thing to her was her appearance, externals, the "show." In the beginning she acted a bit like a dumb cow, but afterwards she learned when to keep her mouth shut. She always knew whom to befriend, how to exploit and how to compliment. She would leave the children with the neighbors a lot and go off with him. She would play the intellectual. If she read one book in the entire time that she was here, I am a flower pot." In Nahalal, too, they were afraid to be quoted.

The Tragedy

From Nahalal back to Tzahala, a woman following her husband who was studying law at the university and who had been made general in the capacity of head of the IDF training division. In the Six Day War, Sharon returned in glory following the big battle at Umm Kuttuf. But the public and private joy was cut short 4 months later. On the evening of Rosh Hashanah [the Jewish New Year], Gur, 11, was playing with an old rifle of his father's at the door of the house and discharged a bullet that struck him in the head. Arik, in the kitchen, heard the shot, ran with the boy in his arms to a neighbor who was a doctor and from there to Tel Shomer. In vain.

The daily newspaper reports were brief. Only HA'OLAM HAZE was more expansive: "With a career like that it is no wonder that Arik did not see how this quick, thin, dark-complexioned lad generally dissociated himself, despite everything, from his second mother, refusing to the very end to accept her or call her "mother." Instead, with much sympathy, he called her "Lili." His temperament grew more and more stormy. Gur let it all out by riding horses, running in the fields at the farm of his grandmother, Arik's mother, in Kfar Malal." It also wrote: "Although Lili treated him as a mother in every way, later even

officially adopting him, Gur refused to forget the memory of his first mother. He kept her things and frequently recalled the joint experiences that he had with Margalit."

Gur was buried alongside his mother's grave in Qiryat Sha'ul. Over her grave was placed a large unplaned black stone. Her name is written on the left side in hard angular letters. Her first name appears inside the family name. Gur's marker is small and white, sculpted in soft lines. Abstract, it brings to mind the upper half of a boy's body. It lies within a completely green surface. Alongside the sculpture is a vase of fresh flowers. On the black stone there are none.

The Umm Kutuf victory won Sharon appointment as general of the southern command. The family moved to Be'ersheva, to a house in the Rosco-Hatzerim neighborhood. There the second son, Gilead, was born. They would not go back to the house in Tzahala. Betzal'el Mizrahi fixed this house up for them. Yig'al Tumarqin tells how he one day he traveled together with Betzal'el Mizrahi to an armor exercise. "He cried on my shoulder the whole way about how Lili was driving him and the workers up the wall. She would berate them to the point that they didn't want to work. Every time they would walk out and he would have to ask them to come back. Betzal'el brought her maybe 15 different kinds of handles for the patio doors, and she didn't like any of them. Finally she found something, they agreed and he put it on. The next day after, she visiting friends in the evening, she saw something else and again asked him to change everything. As far as I can tell, the renovation of that house cost them about as much as a new house." Betzal'el Mizrahi denied it all the minute he heard who it was about.

With the painful news about the loss of any hope of becoming chief of staff because the appointment went to Dado, Bar-Lev's candidate, Sharon entered the ring of high politics. He joined the Liberal party, obtained a membership card for himself and Lili and devoted all his energy to uniting all the parties of the right within the framework of Likud. This was 3 months before the Yom Kippur war broke out. Overnight Lili Sharon became the wife of a politician instead of the wife of a general. She didn't yet understand the new playing field. It would take her several years and many hours in the corridors. Meanwhile, in an interview, in response to the question "Whom did you vote for in the last elections?", she answered: "I really don't remember. I wasn't political minded. I voted for the person Arik told me to vote for."

The sharp transition was interrupted by the war. Lili found ways of her own to assume part of the burden. She would gather worried wives of officer friends in her house and deal with their problems as she knew how. Sharon's telephone reports from the battle fields became common property and increased or decreased their anxiety according to the half hints and the tone of voice. In order to spoil her husband at the front, Lili made sure to fill his car with sausage, cheese and other snacks. She carried out her mission successfully, and Sharon, stuck in his car, left it to her to brief reporters and arrange trips to see him.

She also talked. She gave an interview to Bruria Avidan-Brir in LA'ISHA. "I don't mind being a kind of western geisha...when you are Arik's wife, you want

to be his geisha...when he would come home, he would settle down in his favorite easy chair. I would take off his shoes, light his cigar, bring him a drink and put on whatever record he asked for..." And "we need three Ariks--one for the army, one for politics and for the house, for me and the children." On other occasions she would repeat the sentence: "The children and I belong to Arik and follow him. For me, anything apart from Arik is secondary."

In an interview in LA'ISHA, she said things that would come back to her 10 years later in a different version addressed elsewhere: "I want to say what is in my heart with regard to the incident of the memorial services at the temporary graveyard. I don't think it was right, to express myself politely, that the heads of state were not there. What were they afraid of? It was clear to Arik that he had to be there. It closed the circle. You go with young men into battle and then you don't have the conscience or the courage to look the bereaved parents in the eye. A commander doesn't finish his duty on the battlefield. He finishes it at the memorial service, in the heavy, difficult moments."

Toward the end of his military service as general of the southern command, Sharon found the farm he had dreamed about. Almost 5 years went by before the multi-leveled villa was built, the yard prepared and the outer wall set up. Those 5 years were spent in Rehovot, the last temporary stopover. Each time Lili would set up house all over again, and, according to guests, it was warm and pleasant and full of good taste. With all that, she managed to develop a network of women friends and the image of the elegant lady, dressed according to the dictates of high fashion, with lots of thought, lots of energy and lots of money. Fashion designer Lula Bar was among the first to merit her frequent visits to Tel Aviv. They became friends then. However her taste, apparently, was too conservative for Lili. "No hard feelings," says Lula Bar. "I am a professional. I don't mix friendship and work. I understand that Jerry Melitz attracts her more. She and I today have three things in common: clothes, love for flowers and appreciation of Arik."

Broken Ties

Before she landed conclusively at the Jerry Melitz studio, there was a brief Rosy ben Yosef period. The ornament of the rich. There she made friends with several veterans of the "Club of the Left." Gila Almagor became a devoted friend, along with her husband Ya'akov Agmon and also Hedda Bosem. Yig'al Tumarqin was also briefly in the area. "Lili," he says, "is a vulgar woman. She doesn't let anyone talk. She doesn't know how to listen to anyone other than her man. You can see on her that she has read all the "How to" paperbacks. She always tries to speak about art, what stupidities. I will never forget the meeting in the room of the millionaire Sam Zaks, a mutual acquaintance. They had just gotten back from the United States and were visiting in Riqlis's room. Arik said: 'What a pervert that guy is. I opened his drawer and found a pink vibrator!' Then Lili gave him a very meaningful look and said: 'Isn't it true, Arik, that we don't need that sort of thing?' I hate her, that vulgarity. I will never forget how once she took leave of our friend Rina Zaks and shouted to her: 'Don't forget a pair of Puccis.' They would always bring Lili Pucci panties."

"What was always important to her was how to be inconspicuous when she came in. To be dressed well without attracting attention..."

The breaking of ties for political reasons has occurred often in the last few years. She did not forgive Gila Almagor for appearing during the Lebanon war on a platform covered with signs: "Arik is a murderer." She also didn't forgive her close friend Sara Sela, the wife of Professor Mikha'el Sela from the Weizmann Institute, for inviting a Palestinian from the occupied territories to speak to Institute people. Afterwards she didn't forgive her for not denying the press reports that Sharon attended a party at her place the evening after the tragedy at Tyre. Lili Sharon is now beginning to forgive Batya Disenchik, the wife of Ido Disenchik of MA'ARIV, for his attacks on Sharon over Lebanon.

A former friend, who refuses to be identified, says that Lili is the queen of accountants. "She doesn't forget who did what and she doesn't forget for children what their parents did--to the fourth generation. Once you hurt her, you are burned. You may as well move to Alaska. There is no forgiveness. But if you simply fell out of favor, you may get back in, according to circumstances."

With Jerry Melitz, the fashion designer, they say that there are strong mutual ties of dependence. She became his designer. For 12 years now he is the only one who dresses her and is a close friend: "Batya Disenchik came and said that she wanted to bring the wife of Arik Sharon, and I asked her who was Arik Sharon. You see I don't mind admitting my stupidity. I never got into politics and never knew anything about patriotism."

Melitz finds it very important to explain that the tie between them is not just on the matter of clothes. "That is the smallest part of the story. She is a woman who finds everything esthetic important. She has to know that everything around her is pretty. You should have seen her when she came the first time, how confused and shy and lacking in confidence. Just the opposite of what they try to make of her. What I like about her is that when she orders a dress, she will relate to the pictures, to the flowers arranged on the table. She is that kind of person and I understand it. Every corner in her garden has the feminine touch. I am sure that even to her maid she would set out the food in a nice arrangement, with a napkin. She has excellent taste that is continuously developing. She is not a great artist, but it gives her the tools to judge. Whether you believe me or not, she dresses in a very understated way. What is very important to her is that she be inconspicuous when she comes in. To be dressed well without attracting attention. She has no favorite colors. Sometimes she will have a black period, then she won't be able to stand black. She is very open to fashion. The same with flowers. I can't point to any flower that is a particular favorite. She loves them all. What is important to her in clothes? What Arik will say if she and I are agreed on something, and what the children will say. She has a friend, a very fashion-minded lady in London, Jane, and she also thinks about what Jane would say. Those are the people and that's the order. What I like about Lili is that she will never do something simply because it is expected of her. That is why she doesn't head any philanthropic organization. I know all the big ladies in the country with their hypocrisy

and their terrible boredom and their feigned image. She isn't like that. I find, personally, that it is getting harder for her with all this political exposure. She would like to stay at home and tend the garden, cook and host guests, but since she took it upon herself to be his wife, she will be with him to the end. That is very important to Arik as far as I know. It is a kind of support for the man, if you understand what that means."

--It sounds very dependent.

"There is a certain family thing between them, a kind of strong sense of humor. I find it hard to imagine that Arik could get that particular aspect from anyone else on his staff. She doesn't go to work with him. She doesn't go to the office or to government sessions or to election gatherings. She goes to places that a man would go with his wife. There are women who sit at home and manage their husbands' offices from there. I know at least two like that.

"There is a lot of hypocrisy in the attitudes toward her. One day the Defense Minister of Zaire was to arrive. Because Lili was hosting his wife, I suggested doing a little fashion show in my house. As the gods would have it, the day before they published the results of the Kahan commission report. Among the guests was Leah Rabin, who came to the show without anyone forcing her. The invitations went out from the minister's office. Two days later I read in the paper that a female reporter at the show asked her: 'What are you doing here? Are you a friend of Lili's, too?' She replied: 'No. Jerry invited me.' That was an absolute lie. That's an example of the way people behave. Nice to your face, but the minute you turn your back they slander you. If they want to attack Arik, that's legitimate, he's a political figure. But she isn't."

Oil On the Impulses

Lili Sharon is very much a political person. In her own peculiar way, but very much to the point. And not always passive. Together with him she got her membership card in the Liberal party. Together they founded the Shlomtzion party in which she was one of the outstanding personalities. And together with him, she moved to Herut. Not to mention her continuous presence in election campaigns, lectures and press conferences and in the TV studios. Not just to bring him water or straighten his tie. Also to advise. Actually at first she didn't find her place very easily in those matters, but she quickly mastered them. During the election campaigns, by the way, in an interview for 'OLAM HA'ISHA, Arik Sharon said: "Lili is a pretty woman, but she doesn't have to be so gentle. She is now taking a course in how to be hard-nosed. She is learning to shoot for self-defense."

There are no differences of opinion between them. There is a difference in nuance with regard to Gush Emunim. She is much closer to them than he is and appreciates their way of doing things. Her control of things makes her an important source for reporters. Often, when Arik was not around, she would brief them, react, provide background. She is still quiet when surrounded by flash bulbs, microphones and cameras. A former close friend says that "if it were not for Lili, Arik would not be the way he is. She serves as a catalyst for his worst traits. On the one hand she adores him, and that would flatter

any man with a low ego, and, on the other, she is not at all critical. She is an evil woman who fans the fire and throws oil on his impulses. She will tell him: 'That guy is a swine, a jerk, a bastard.' That's her language. She is an earthy person, primitive, with strong feelings.

"Anyone in the household knows that you don't argue with Lili. With him you can argue and move on a professional level. With her, there is no professionalism. She will come and say about someone: 'Shouldn't he be shot?' If whoever she is talking to doesn't say: 'You're right,' she will tell Arik that evening not to trust him. She can say about good, serious people--Who is this guy that Arik should talk to him? She puts everyone down. Even those who can help. When she doesn't accompany him on tour, he will pick up the phone wherever he is and tell her what is going on. In the minister's office, when they put out the schedule for the following week, she gets a copy. She will never miss an opportunity to be near him. When Arik asks: 'How was I?' she has to be the one to tell him: 'You were divine.' She throws herself on him, caresses him on the back of the neck and says: 'You were marvelous.' Everyone around her hates her and kisses her ass: 'How beautiful you are,' 'What a pretty dress.'

"Their world is divided into two: our camp and the enemies, us and all the rest. Their camp gathers on Fridays in the Tel Aviv office at 2:00. She goes to all the meetings in which they decide whom to attack, whom to come down hard on, how to advance Arik's career. There is no meeting of this sort without her. If they are going to talk about a new document on Israeli-Jordanian relations, she won't be there. She'll stay with Melitz. But if next week we are going to attack Peres for his lack of defense experience, then you can be sure that she'll be there."

Ariela Kish, the former wife of Michael Kish, the director of "Protarum," has been her closest friend for the last 20 years. Kish, who works today in the aviation industry promoting marketing for the defense network, is from a Revisionist home. They were neighbors in Tzahala. "I had a daughter who died at 6 from a tumor in her head. I was in very bad straits. She would come, open the windows and force me to get out of the house. She didn't let me be alone. I had other friends, but she displayed so much humanity and warmth. We have been close ever since. We traveled together abroad. She took me to exhibits and concerts and, of course, shopping. Every day we talk on the phone. I go often to the farm, and we get together every time when she is in Tel Aviv. We make appointments together with Jerry Melitz. I consult with her before I order things from him.

"At Jerry's we talk, drink, gossip and, among other things, choose clothes. The two of them banter back and forth. Jerry sometimes gets angry at her for mixing into his business. She has a sharp tongue and knows how to give it back. I sit there and don't stop laughing. I guess I'm their audience."

Ariela Kish is often the audience for Arik and Lili as a couple, too. In the days of "Shlomtzion," she became intensely involved in the activity together with them, despite her opinions on the question of "the entire Land of Israel." In the beginning Lili was against the withdrawal from Likud, but when Arik insisted she stopped opposing it. Kish says: "What impressed me

greatly was her heavy involvement. She would travel with Arik everywhere. I would come along and see her in action. I joined them in the last election campaign, too, in order to see how the people love Arik. They had a hard time getting us out."

When Sharon was appointed Minister of Agriculture in the first stage of the Likud government, Kish became the head of his office. "I see myself as a good friend of Arik's, too, despite the fact that there is no separate tie between us. Everything is through Lili. Arik is always telling how he met me 20 years ago at Modai's house in Haifa. Arik was then a dashing, head-turning officer with greying hair and the face of a poet, of a Greek god. He is always reminding me how I approached him, batting my eyes. We really get a charge out of that. There is a man-woman relationship between us based on humor. When I wear a new dress, he will react: 'What a pretty dress, Arieleke. That's what Lili calls me, too. He's always attentive to things like that."

The more controversial Ari'el Sharon became, the more the farm became a place of refuge, a place for only those who were really wanted. In the first years a tradition developed of a "kumsitz" [informal gathering, usually with sing-along and, perhaps, guitar/accordion/harmonica accompaniment] on Lag Beomer [the 33rd day after Passover, a joyful interlude in a somewhat solemn 50-day period]. Everyone who was invited knew that "he was not there." The military plus Bohemians. Watermelons and lamb shish-kabob. A guitar and songs of the Land of Israel. A feeling of belonging. Over the years the number of invitees diminished. Today they only have modest birthday parties for members of the family. Two months ago, when Arik turned 55, Lili arranged a surprise party for him and a cake with chocolate icing in the shape of the entire Land of Israel. Sharon refused to cut the icing. He won't cut the Land of Israel even in jest.

A Spiked Version Called a "Lili Cocktail"

Lili Sharon has no friends among the wives of the ministers and cabinet members. She did not take upon herself any philanthropic activity when Sharon was appointed minister of defense. Reuma Weizmann, Leah Rabin, Mikhal Modai, Ruth Dayan and even Sonya Peres do that sort of thing. Lili Sharon does not.

Everyone invited to the farm is given a splendid reception and a tour of the flower-filled yard, the fields, the stables, the chicken coop and the large, white-plastered house. On the lower floor is a large kitchen in Italian peasant style with pots from the days of Arik's grandmother. In the huge parlor, the flowers are overpowering. Vases everywhere. In front of the fireplace are two identical beige easy chairs. One is Arik's, with a small hassock for his feet, and one is for Lili. The glass table sports an expensive service.

When it is hot outside, you will get cold water with slices of lemon and mint, and an unforgettable flavor. There is also a spiked version called a "Lili cocktail." When Lili isn't there or doesn't care to do it herself, you will get your refreshment prepared by Kokhava, who has been on the farm for 12 years. She lives in Shderot. Lili always introduces her as her daughter even

though the difference in age between them is slight. Kokhava's son Kubi is already over his army service and works as Arik's driver.

A complete wall in the living room is devoted to family pictures. Arik's grandfathers and grandmothers. Arik's parents at historic moments. Arik with famous people and a picture of Lili's parents in their youth. According to Sarogsti in HA'OLAM HAZE who spent some time at the wall, there isn't a single picture of Margalit. Nevertheless there is a picture of Gur at the entrance, on a black cupboard. Besides Kokhava, there are a lot of workers around the house, who know their place and their work. In addition to them, there is also the boxer Itamar and the parrot, which Sharon once said was a planted microphone.

On the second floor there is a workroom for Lili and bedrooms. None of her pictures hang in the house despite the fact that she continues to paint. Their final resting place, as she said in an interview is: "under the bed. I hardly show them to anyone. They are a kind of personal experience that come out of me and return to me. After all, through paintings you can get into a person's soul."

One of the people who had frequented the house in the past speaks of the arguments. "One day she gave him two apples and said: 'You are eating this today, for your diet.' He immediately threw them out, bought himself a huge pizza, and, while eating it, said: 'I'll show you, I'll show you.' At night, when we got to the farm, he would steal into the kitchen and finish off the sausage. The arguments were generally about his diet or why he was unwilling to stop at the seamstress' to leave off a dress. What really drives him up the walls is that she is always late. She never finishes getting dressed on time."

9794

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ISRAEL

TOURISM AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 31 Mar 85 p 7

[Article by Dan Arkin: "Organized Tours to Czechoslovakia Will Depart Israel Soon--Histour Signed a Tourism Agreement with the Prague Administration"]

[Text] After protracted efforts which dragged on for 2 years, the Histour Company has succeeded in reaching agreement with the government of Czechoslovakia to run the first organized tour of its kind to Czechoslovakia for Israelis.

The group will leave for Czechoslovakia on 19 May and participate in memorial ceremonies for survivors of Theresienstadt, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of this ghetto by the Soviet army.

The director general of Histour, Herzl Shalem, told MA'ARIV that entry visas had been obtained for 50 Israelis and that they would reach Prague by air via Vienna. According to him, this is an important breakthrough because, up to now, Czechoslovakia had not permitted organized excursions by Israeli tourists.

Czechoslovakia, in contrast to other communist countries such as Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania, makes it difficult for visitors to enter the country and still does not have a large tourist flow, though it is interested in encouraging tourism in order to increase foreign exchange income.

It should be noted that prices in Czechoslovakia are not exorbitant and are comparable to tourist prices in other Eastern Bloc countries.

12884
CSO: 4423/39

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

CISKEI MINISTERS VISIT--Fourteen Ciskei pilots have recently been trained in Israel. This was divulged yesterday by Chief (Zulu), Ciskei transport minister, in a news conference marking the end of a week-long visit in Israel. The guest said his government appealed to South Africa, requesting it to train pilots for developing aerial transportation in Ciskei. The answer received was: "How are you going to fly planes when you cannot even drive a car yet?" Ciskei's transport minister visited Israel along with (Ray Mali), a minister without portfolio. During their visit they met representatives of Israeli companies in order to acquire knowledge for development purposes in their country. Shortly Ciskei will launch internal aerial lines, and it has been learned that the guests held talks with the "Arkia" company for the operation of these lines. Chief (Zulu) said that during his visit he held no meetings with ministers or top officials in order not to embarrass the Israeli Government, which does not officially recognize the South African Protectorate. (Ray Mali), who is secretary general of the Ciskei National Independence Party and former foreign affairs minister, said that at present there are approximately 200 Israelis in Ciskei, who greatly enhanced the development of his country. [By Nehama Duwek] [Text] [Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 5 Jun 85 p 7]

CSO: 4400/162

LEBANON

PRO-SYRIAN LEADER OFFERS ANALYSIS OF SITUATION IN SOUTH

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 3-9 Apr 85 p 17

[Interview with In'am Ra'd, Former Chairman of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, by Ilyas Harfush: "The Resistance in the South Has Evolved into a People's War Embracing All Areas and Factions"]

[Text] AL-MAJALLAH met with Mr In'am Ra'd, the former chairman of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (its current chairman is Mr 'Isam al-Mahayiri) and the dean of the party's foreign department. Ra'd had taken part in the London festivals the Committee of Solidarity with Southern Lebanon had organized, and he gave a talk in which he concentrated on the nationalist nature of the national resistance in southern Lebanon and the strategic change the resistance's operations in the south had succeeded in creating in Israeli political and military decisionmaking. This meeting with In'am Ra'd was in the context of the escalation of Israeli strikes against civilians in villages in the south and in the wake of the secessionist movement which Samir Ja'ja' had led against the leadership of the Phalange Party and President Amin al-Jumayyil's policy of alliance with the Syrians. What makes the conversation with Ra'd in these circumstances significant is that his party is one of the elements taking part in the operations the nationalist resistance is carrying out against the Israeli occupation forces; of these, Ra'd told AL-MAJALLAH, "The Nationalists are carrying out more than half." The Nationalist Party is also participating in the National Democratic Front which contains Lebanese parties and organizations which sympathize with the Syrian leadership, such as the Socialist Progressive Party (Walid Jumblat), the Ba'th Party, the Communist Party and so forth. The AMAL movement, under the command of the minister Nabih Birri, is considered a basic ally of this front.

AMAL and Others

In his conversation with AL-MAJALLAH, In'am Ra'd praised the AMAL movement and the prominent role it is playing in the south. He said, "The AMAL movement made two contributions to the resistance operations, during the domestic upheaval in the southern suburbs (he meant the events of 6 February 1984 which ended with the abrogation of the 17 May agreement) and the victorious battle of Beirut. From the suburbs there was a warm reception for the young

people of the south and electricity was provided for the villages of the south through the resistance's operations. Although AMAL's role in this context is major, there are other parties such as the Hizbullah, the Nasirist organizations and so forth. The spiritual leaders of the Shiite faction in Lebanon are honored to have pointed people in the direction of resistance to the occupation, and the al-Husaynis have become targets of the enemy's bombs. However, the phenomenon of resistance has become a general one, and the parties participating in the execution of resistance operations against the Israelis are refraining from declaring their role in order that the resistance will appear in its true form, that is, the form of a comprehensive people's resistance. It is not an exaggeration for us to say that this resistance has shifted to a people's war, which the enemy had not prepared itself for. It is a war of attrition in which the enemy has been compelled to withdraw under the burden of the actions of the resistance." Ra'd pointed out that a political decision existed to effect coordination between the bodies taking part in the resistance operations, but there was no single body leading the operations. Many operations were taking place on the ground in which various parties were taking part.

Concerning the Israeli and Western media's emphasis on the Shiites' basic role in the resistance operations against Israel and the extent to which that is valid, Ra'd said "We are proud that this segment of our people has acquired the competence, by its religious upbringing, to be at this level of combat and perseverance. However, there is a fact which must not be absent from one's mind, which is that there are members of the ideological parties taking part in the resistance operations, including the National Party, who are Shiites from the areas of the south and the al-Biqa'. In this sense, the resistance has embraced all areas and all factions. An Israeli scheme lies behind the description given to the resistance, which is that it is Shiite. The enemy deals with us as factions, not as a nation and a people. It wants to say now that it has a quarrel with a single faction, just as it said in the past that it had made a reconciliation with a single faction. However, the fact is that just as the war against the Israelis now is a people's war embracing all factions, their former peace included parties from all factions."

The Socialist Party

Mr In'am Ra'd talked about the role the Progressive Socialist Party played in the resistance under the chairmanship of Minister Walid Jumblat. He said, "The Socialist Party led the struggles of resistance against Phalangist hegemony which was launched from the mountain. We consider that this party's position on the dominant rule by the Phalange coincides with the positions of the national resistance against Israel. The Israeli enemy would not have kept going had it not been for its Lebanese ally, which sought to rule through it, and the Lebanese ally would not have kept going had it not been for Israeli support." Ra'd refused to comment on press news coming in from Israel that the Israeli army was not opposed to having the Druzes take over the positions it would evacuate in the eastern sector and in Mount al-Baruk and said, "I cannot comment on news I have not read." (This news had been published in the Lebanese papers, and no reaction to it was expressed by the Socialist Progressive Party.)

Referring to Syria's role in supporting the Lebanese nationalist resistance, Mr In'am Ra'd said, "Syria moved all its forces in to support the resistance in the two forms it took when it rose up against the regime of hegemony in 1983 and confronted the NATO fleet and fought against the Israeli occupation. Had it not been for the Syrian hinterland, our people's resistance would have been surrounded on all sides. I can make a strong reference to the day we went to President Hafiz al-Asad in Damascus after the enemy's departure from Beirut. In the midst of this major military setback, and the invasion which the enemy had considered had achieved its designs, he said, 'We and you are deeply rooted in this land. Israel reached its farthest limit in invading Beirut. From now on out, it will be compelled to retreat. The important thing is that the banner of the national resistance rise and keep going. We will support you and we have prepared ourselves, if the situation requires and the enemy launches an attack on Damascus to prevent you from persevering and resisting and Damascus faces destruction. Damascus is not in a better state than Beirut. Our insistence is of this order, and the important thing is that you persevere and fight. We are on your side in this struggle. Be assured that in less than 2 years the balance will change in favor of our people's struggle.'"

The South from the Political and Security Standpoints

We asked Mr In'am Ra'd about his notion of the condition of the south from the political and security standpoints, if the Israeli decision to withdraw is correct and is carried out on the basis of the Israeli plan in 10 weeks. He replied, "The example of Sidon almost became a model of the unity of Lebanon. The enemy spread the fear that the withdrawal from Sidon would lead to factional massacres, but the situation in Sidon and the area surrounding it has been marked by wise combative national unity among the leaders of all the factions, since it has become apparent that the elimination of the occupation is of the greatest benefit. Here is where Israel's gamble on agents lay and this is also why Samir Ja'ja''s movement occurred in the eastern sections."

Ja'ja''s Movement

On the subject of Samir Ja'ja''s movement, In'am Ra'd said "The answer to that must be a national one, because it does not concern the Christians alone. The radical answer in its comprehensive organizational format to the movement of Ja'ja' and his comrades, and every reactionary movement, is the correct one. The National Democratic Front constitutes a proper nucleus for this response, in coordination with the AMAL movement and all nationalists of various factions." Ra'd pointed out that his party, as well the other parties which were allied with Syria, made a distinction between Ja'ja''s movement and the policy President Amin al-Jumayyil followed. He said, "It is necessary to make a distinction between a government, whatever the motives for its position might be, whether that is to preserve the gains of power or has been the result of a change in conviction as the result of a change in data and relative strength, and he has proceeded on the basis of a conciliatory Arab option, notwithstanding all the observations we have about this option. At this point, President Amin al-Jumayyil, in our view, has detached himself from the original Phalangist plan. We do not call Ja'ja''s movement

a rebellion. This movement is the legitimate offspring of the Phalange Party. Here is where the serious nature of this phenomenon lies, and the serious nature of the conviction some people hold that if Fadi Ifram is replaced by Fu'ad Abu Nadir, the situation will be reversed."

Mr Ra'd asserted that a large segment of the Christians in Lebanon have washed their hands of this separatist orientation, especially after the protection of the Christians which the Lebanese Forces allege turned into a slaughter of the Christians after the events in the battles of the mountain which Samir Ja'ja' himself led. Ra'd pointed out "Christian public opinion cannot side with a movement such as Ja'ja's unless it is pushed to do so because of unsound factional reactions. We believe that the Phalangist plan could have been eliminated but frankly the national democratic plan was not established on the ground with the requisite speed and vitality."

In'am Ra'd concluded by asserting that there was no truth to the news that has circulated concerning plans for a confederation between Lebanon and Syria and security treaties between the two countries. He said that the exploitation of these rumors as a justification for Ja'ja's movement was suspicious. However, he added "We see no harm in the establishment of security or economic agreements between Lebanon and Syria. All countries, including large ones and ones with a lengthy past, have the tendency of establishing those with their neighbors. This must be studied objectively, because sovereign countries which have confidence in their own strength are not afraid of this sort of integration and conclude agreements with all countries from a position of strength, not from a position of fear and weakness."

11887
CSO: 4404/344

LEBANON

INTERRELATIONSHIPS IN 'AYN AL-HULWAH CAMP REVIEWED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 3-9 Apr 85 pp 22-25

[Article by Zaki Shihab: "The 'Ayn Al-Hulwah Camp: The Intersection between the Officialdom of Lebanon and the Officialdom of Palestine"]

[Text] Everyone who is afraid of possible explosions after the Israeli withdrawal from Sidon and its outlying areas thinks in a similar way. Palestinians and Lebanese are alike in this regard. Therefore, the Palestine Liberation Organization is asking the international emergency forces to protect the Palestinian camps which, according to the organization's legal interpretation, are entitled to international protection. Some people in the Lebanese government are also requesting the deployment of emergency forces in the area north of the al-Litani river, and as a reason for that raise the fear that the armed factional communities, which have been closed off to one another, will suddenly and without preparation be opened up to the world of swift uncontrolled intermingling. Perhaps on this point specifically the two crossroads of the officialdom of Lebanon and the officialdom of Palestine intersect!

However, a tour through the 'Ayn al-Hulwah camp, which is connected to Sidon, does not give the impression that the inhabitants of the camp are thinking of the international emergency forces or other forces so much as of protecting themselves through internal cohesion and the alignment of positions with decisionmakers in Sidon. This is the most conspicuous political view as far as everything one hears from the inhabitants of the camp is concerned.

A foreign correspondent went into the 'Ayn al-Hulwah camp situated in the Sidon area, went to the home of a people's committee member and asked "I would like to hear the views of all the political groups here -- the opinions of Abu 'Ammar, Abu Musa, Habash, Hawatimah and Jabril." The owner of the home answered him: "You came at the right time," and proceeded to introduce him to a group of persons present: "This is Abu 'Ammar, this is Abu Musa, this is Habash and so forth." The correspondent was surprised to find that all these organizations' representatives in the camp were sitting with one another in an ordinary atmosphere and all talking with him as people in one camp who had the same demands, the same views of problems and the same

ways of dealing with them. That person had come to the camp with a picture in his mind of Palestinians whose orientations were so disparate that news had it that it was expected that a Palestinian-Palestinian clash would be the first spark among all the conflicts and other dangers in the Lebanese and non-Lebanese contexts.

Everyone who visited the city of Sidon or followed the news of the Israeli withdrawal from the Sidon area related the story of the foreign correspondent and the impression he had brought, in addition to other images, although the truth was wholly the opposite. From the northern entrance to the camp, at the bridge where a number of soldiers from the Lebanese army were standing, to the center of the camp, activity seemed normal to them, and indeed brisk. The camp had not experienced the likes of that since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon began -- young men meeting in circles, chattering and laughing, children playing soccer in spite of a light drizzle, the streets of the camp filled with holes which in turn had turned into bogs, and an old woman saying "For a long time we have been waiting for a day like this. God willing we will see the enemy evacuating all the occupied territory in the near future."

A young man in his twenties approached me, stating "If you need help, I am ready to offer it to you." I accepted, and asked him to direct me to a member of the people's committee in the camp. He nodded, answering "Yes." The young man added, "I believe that the committee is now meeting in the home of one of the members, and in a few minutes we will be in their midst."

We continued our progress, and entered a lane leading to the home of the people's committee member, 'Abd Muqdihi. The young person excused himself and asked me to wait a moment, so that he could inform the people meeting in the home of the subject. One of them, in the company of the young man, rushed up to me and gave a greeting: "Please come in, welcome." We entered the home, where eight people were scattered about -- all the members of the people's committee in the camp. They asked about the purpose of my visit to the camp, and I said, "To seek information about the situation and to learn the truth of the rumors going around about the occurrence of some problems and disturbances in which the camp is playing a specific part."

At this point the person whose home it was interrupted and said, before beginning the discussion, "Let us have some tea, and let us introduce you to the people present. We are not divulging any secrets if we say that we here in this room represent the most prominent currents on the Lebanese stage. Our brother, for example, represents Abu 'Ammar, another represents Abu Musa, and the others represent the Democratic [Front], the General Command, al-Sa'iqa and the People's [Democratic Front]. We are working here on an equal footing, discussing the general situation, and we are also in constant contact with influential people of Sidon."

The Representative of the Democratic [Front]

Abu Sa'id Murad, people's committee representative of the Democratic Front, was called on by his colleagues to give a picture of the Palestinian situation in Sidon, and he said:

"We as Palestinians in the 'Ayn Hilwah camp and in the Sidon area are fully aware of the scope of the Israeli scheme which calls for the trumping-up of factional and regional problems in the area. Israel through its commanders' statements and through its stooge agents who are tied to Israeli policy has constantly tried to spread the rumor that there are problems which will occur between the Palestinians and the Lebanese, as well as between the Moslems and the Christians. We defined our position from the beginning, and said that we could not be drawn into such a scheme and would deprive the Israeli enemy of the opportunity. We as Palestinians have had the honor of starting to make contact with influential Lebanese in order to give them a clear picture of the Palestinian position, and regardless of the oppression and terror carried out against us by Israel and the people connected with them, specifically the Lebanese forces which have stripped our camps and kidnapped our young people, killing many of them, confiscated the possessions of some others, driven out our people, and turned the Islamic cemetery into a soccer field after stripping off the graves, regardless of all these practices, we got in touch with our brother Mustafa Sa'd, the secretary general of the Nasirist people's organization before he was wounded, with his eminence the mufti of Sidon, Shaykh Salim Jalal-al-Din, Dr Nazih al-Bizri, the deputy of Sidon, Mr Ahmad al-Kalash, the mayor, and other influential persons, as well as holding meetings with the Lebanese government as represented by the governor, Halim Fayyad, and meetings with the mayors and chiefs of neighboring Islamic and Christian villages, and defined our position in the following points:

"First, we, as Palestinians, are not factionalists and our history bears witness to that. If we had been, how would we have accepted such Christian leaders as George Habash, Nayif Hawatimah, Father Iliya Khuri and other brothers at the head of the pyramid of the organization? If we had been, we should have slaughtered, or started to slaughter, our Christian leaders. However, history bears witness that we are against factionalism, and we have asserted to our Christian brothers that we will not commit aggression against anyone in this area, whatever his faction may be. But at the same time we will not allow anyone to commit aggression against us.

"Second, our position toward the Lebanese government never was and never will be one of hostility. We welcomed the Lebanese army which came to deploy itself on every piece of land from which the Israeli forces of occupation withdrew, and consequently we ask conversely to be given suitable human treatment, to be permitted freedom to move about and to be given work permits.

"Third, freedom of political affiliation: we, as Palestinians, are humans, and we have our political orientations and ideas, which we are supposed to express through political affiliations. These are some of the things which the Lebanese government must take into consideration.

"As far as the Palestinian position goes, we do not deny that we are among the Sidon national decisionmakers in this area, we commit ourselves to the decisions nationalist Sidon makes and we will not take a position which is independent of the Sidon national position. Now that the Israeli withdrawal from the Sidon area has taken place, the Lebanese army has gone into

positions in the area and occupied new positions, and there is joy in the hearts of all the people there. We as Palestinians have felt that a fraternal army now exists for the sake of spreading about security and stability in this area. The internal Palestinian position in the Sidon area is united, and there are no political or ideological disputes. We as Palestinians cannot be against ourselves in any way and trump up any problem among ourselves, and we will continue to be like this until returning to our own land."

Before 1982

On the fears which are being spread about concerning Palestinian preparations to open armed centers which will be similar to what prevailed before 1982, Abu Sa'id Murad said, "We are against any armed manifestations in the area, whether in the Palestinian context or in the Lebanese one. We are against the opening of any offices or centers. We are also against the armed men who came in with Israel."

Abu Muhammad Qasim, FATAH's representative in the people's committee, answered a question on the possibility that skirmishes might take place between loyalists and opponents of the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasir 'Arafat, by saying, "There is no intention to have a dispute with any Palestinian, whether he is a supporter or opponent of the policy of the chairman of the organization's executive committee. We here as Palestinians in the Sidon area are acting with a single hand and in a single rank. The media attack which is trying to disparage our struggles has no basis in actual circumstances."

Rizq Salih, Abu 'Atif, the Popular [Front]'s representative in the committee, talked in turn to AL-MAJALLAH about the future of Palestinian action in the Sidon area following Israel's withdrawal and said, "We consider the Sidon area, after the withdrawal of Israel, to be an area of political and mass action, being among the nationalist men in the street in Sidon with all their political and mass movements, and we have thousands of students and workers here. As a consequence, these people must be part of union organizations which are in general frameworks for ordering our domestic conditions and pursuing all the social issues and problems which our people are suffering from. In the political context, our Palestinian people must have political expression, embodied in total loyalty to and affiliation with the Palestine Liberation Organization. In the military sense, we consider that the Sidon area is not a military area and that any struggle or conflict against Israel will take place in the first stage within the struggle alongside the national resistance front to evict the occupying forces and invaders from all Lebanese territory."

'Abd Muqdih, al-Sa'iqah's representative in the people's committee of the camp, talked about living conditions in the camp and said "The Israeli occupation has had a great effect in creating problems and disturbances for our people in the camp in particular. Moreover, the things the occupation brought to prominence have played a greater role in preventing thousands of Palestinians from earning a sustenance by the sweat of their brow by depriving them of work outside the camp context. All this constitutes one of the

basic factors which have reduced job opportunities. Most of the young people in the camp were imprisoned in the Ansar prison, and our old men, women and children bear great responsibility for earning a livelihood. Thanks to our struggle and the struggle of the Lebanese brothers and the people in the national resistance, the occupying forces have withdrawn. We are optimistic about good things in the near future which without a doubt will bring all good things to all of our people."

Israeli Rumormongering

Concerning the possibilities that disturbances and dissension might break out between the Christian villages adjacent to the camp and this camp, 'Abd Muqdih said, "That is what Israel has spread rumors about and has been anxious to have happen. Before it withdrew it deliberately tried to make the situation in the region erupt, since rockets would rain down on the camp and women, young men and old people would be the victims of those. In addition, there was continuous firing on the camp and Christian villages such as al-Miyah wa-Miyah, Darb al-Sim and Maghdushah aimed at provoking dissension between us and our brothers the Christians. We have shown everyone our concern for neighborliness and our rejection of factional strife. As for news items which talk about the Palestinian-Palestinian infighting that will take place in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal, as you see in the present session, there is total concern on the part of all our brother representatives of organizations in the people's committee over national unity, and there is no one who says, 'We are Abu 'Ammar and that is Abu Musa, or Habash, or al-Sa'iqa, or something else.'"

Ahmad Qasim (Abu Haytham), director of the Refugees' Aid Agency (UNRWA) in the camp, presented a review of the actual situation in the camp, which he began by talking about the agency's task, saying "The task of the aid process is not to create radical solutions to the Palestinian problems on all levels of life, whether for the sake of providing education, health or public sanitation. Therefore, services do not respond to the actual needs of the questions of the growth and development of Palestinian refugees in the camps."

The Inhabitants of the Camp

The number of people registered in the 'Ayn al-Hulwah camp at the end of 1968 officially came to 20,000 persons, but in reality the number was no less than 30,000. Therefore, Abu Haytham said, "In general we faced a process of reduction in services resulting from the failure to take the population increase into consideration. During the seventies, organizations were found outside the framework of UNRWA which offered services to the Palestinian refugees. However, with the beginning of the invasion and the effects it imposed on the region, the number of inhabitants residing in the camps came to 45,000, while the services offered by UNRWA were maintained on the basis of its statistics which it had acquired in 1968."

We asked Abu Haytham about the number of detainees from the camp in the enemy's prisons, and he said, "They are no fewer than 100."

[Question] Are there prisoners whose fate is unknown or who are lost?

[Answer] There are prisoners, lost persons and kidnapped persons who have been kidnapped by local Lebanese forces.

[Question] What is the basic problem facing a person in the camp today?

[Answer] Security and bread.

[Question] What exactly do you mean by your statement "security"?

[Answer] The guarantee of our freedom to move around, work and act and our dignity. What we hope is to avoid regressing.

[Question] The director of UNRWA in Lebanon has declared that UNRWA has exerted great efforts to preserve the security of the camp through the contacts it has carried out. What is the nature of the efforts which have been made in this context?

[Answer] Here I can record a fact which is obvious to every Palestinian. The general commissioner, Reedbeck, the secretary general, Mr Deverts, and all the international employees have played a conspicuous role in maintaining the security of the 'Ayn al-Hulwah camp. We can also record on his behalf the prominent and effective role of Mr Bernard Miles, the assistant director general in southern Lebanon, through his efforts which were exerted in actual conditions to limit acts of interference by the armed group which the occupation forces had brought to bear against the people of the camp. In the previous stage, they constituted the official voice and the spokesman of the security woes of the Palestinians in southern Lebanon, and through the media they participated effectively in reducing security pressure on Palestinians from the Israelis.

Living Conditions

[Question] What about the part they have played in strengthening the relationship between the camp and the neighboring Christian villages?

[Answer] Mr Miles and other employees have made numerous visits among all influential persons in the Christian and Islamic area and expressed the desires of the inhabitants of the camp and the importance of strengthening the relationship between the Palestinians and neighbors.

[Question] Is there any intention on the part of people in the camp to take revenge on personnel or individuals who exerted pressure or committed aggression against the people of the camp at an earlier time?

[Answer] There is unanimity on our part that the leaf of the past should be turned over and a concern that we should entertain the best of relations with neighbors. The Palestinians consider that their presence in Lebanon is connected to their good relations with all local Lebanese forces, in one form or another.

[Question] As a camp director, to what do you attribute the failure to pave roads, provide the camp with electricity and install water systems?

[Answer] I attribute that to two things. The first is a failure on the part of UNRWA and a lack of actual serious attention, though the basic responsibility lies on the shoulders of UNRWA. The second is that after 1982 numerous factors such as the occupation and the things it brought to bear altogether contributed greatly to limiting the provision of services and the execution of projects for the refugees in an acceptable manner.

[Question] What about water and electricity?

[Answer] The water system was basically torn out in 1982. Some hydrants were supplied to some areas, but the water pressure is not enough to bring water to all these hydrants. Now there is a tendency on the part of UNRWA and UNICEF to install a new system in cooperation with the Sidon water company, and the promises are that this process will take place in 2 months. The same applies to the paving of roads.

The hands of the clock were drawing close to 2200 hours at night. There was a suggestion from Abu Haytham on staying overnight with him at home in the camp, since traffic was almost nonexistent, and not leaving, so that we could complete the conversation we started early the morning of the next day. We decided to go, because we had a connection with an appointment with a friend, and an indication that what we had received would give a full picture, to some extent, about the actual nature of the situation in the camp.

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SAUDI ARABIA

COMMERCE MINISTER DISCUSSES FOREIGN TRADE, PRODUCTION STRATEGIES

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 22 May 85 pp 3-13

[Interview with Dr Sulayman al-Salim, Minister of Commerce: "Dr Sulayman Al-Salim to AL-YAMAMAH: It Is Necessary To Limit Imports and Raise Domestic Production Capability"]

[Text] The importance in meeting with his excellency the minister of commerce, Dr Sulayman al-Salim, arises from and consists of the proliferation and ramification of the ministry's lines of communication with the interests of merchants, the network of their commercial activity, the costs of their imports and their profits, and the needs of consumers and their daily requirements as far as their food, drink, ways of moving about and being transported and even their luxuries are concerned. If merchants are added to consumers, the net result will be all citizens, without exception. This meeting's importance touches on all of these people, and his excellency the minister's replies contain answers to all their requests for information concerning the Ministry of Commerce's future policy and the activity of the market in the light of circumstances arising from the drop in oil revenues, the end of the stage of the forward leap and the beginning of the return of affairs to their normal state. In addition, this conversation includes answers concerning import activity and customs duties, the prices and specifications of commercial goods, commercial complexes, the phenomenon of the spread of shops in the streets and sections of towns and villages, commercial fraud, tradition and the phenomenon of concealment. It is a conversation involving all concerns which bear on the nation and the citizen. It is a meeting which enters into the context of the previous ones AL-YAMAMAH has held in the wake of the new circumstances which have befallen local and international economic conditions, or after "the end of the stage of the leap forward," as his excellency the minister himself puts it. Dr Sulayman was generous with our questions and controversies for a period of more than 2 hours, which was an imposition on our part and generosity and accommodation on his.

Everything Is Now Returning to Its Normal State

AL-YAMAMAH: At the beginning of this meeting, I am pleased to welcome your excellency and thank you in the name of all our colleagues in the magazine

for this generous visit. The conversation of course will be connected to economic conditions in the kingdom and the world and their effect on trade activity, the Saudi consumer and all the events which have occurred recently, whether those be related to oil, the dollar or other things connected to the Saudi market in the context of current economic circumstances, domestically or abroad.

Al-Salim: First, I would like to thank the colleagues in AL-YAMAMAH for their efforts in providing reports on issues which are of concern to citizens on AL-YAMAMAH's pages. I am happy to come back to the colleagues who are offering memory of my modest contributions to AL-YAMAMAH. As regards the Saudi market, that is a broad question; however, I might point out that by the standards of economic growth, by the standards of the inflation rate and the unemployment rate, which are among the most important of criteria, the Saudi market is in good condition. The rate of inflation is one of the lowest in the world. The growth rate, although it has dropped below rates of past years, is nonetheless a reasonable one and in keeping with realistic, natural conditions. As for the unemployment rate, I do not believe that there is any citizen looking for work who is serious and is finding difficulty in getting work. What has happened in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is that we have started to go back to normal conditions. What it was the custom to call the years of the forward leap has ended and we have started to bring things back to the ordinary, normal situation which changed when oil prices rose many times over in 1974 and changed as a result of spending on development programs in the kingdom. I would like to add that "the sieve is very active," an expression which people keep repeating and is a valid one. A reduction has begun to be made in the status of everyone who made an appearance in the market but was not qualified, and therefore they have had to change their methods of work or withdraw from the market. This is a situation which serious entrepreneurs welcome.

AL-YAMAMAH: Don't you believe that the measures taken recently in the context of the drop in oil production revenues and other measures to reduce incomes might to some extent have an effect on the living standard of the ordinary citizen, whether he is an employee in the government or the private sector?

Al-Salim: The standard of living of the Saudi citizen as embodied in his real income has risen several times over, whether that was fixed income or income that has been increasing year after year, along with the minor rates of inflation or no inflation which have been the case in our country. This means that the individual Saudi's level has improved. It is true that our income from oil has dropped from about 300 billion riyals in the past few years to about 100 billion riyals at present. While we had been producing about 10 billion barrels a day, we are now marketing about 4 million barrels. This is obvious, it is a fact we must acknowledge and it has been reflected in our budgets in the past 2 years. This year we had a budget deficit from last year and the year before that, and this year we have tried as much as possible to balance the budget and not resort to drawing down reserves. Has this affected the standard of living of the individual Saudi? I do not believe so. All the development programs have been completed, approximately, or at least the infrastructure has. Liquidity exists in the

possession of the private sector and the most recent evidence of this has been the coverage of the pharmaceutical company, which was met on three occasions. Areas of activity and opportunities for investment have been available. For anyone who wants to perform any economic activity, incentives exist, in the form of loans and so forth. There is nothing to worry about regarding the standard of living of the individual Saudi. Indeed, there is no justification for such a worry.

AL-YAMAMAH: Saudi merchants, in the time of the forward leap, found themselves possessed with the enthusiasm to import and sign contracts for big transactions. Do you believe that this initial enthusiasm, as well as boldness among merchants, still exists?

Al-Salim: Businessmen respond to the need of the market as long as demand exists in the market, as long as there is an absence of any restrictions on the transfer of hard currency and the opening of credits and as long as there are basic facilities which make the provision of these requirements available to importers and farmers. The Saudi merchant has now begun to respond to the needs of the market. The market's needs at present for construction materials, for example, are less than the need for them last year or the year before that. The businessmen have only to reduce their imports of these materials, which is an advantage of the free market -- businessmen adapt themselves to conditions which arise and this is the advantage of the kingdom's economy, in which there are no restrictions to burden down businessmen and limit their movement and mobility from one sector to another. Enthusiasm continues to exist but there is an adaptation to new conditions by businessmen regarding the extent of need in the market.

The Saudi Economy Guarantees Freedom of Movement

AL-YAMAMAH: A little while ago you talked about the expression "the sieve." This expression needs clarification as far as the reader goes. I believe it means that the organizations which were founded on superficial conditions and were not deeply versed in terms of their commercial expertise began to be eliminated, so that stronger economic or commercial organizations remained. Are there specific examples?

Al-Salim: For example, the Saudi businessmen or citizens who came recently, after the visitors had left as is said, and started to establish for example a cinderblock factory are still traditional and it would be better either for them to reduce the size of this plant or to concentrate on another project if they have other ones. In the period of the forward leap, we found businessmen going overboard with luxury, for example having private airplanes. However, the situation has now changed. The rate of profit in the past might have come to 50 or 100 percent; now the situation has changed, and they must be made satisfied with much less than that, and these peripheral expenditures must be eliminated. I know businessmen who had deep roots in business for many years prior to the time of the forward leap. The leap occurred and went, and they did not acquire their own airplane. However, I asked one of the merchants [who had established himself in] the leap "Do you have a private airplane?" and he said "I have 34." Meanwhile, Saudi Arabian Airlines's planes totalled 34 in number. These people are the ones who

appreciate conditions and realize that the pressure on spending is to be taken into consideration; whether there is a leap, or there is no improvement, they wanted to start with anything, even without study and without an investigation of market conditions. Of course, they have found that the conditions of the market change, and that is what I meant by the expression.

We Must Reduce the Imports of Unnecessary Goods

AL-YAMAMAH: Taking an ordinary glance, as long as there are citizens who have started to make calculations as far as purchases go, that means that they will have an effect on merchants and on the market, in the sense that demand will not exist to the extent that it existed in the past. Will this effect extend to include imports from outside the kingdom? What are the conditions of imports now?

Al-Salim: As I pointed out, businessmen respond to the needs of the market. Consumers have needs which are not open to absolute flexibility, as the economists say. Rice and bread represent an everyday need, and their consumption is not subject to a rise or drop in prices. These basic needs are consumed in a uniform quantity. However, some families which have for example three cars might make a reduction and content themselves with a single car or two. In addition, as regards the reduction of imports, we are anxious to have imports drop because this will be reflected in the balance of payments. We now have a deficit in the balance of payments, in the sense that we import and pay for the remittances of workers abroad, along with other expenditures for which provision has not been made, and this is all reflected in the balance of trade. The balance of payments includes all these things and increases our deficit, and we are certainly anxious to reduce imports by increasing domestic production or by doing without unnecessary things. This should be interpreted as meaning not that the government intervenes to prevent the import of specific requirements but rather that it intervenes by increasing the capability of domestic projects, whether they are industrial or agricultural, and increasing our ability to compete with importers so that remittances of foreign currency out of the country, which have started to decline in view of the conditions of the oil market, will not increase.

Placing Restrictions on Automobile Imports Has Its Harmful Effects

AL-YAMAMAH: The reference to cars came up incidentally in your answer. This leads us to a question, which is that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia imports a large quantity of cars, and it appears that the government has had a plan to raise customs tariffs in order to attempt to limit the tremendous imports of cars. What has happened in this regard?

Al-Salim: Customs tariffs have been raised from 4 to 7 percent on cars and other commodities whose tariffs previously totalled 4 percent. As regards automobile imports, these have indeed started to decline, and the reason is the termination of the contracts of the major companies which had bought cars for their employees and workers in large quantities.

AL-YAMAMAH: There are of course debts to be paid which will come due in the market and also financial commitments in the context of the conditions which your excellency described as the sieve. By what steps will that be remedied?

Al-Salim: We must live with this state of affairs for a while. There are checks without cover and there are debts, and these problems occur in all countries. However, we must not go overboard concerning the existence of these sorts of problems. As I mentioned, the free economy in the kingdom gives citizens the chance to review their activity and shift from one area to another. Our social situation, which is dominated by mutual bonds and cooperation in the context of Islamic law, as well as family interconnections, are all things which we are proud of and they will help those people who meet difficulties in transcending these problems.

The Rise in the Price of the Dollar Raises the Price of Our Exports and Reduces the Price of Our Imports

AL-YAMAMAH: Has the rise in the price of the dollar in the recent period had an effect on the volume and figures of imports and exports in the kingdom and on the Saudi market in general?

Al-Salim: The rise in the price of the dollar has had two major effects in my view. The first effect has been that our income from oil is affected by the dollar; in the sense that we sell a barrel for \$29. From that stand-point, the more the price of the dollar rises the more advantageous this is for us because the value of the currency we receive, which is hard currency, increases. The second point is that the rise in the price of the dollar measured by its relationship to the other currencies raises the value of the dollars you possess. As regards the other currencies, this means that you can provide your requirements in imports at a lower cost, because these dollars buy more pounds sterling, more French francs and more Japanese yen. Thus, you can buy foreign goods at a lower cost, and this is one of the most important reasons which have caused the rate of inflation here to be minor and one of the most important reasons which will lead to the maintenance of this level of inflation in spite of the 3 percent increase in customs and the measures which have been taken in the current budget.

High Specifications Serve the Competition from Other Industries

AL-YAMAMAH: It is noted that Saudi non-oil exports come to no more than about 4 or 5 percent of total exports. This is certainly a minor figure, especially following the growth of our domestic industries. To what do you attribute the lowness of this figure? Is it mediocrity in promoting Saudi goods or a shortcoming on the part of producers?

Al-Salim: As you know, since the thirties, and since World War Two in particular, we have become a country which relies greatly on the export of oil as a raw material. However, all the kingdom's previous plans concentrated on diversifying income sources. We have now started to export other things besides crude oil, and this is represented first of all by petrochemicals, secondly by products derived from oil and thirdly by intermediate industries -- the small industries which the private sector is assuming charge of. These are now the growing sectors which will reduce our reliance on oil, in the sense that the plans on which we have concentrated as regards the infrastructure and the petrochemical industry and the incentives which have been given to the private sector to establish carefully studied, competitive

industries have started to yield their results. We have been exporting methanol, we have been exporting fertilizer and so on, and Saudi factories have started for example exporting pipes and outfitting units. Indeed, our exports will increase in the future.

AL-YAMAMAH: What are your expectations for the future?

Al-Salim: I am very optimistic over the strength of the Saudi economy and the absence of restrictions with respect to remittances. As regards specifications, high specifications of course exist and Saudi producers are compelled to maintain these since the market is open and accepts the best products in the world, and they have to compete with them in the market, in the first place if they want exports to compete with others in the foreign markets. As a result of this, our factories have started to export to neighboring countries. We are living in a central area in the world and are surrounded by countries with population concentrations, across the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf or south of the kingdom, and now that the basic equipment and a level of industrialization exist, we have businessmen who have now started to act and try to enter markets. In the Ministry of Commerce we have actually started to proceed in the direction of promoting exports. Exhibitions have been held to exhibit the promotion of these exports, and they are no longer as they were in the past just exhibitions for media purposes.

We Want Others To Deal with Us As We Deal with Them

AL-YAMAMAH: What about the struggle Saudi exports are now facing abroad, especially in Europe, or the West in general?

Al-Salim: We did not actually appreciate the problem of protection abroad with respect to exports until recently, when we started to export petrochemicals, when the demand for oil declined, and tried to export petrochemicals. We came up against a wonder of wonders in the world in the form of restrictions under various names. We had heard about them in the past but we did not take them seriously. There are restrictions as regards customs tariffs, restrictions as regards quotas and permits, restrictions on what are called non-customs restrictions related to specifications and so forth. We have found that the realm of commerce in the world is one which differs from what we had conceived of when we were merely oil exporters. I believe that this is a return to the situation we were in before the emergence of oil, when we fought and crossed the desert with our camels to market them in Egypt and the Levant and traveled to obtain our modest needs. Now we have indeed started to enter the world of trade as it exists and we have started to realize these problems and seek to reduce them from a position of strength, because we do not put these restrictions on others and of course we demand that we be treated on a basis of reciprocity.

AL-YAMAMAH: Meetings have been held on this subject, most recently in Doha, to come up with solutions to overcome this problem, but so far the evidence indicates that the Europeans are still holding to their position of fighting our exports.

Meanwhile, if the European position of fighting our exports by tightening up restrictions on them continues, in what way will it be possible to put pressure on them?

Al-Salim: Let me state that what has happened in the case of the European group is that they put a tariff of 13.5 percent on the export of methanol but did not specify particular export quotas. They give us the preferential treatment which is normally given to developing countries, in the sense that we can export a minor amount without customs duties, but when that reaches a specific level any European country which belongs to the European Common Market can demand that protection be imposed. Imposing protection does not mean setting specific quotas; rather, we will continue to export to them although this protection exists. It happened that we asked them to raise this customs tariff since most of their exports come here without customs tariffs, but the basis of their view is that they need to amend the new conditions since their petrochemical industries are represented by old plants and they will need time to change these conditions and these factories. Discussion is continuing by means of the secretariat of the Cooperation Council and the European market countries, for instance Germany, France and Britain, are important ones as far as we are concerned and we would like the cooperation and discussion to continue. Give and take is something that is understood as far as these matters go, and I believe that matters will be clarified in the future. I do not expect that there will be difficult problems which it will not be possible to solve. Of course Europe is not represented by the European market alone, because there are other countries, the Scandinavian countries and others, and our relations with them are ongoing. Great relations exist with the United States and Japan, discussion between economic powers and with these countries is something that is accepted, continuing it is something that is accepted, and that is what is happening.

AL-YAMAMAH: There is a view which holds, why shouldn't we direct some of the kingdom's industrial exports to countries which need them and which they might also support, such as the African and Asian countries?

Al-Salim: That is a valid point, of course. When you have a commodity you will welcome any customer, but Europe is considered a natural market for petrochemical products because it is important and meanwhile the needs of the Asian and African countries are modest.

AL-YAMAMAH: Have we tried marketing in them?

Al-Salim: Of course, SABIC works on commercial bases, and any applications which they receive by telex or other means they will respond to.

Maritime Deception and Commercial Fraud

AL-YAMAMAH: Some Saudi merchants are subjected to robbery at the hands of phantom companies in east Asia, for example. The question is raised, what has the Ministry of Commerce been doing?

Al-Salim: First of all, there is an exaggeration regarding the robbery you are talking about. Specific cases occur and when these cases become clear to

us, we give notice about them, and try through commercial investigators and exporters to bring things back to their proper place. We have indeed confronted such cases, and they were all limited. The person with primary responsibility in this process is the importer himself. Some people try to meet their requirements from abroad at the lowest possible cost and turn first of all to exporters with a bad reputation without making sure of their conditions, commercial matters and the banks, and then they turn to shipping through shippers who are not members of international federations. The result is the loss of rights.

AL-YAMAMAH: On the subject of maritime deception, a symposium was held recently in the Eastern Province whose subject was maritime deception. It is said that this phenomenon has become widespread in recent years in the Gulf area. Have there been Saudi losses?

Al-Salim: As I mentioned, the incidents are limited, but it is necessary to hold these symposia to enlighten Saudi merchants and warn them against dealing with uninsured shipping lines. On this subject, we now have the Maritime Shipping Company, a Saudi corporation, and I call on all our brother importers to use it.

AL-YAMAMAH: Will that cover all requirements?

Al-Salim: Perhaps not at the present time, but when you have goods which you want to ship, it is possible to turn to it for help.

AL-YAMAMAH: Why doesn't a sort of coordination exist among chambers of commerce in the Gulf, even in the context of the ministries, to exchange information on the companies committing theft we have talked about?

Al-Salim: Coordination exists. We get information from the secretariat general of the Cooperation Council and distribute it in turn among the chambers of commerce concerning suspicious lines and warn about dealing with them.

AL-YAMAMAH: In its secret bulletin the International Bureau of Shipping quoted fantastic figures regarding the losses from marine fraud, since these came to \$13 billion, and the Gulf merchants' share of the losses in that is large. What is your comment on that?

Al-Salim: That figure is massive, but it covers the whole world. As far as the kingdom goes, the ratio is small, indeed very small.

The Ministry Cannot Impose a Specific Policy on Merchants

AL-YAMAMAH: Some people consider that the Ministry of Commerce does not intervene directly with respect to imports. Some merchants will try to import anything, and sometimes get implicated in things which are not in keeping with demand in the Saudi market. Why doesn't the ministry intervene in this matter and regulate imports one way or another through commercial attaches or chambers of commerce?

Al-Salim: If what intervention means is guiding importers to specific areas or countries, I do not believe that that constitutes part of the ministry's

activity and in no government believing in the free economy must the ministry intervene in such matters. If what it means however is setting out specifications, that is desirable. The Saudi Arab Specifications and Standards Authority has issued more than 400 specifications and may issue more. However, we are striving for the adoption of important specifications which can be applied, especially in the case of foodstuffs. These specifications exist and can be requested through quality and classification laboratories that are to be found in the ports or through certificates stating that the commodities correspond to Saudi specifications. These have actually been put into effect with respect to cars. No car is imported now or released from customs unless it is accompanied by a certificate from the manufacturer that it corresponds to Saudi specifications.

AL-YAMAMAH: What has been done regarding the study of the possibility of consolidating the purchasing bodies in council countries?

Al-Salim: I believe that what is meant is collective purchases. This has been applied as a preliminary stage in the case of importing rice from Pakistan. This is the fourth year in which we have been negotiating with the Pakistani Rice Organization, cooperation in fact exists, and the rice requirements needed have been provided from Pakistan.

The idea is that there should be a sort of collective negotiation to buy large quantities in order to reduce costs. As far as the kingdom goes, of course rice importing is done not through the ministry itself but rather through the Saudi importers who were represented in these negotiations, and we agreed on a specific price and specific quantities, but opening credits and shipping arrangements are done between the importers and the exporters themselves.

Customs Duties among Cooperation Council Countries

AL-YAMAMAH: Why isn't the duplication in customs duties on foreign goods which some council countries re-export to other council countries eliminated?

Al-Salim: Agreement has been reached that customs duties among council countries should range from 4 to 20 percent. This is a kind of customs unification among Cooperation Council countries. Regarding exports among council countries, they are a single open market and there is nothing to prevent such exports among these countries.

AL-YAMAMAH: Doesn't duplication exist among customs tariffs?

Al-Salim: The customs duties differ from country to country, but they are confined to minor limits, as I have mentioned. There is a minimum of 4 percent and a maximum of 20 percent. Customs and customs tariffs might vary from one country to another or from one category to another, but the variations are minor. The important point in the matter is that barriers to trade not exist among Cooperation Council countries.

AL-YAMAMAH: It is said that there are some goods on which customs tariffs will increase. Does such a notion exist?

Al-Salim: This is an ongoing discussion, but there is nothing specific that I could talk to you about.

Duties on Road Use

AL-YAMAMAH: In our conversation with him, the minister of communications said that in order for the citizen to contribute to road maintenance, there is a serious study to investigate increasing customs duties on spare parts for cars and trucks and increasing the prices of fuel, motor oils and so forth, provided that this be taken and added to the budget of the Ministry of Communications to cover or help cover the costs of road maintenance. Of course his excellency the minister of communications called this an indirect method. There is another direct method for paying duties on road use represented by placing toll gates at points of entry leading to roads or via bridges. What has been done in this regard?

Al-Salim: There is a view which holds that instead of having meters and waiting for travelers to pay when passing over a bridge or using a road, instead of this we should set out a specific duty on gasoline whose income would be directed to these things, but that has not been put forth on the discussion table.

AL-YAMAMAH: Doesn't that enter into the recent increase in customs tariffs from 4 to 7 percent?

Al-Salim: That did not enter into the discussion.

The Ministry Is Serious about Combatting Imitation

AL-YAMAMAH: A little while ago you talked about specifications, but there are some goods in the electronic area, refrigerators, television sets and so forth, which the Saudi citizen feels get worn out rapidly. Where are the specifications for these?

Al-Salim: I mentioned to you the subject of customs cards as far as automobiles go. A plan is now being drawn up to put this into general use with refrigerators, cooling equipment and the like. The same idea will be applied to them, that they should correspond to specifications. God willing, this will take place soon.

AL-YAMAMAH: When will this be put into effect?

Al-Salim: The plan exists and is in front of me now. God willing, it will be discussed by the board of directors. The fact is that the success of the correspondence card in the case of cars, through cooperation between the ministry and customs, has encouraged us to put it in general use among other agencies concerned with citizen safety.

AL-YAMAMAH: Why didn't you think of it before?

Al-Salim: It came into being as a result of thought that was given to it. In addition there were studies, committees and contacts with customs, and we started it in the case of cars. God willing we will move on to other things.

AL-YAMAH: There is now in the kingdom a phenomenon known as imitation goods which come from southeast Asia. We previously dealt with this subject in the Issue of the Week. What solutions does the Ministry of Commerce have in mind to limit this phenomenon?

Al-Salim: The whole world suffers from the problem of imitation, and the kingdom is not unique. However, the struggle against this phenomenon takes form in the attempt to get these goods at points of entry, the ports, and prevent them from entering the kingdom. This is actually being done. There is cooperation between the ministry and customs on this subject. The process is considered fraud as well as a process of imitation, and the owner of the brand has the right to submit a complaint against the imitator. There are strict penalties in the Statute on Commercial Dealings and if the owner of the original brand does not file suit against the imitator, the ministry may intervene, on grounds that the process is fraudulent. When we gave notice concerning some imitators, prosecuted them and returned many of the imitated goods and they did not come into the kingdom, a limit was placed on this imitation, but the phenomenon still exists. As I have mentioned, it exists in the whole world and calls for awareness on the part of the citizen and a continued struggle against it.

AL-YAMAH: Citizens receive goods on which the same trademark as the original is written, and it is difficult for them to tell the difference.

Al-Salim: There sometimes is accuracy in imitation, but the role of the owner of the original trademark in this regard is great.

There Is No Comparison between the Merchant's Profit and the Fine

AL-YAMAH: The penalties and fines imposed on imitators or people who sell commodities whose usefulness has expired are not in keeping with the loss which results from the marketing of these commodities. These are modest fines relative to the profits the merchants get.

Al-Salim: The fine in the new statute on commercial fraud comes to 50,000. Notification is considered much more significant than the material fine itself. The penalties are deterrent; as a result of these penalties and the spread of notifications, we have managed to limit fraud in these matters and dealings in materials whose usefulness has expired.

By the way, some years ago there was no expiration date on commodities; this appeared only after the specifications, the date of manufacture and the date of the expiration of usefulness appeared. Citizens started to note the date when using these commodities, and merchants started trying to get rid of their goods before their usefulness expired. This helped us in the Ministry of Commerce prohibit the storage of goods whenever the expiration date was close to falling due, whenever the merchants tried to get rid of these goods. There sometimes is a difference in the price of the goods themselves according to the proximity of the expiration of their usefulness; that is, if they will keep for a period of a year, their price will be greater than it would have been had they kept for a month before the expiration of their usefulness.

AL-YAMAMAH: Regarding the subject of imitation, it is noted that most imitation in foodstuffs is related to canned goods and so forth. What is the ministry's role?

Al-Salim: Regarding foodstuffs, there is close oversight on these and it is not possible for them to come in until samples of them have been examined in laboratories. In the laboratories, they observe their fitness and also take note of the imitation process, if there is any. I am more secure in the case of foodstuffs than with other materials such as spare parts for cars and perfumes where the imitation is more obvious.

AL-YAMAMAH: One form of imitation is done by manipulation, for instance with the name of an international company to which people add or change a letter.

Al-Salim: If there is an obvious resemblance and the purpose in that is to defraud the consumer, that is observed and discovered. It has happened that an imitation was made just by changing the location of the space between two letters, and it was caught. However, this does not mean that imitation goods seep in, because a tremendous [volume of] goods come in, and a single carton of imitation goods might seep in out of 100, for instance.

AL-YAMAMAH: I believe that the role of the Ministry of Commerce in this sort of thing is very sensitive and important in light of the awareness of the Saudi citizen if he cannot find an agency which can actually protect him, because many people do not think about the matter of a change in a letter, the location of a space or such things.

Al-Salim: We have investigators, laboratories and notices to citizens, which all help eliminate this phenomenon. I believe that our situation in the kingdom is better than that of others as far as imitation goes, because of these measures, because of the notification and because of the crackdown on these things in customs. As I mentioned, every country suffers from imitation, but that does not mean that we are taking the subject lightly.

Products of Boycotted Companies Are Confiscated in Customs

AL-YAMAMAH: Let us now pass on from the process of the entry of imitation goods to that of boycotted goods.

Al-Salim: I do not think boycotted goods [come in], because they must pass through customs and if they do, they are confiscated. Customs has the names of the boycotted companies, which are placed on the blacklist, and any goods which arrive in customs are confiscated.

The Procedures for Opening Accounting Offices Are Not Difficult

AL-YAMAMAH: It has been said that the kingdom is suffering from a shortage in accounting offices in spite of the immense numbers of commercial organizations, and it has been said that the secret behind that is that the ministry sets out difficult conditions for people who want to open accounting offices.

Al-Salim: I do not believe that this is so. If there is a reason, that is the shortage of accountants; the conditions that have been set out are normal ones. It is necessary to set out the condition that they obtain a bachelor's degree along with a period of training. These conditions have been simplified and the measures are not difficult. To the contrary, the ministry encourages citizens to enter into this field. It also encourages the establishment of professional mutual responsibility companies to engage in accounting, and in fact this happens. You can observe professional accounting companies which two or three people have established.

Permits for Public Service Offices

AL-YAMAMAH: It is also said that the kingdom has a shortage of organizations and offices which operate in the area of services, that is, that they do not support such activities.

Al-Salim: The ministry is in charge of giving permits as far as engineers, accountants and consulting, economic and administrative offices go.

AL-YAMAMAH: What about public relations offices?

Al-Salim: The Ministry of Information issues permits for public relations offices.

AL-YAMAMAH: What about offices that organize gatherings for specific companies or meetings for commercial companies, for instance when a company wants to hold an exhibit of its products in the kingdom?

Al-Salim: Permits for holding exhibits are given out directly to the people who apply for them.

AL-YAMAMAH: Why shouldn't there be organizations in charge of this matter?

Al-Salim: There are companies in charge of this matter. There is a company in Jiddah, a company in the Eastern Province and individual organizations which carry out these activities.

Foreign Capital

AL-YAMAMAH: To what extent has foreign capital been receptive to operating in the kingdom?

Al-Salim: The kingdom is considered an object of interest of foreign capital because of confidence in the kingdom's economy and because of the incentives provided to investment in areas which can help develop the kingdom, such as loans at no interest, electricity at token prices, land given to projects at token rents, tax exemptions, a free economic climate and the freedom to transfer revenues and hard currency. All this contributes to the receptivity of foreign investors, and we welcome capital which serves our economic goals and is subject to the few statutes we apply, such as the Statute on the Investment of Foreign Capital, the Statute on the Tithe and Income, the Commercial Registry Statute, the Statute on Companies or the Bank Oversight

Statute. We always welcome foreign experts and have offered all these incentives so that if foreign capital wants to remain 100 percent foreign it will be able to enter the market -- though of course it will be ineligible for the incentives we offer, because the conditions in the Foreign Investment Statute are that there be 25 percent Saudi participation.

Repressing Incentives Leads to the Idling of Capacity

AL-YAMAMAH: Does your excellency believe that the kingdom has reached the stage of production where consumer greed is an important factor in supporting production, as in the countries which preceded us, since consumption generates further production?

Al-Salim: Consumption in the sense of demand that exists in the market, for the sake of satisfying domestic demand or exports, of course encourages investment in projects. The idea is that capital seeks profit, which is to be taken for granted. We offer encouragement because merely by repressing this incentive, you idle the capacities which you ought to be encouraging. The People's Republic of China has begun once again to put faith in the importance of individual initiative and the free economy, has carried out measures related to agriculture, trade and industry and has started to open up to its citizens and the outer world. It was preceded in this by another Communist country, Hungary, which is now distinguished from others in this situation. This is the policy the kingdom has followed for a long time, which is that the government should not perform activities the private sector can carry out, but should give incentives for the performance of these activities. In response to your question, as long as there is demand in the market and as long as there are economic feasibility studies, receptivity to investment among citizens will continue when cash liquidity exists.

Participation by Non-Saudis in Areas Other Than Commerce

AL-YAMAMAH: On the issue of concealment in the kingdom, it is true that the statute says that is forbidden, but there is concealment in the kingdom and we all know that. The minister of commerce himself may know that. As long as such concealment exists, why shouldn't ways be sought for regulating the process since the person carrying out the concealment derives good benefit, and the person under whom the concealment is done also benefits in a reasonable fashion, because concealment continues to exist?

Al-Salim: In the framework of the Cooperation Council, you will find the word "concealment" only in the kingdom. You will not find this term in the other countries in the Cooperation Council, because they have done what you yourself mentioned, in the sense that commercial registry is given to a citizen who rents out a store to a foreigner in exchange for a specific sum which he pays him every year. The foreigner continues to work, and this is not called concealment, because he pays what is required to the citizen. The word "concealment" exists here in the kingdom, because we have been concerned from the beginning that commerce should be in the hands of Saudis. I mentioned earlier that we welcome the participation of non-Saudis in industrial areas and other investment areas covered by the statutes on foreign capital investment, but commerce is an activity of the Saudis and we want to

give entry visas to people who are not Saudis not to engage in commerce but to engage in a specific profession. Permits are given to invest in a specific industry, but the pursuit of commerce is left to Saudis. In any event there is a draft which has been presented to the Ministry of the Interior related to concealment, and the subject is now being studied in order firmly to establish that commerce should be kept in the hands of Saudis. There is nothing to prevent Saudis putting employees in shops to help, but the owner and the employer who engages in the activity and is responsible for it is a Saudi.

AL-YAMAMAH: Do you know that there are Saudis who have no connection with certain kinds of commerce that exist except just the name?

Al-Salim: There is a committee made up of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Commerce. This committee was broad in the past and contained the Tithe and Income [Bureau] and other bodies. This committee constantly works to put pressure in such cases and it always happens that the residence statute is applied in such cases and the statute on the commercial registry as well. Cases occur where foreigners whose participation in such concealment is proved are deported, and the followup on this subject is continuous.

Prohibition of Automobile Imports Will Result in a Rise in Their Prices

AL-YAMAMAH: As far as cars go, we say that you have raised the customs tariffs on cars to give the government new revenues and also for the purpose of reducing purchases of cars. There is a view which questions why you do not prohibit the import of small cars, Japanese cars for instance, for a period of 3 years, until those which are present are finished, because it appears that the Saudis have a complex about buying cars.

Al-Salim: I believe that prohibiting imports is a very extreme approach and it must be resorted to only in cases of need. I pointed out to you that automobile imports have naturally started to tend to decline because of the stabilization of conditions and the departure of the companies.

Why should we adopt such measures to prevent automobile imports? Speculation, the black market and smuggling would start, and the same people who are now demanding that imports be prohibited would come and complain about the presence of the black market, the rise in the prices of cars and the rise in the cost of automobile repairs in shops.

I believe that the market is the arbiter and that is what will correct these conditions, if these conditions need correction.

AL-YAMAMAH: The problem of spare parts for cars is an old one and comes up again every once in a while because there are companies which act as they please in setting the prices of spare parts as far as they can for the same type of car for example. In addition to their control of the price, the spare parts sometimes cannot be found.

Al-Salim: The agent is responsible, and the distributor and the importer are responsible, for providing spare parts, and they must provide them. We

receive complaints sometimes and compel agents to take spare parts which are not available off other cars they have. Of course the market is open to the importation and marketing of these spare parts; the problem is not the lack of availability of spare parts. There is no justification for a lack if imports are open and there is demand on the market. These things must be available. This is the nature of things as far as the open market is concerned. If there is demand, these requirements must be provided. We apply the Statute on Commercial Agencies and urge agents and importers to have workshops at the requisite level. In addition to this, there are other workshops besides those belonging to the agents which do the work.

The basis of the idea behind the automobile service company, and the encouragement and establishment of it, was to fill the gap that now exists in the provision of services as far as maintenance shops go. As for automobile services in general, I believe that they are proceeding in this direction.

Spare Parts

AL-YAMAMAH: Hasn't the Ministry of Commerce thought about imposing a penalty on the agent for a machine, whatever the machine might be, whether it is a car or something else, since a citizen might use this machine and when it is subject to some breakdown be surprised to find that spare parts do not exist?

Al-Salim: There is no thought about it; the statute requires importers to provide spare parts.

AL-YAMAMAH: What if they say they do not have them?

Al-Salim: The consumer can submit a complaint.

AL-YAMAMAH: Regarding intervention in the price of spare parts, some companies control these prices.

Al-Salim: The types of spare parts number in the thousands, and the prices of these cannot be set. However, if there are obvious excesses in prices and exploitation of the citizen, it is possible to submit complaints.

AL-YAMAMAH: There are well known trade names, for cars for instance, and it is easy for the Ministry of Commerce to learn how to set the price of spare parts for a car like a Mercedes, a Cadillac, for example, or others.

Al-Salim: This issue has been studied from a number of angles. It is difficult to set the prices of spare parts. There are moving spare parts for which there is great demand, which lowers their prices, and there are parts for which demand arises only every 2 or 3 years which remain in storage with the merchant, and consequently their price is high. There are spare parts for models which no longer exist which the merchant is compelled to keep until the old models cease to exist.

The world of spare parts is vast and it is necessary to be wary about intervening in price questions. It is necessary in my opinion to concentrate on

the availability of spare parts and on making the agent responsible for providing these parts. If there are excesses and distortions in price, we will punish the people who go to excess regarding the prices.

The Pricing of Luxury Items

AL-YAMAMAH: With regard to the subject of pricing, the prices of foodstuffs are set. Is it possible that the list might include other materials, such as luxury items, for instance?

Al-Salim: If the statistics show that prices dropped last year and did not increase, what is the need for imposing pricing on these materials? That is not like the market, where competition is a factor in stabilizing prices and the objective is to have materials available at reasonable prices; the best way is to provide competition and increase the supply of these commodities, which is what has happened.

We intervened in the pricing of some commodities which were subsidized because the government is a party to the issue and pays part of the price of these commodities. However, when the commodities are not subsidized and are not essential, conditions are normal, there are no shortages and there is no lack of materials, intervention in such cases does harm and is not beneficial.

Hotels and Tourist Areas

AL-YAMAMAH: According to the most recent report, it has been stated that there are 214 hotels in the kingdom, 13 of which are luxury class, containing 3,549 rooms, and 36 are first class, containing about 6,640 rooms. Do you consider that this number is adequate and can accommodate the numbers of people who come to the kingdom and the Western Province in the pilgrimage seasons and in Riyadh at times of conferences as well?

Al-Salim: The answer to this question hinges first of all on the areas, whether they are in the towns or in the villages, and secondly the classes desired. On this occasion, the Department of Hotels in the ministry has played a very important part in directing investors on their own behalf and on behalf of the country.

Hotels are established only when a permit to do so is granted by the Ministry of Commerce, and when the hotel is established another permit must be granted for the operation and to determine the class of the hotel and set the prices of the rooms. This has resulted in a sort of balance in the availability of rooms and the availability of hotels of the appropriate classes in various areas, in the sense that when someone comes to us today and goes to the Department of Hotels wanting to establish a luxury class hotel, the Department of Hotels informs him that Riyadh has enough luxury hotels but that it needs a second class hotel. You, as an investor, do not want to establish a building for pleasure but want to invest a sum of money which will bring you an income and be of use to the city.

However, if you insist on establishing a luxury class hotel, you must not do so in Riyadh. You can establish one in Abha or al-Khamis, for example, because they need hotels.

Therefore you will find that the situation with hotels is reasonable and that there is no surplus or shortage in this regard. Moreover, the situation resembles that of automated and semi-automated bakeries. It is not possible for permits for those to be granted before reference is made to the ministry. If the matter was left unattended, there would then be a surplus in such bakeries in some areas and a shortage in other ones.

The Phenomenon of Shopping Centers

AL-YAMAH: Will a limit be placed on the phenomenon of the spread of shopping centers, which has gone beyond reasonable bounds?

Al-Salim: In my opinion, the municipalities now are studying this situation. As far as commercial markets go, there now is a surplus in the city of Jiddah, specifically, and we have started to observe a surplus in the city of Riyadh. Therefore a sort of coordination must be created between the municipalities and the other bodies concerned to guide these centers, in terms of location and in terms of need for them, because we do not want these projects to become liabilities or fail to cover their costs.

AL-YAMAH: Going back to the hotels in the tourist areas that now exist in the kingdom, such as Abha and the areas that encourage tourist activity, one of the main reasons which prevent some people from going to these areas is the low level of the services there, especially in the area of hotels. How do you view the activity of the Organization of Hotels and Tourist Areas?

Distribution of Existing Hotels among the Towns and Provinces of the Kingdom

Province	Luxury Class Number Rooms	First Class Number Rooms	Second Class Number Rooms	Third Class Number Rooms	Total Number Rooms
Riyadh	3 1,008	10 1,812	12 1,145	12 557	37 4,522
Jiddah	3 886	9 2,335	19 1,594	11 484	42 5,299
Eastern	4 1,123	6 921	17 1,082	5 104	32 3,280
Mecca	1 173	1 316	12 1,296	8 302	22 2,087
Medinah	1 192	4 647	14 1,063	28 1,320	47 3,222
Al-Ta'if	2 290	-- --	8 325	9 219	19 834
Southern	-- --	3 378	5 244	5 111	13 733
Others	-- --	5 670	8 391	11 192	24 1,253
Total	14 3,672	38 7,079	95 7,140	89 3,339	226 21,230

Al-Salim: It is assumed that the hotels try to serve the people staying in them and market their services. The Department of Hotels follows up on the conditions of hotels and has set out complaint and observation boxes in every hotel and collects these complaints and observations. However, I do not doubt that the level of hotel services in the kingdom has improved greatly over that which existed in the past.

AL-YAMAMAH: Are there areas in which there are no hotels at all?

Al-Salim: Of course, there are areas which still need hotels. Any citizen wishing to invest should refer to the Ministry of Commerce and the Department of Hotels to direct him to the areas which are in actual need, and in which investment can be feasible.

AL-YAMAMAH: Don't you consider that the government must establish hotels in some tourist areas in order to draw attention to them and in order first of all to stop or limit the flow of people traveling abroad, then secondly to stimulate tourist activity inside the country?

Al-Salim: The government has not been remiss in this regard. It has carried out similar projects in al-Ta'if, and the role of citizens in completing what the government has started has now begun.

Loans have been given to establish hotels for up to a maximum of 50 percent of the cost of establishing the hotel. Of course the program of loans has come to an end and they are now given out only in very limited form, specifically in areas which are really in need of such hotels.

The government has played its part, and encouragement to establish these sorts of projects in the available areas still exists, to the point where the pricing which was set out by the ministry has been feasible and has encouraged continued activity in this direction. If we had priced the rooms at low levels, investors would not have been as receptive as we have seen they were.

AL-YAMAMAH: What about the grain silos? What are their capacities?

Al-Salim: The capacity of the grain silos that exist and are under construction comes to 1.5 million tons.

AL-YAMAMAH: Is this figure adequate?

Al-Salim: This figure is equal to three times what we need to maintain enough storage for the kingdom for a period of 6 months. We have exceeded what is required in the statute by 300 percent.

AL-YAMAMAH: Where is this excess being directed?

Al-Salim: It is consumed.

Capacity of Grain Silos in the Kingdom's Provinces in Tons, 1985

Silos	Storage Capacity in tons
Riyadh	310,000
Jiddah	120,000
Al-Dammam	80,000
Al-Qasim	285,000
Khamis Mushayt	40,000
Ha'il	100,000
Al-Jawf	20,000
Total	955,000

Development of Capacity of Silos in the Period 1977-87

Year	Storage Capacity in Tons
1977	40,000
1978	180,000
1979	300,000
1980	340,000
1981	340,000
1982	380,000
1983	585,000
1984	885,000
1985	955,000
1986	955,000
1987	1,480,000

After completion of the Wadi al-Dawasir and Tabuk silos and expansion of the Riyadh project.

Productive Capacities of Flour Mills, May 1985

Project	Productive Capacity (in Tons per 24 Hours)	
	Wheat	Flour
Riyadh	960	740
Jiddah	1,080*	832
Al-Dammam	540	416
Al-Qasim	270	208
Khamis Mushayt	300	231
Total	3,150	2,472

*This capacity will increase in July-August 1985 to 1,680 tons of wheat per 24 hours.

Development of the Capacities of Mills in the Period 1977-1986

Year	Total Mill Capacity	Tons Per 4 Hours of Wheat [sic]
1977	270	
1978	1,080	
1979	2,160	
1980	2,160	
1981	2,580	
1982	2,580	
1983	2,850	
1984	3,150	
1985	3,750	
1986	4,350	

With the operation of the fifth mill in Kiddan and the operation of the second mill in Khamis Mushayt.

AL-YAMAMAH: With respect to the Western companies which cast aspersions on the Arabs through campaigns of distortions which they wage through the media, the attacks against these distortions have not assumed an adequate form. Have means of deterrence been taken so that such distortions will not be repeated?

Al-Salim: Instances of this sort have taken place through cooperation among the ministry, some Arab regimes, the commercial attaches and the press, and we have taken a stand against these things. These companies which have actually carried out this sort of thing as well as the public relations firms which are ignorant of the importance of being concerned with the feelings of the Arab world and defame advertisers or exporters rather than serving their interests have apologized.

AL-YAMAMAH: Do you consider that there is a possibility that the forward leap the kingdom went through the past 10 years could recur?

Al-Salim: Let my answer take this form: the forward leap happened not just because of the increase in oil revenues but also because of the country's need for massive projects. Therefore, what was achieved in the past 10 years has not in my opinion happened with such speed in the history of any other country. However, do you have the same need as you did 10 years ago in terms of the need for roads or the need for ports if you have enough ports, enough roads and enough sewers? Even if you want to spend on projects you will find that you have enough of them. Even if there is a further increase in revenues the forward leap will not occur in the form of unnecessary spending.

AL-YAMAMAH: With respect to the elections to the Chamber of Commerce in Riyadh, what happened, specifically?

Al-Salim: With respect to the elections to the chamber of commerce, what I must stress is that the statute on the chamber of commerce was issued more than 40 years ago and stipulated that two thirds of the members of the board of directors would be elected and the ministry would appoint the other third. In the past, the board of directors were reappointed uncontested because other persons did not run as candidates. What has happened recently as a result of the spread of awareness among businessmen of the role and importance of the chamber is that this competition has occurred; what took place with the chamber elections recently is part of this phenomenon, which is a healthy one, and the competition was honorable and all within the context of the chamber and the competition to make a contribution in serving merchants.

AL-YAMAMAH: With respect to the businessmen's conference that was held recently, what is your opinion on that and how great is the conviction that it will continue?

Al-Salim: His majesty the king's attendance at this conference and the honor of his presence at it had an extreme influence which gave a massive impetus to businessmen and their sense of their role, especially since we are at the beginning of the fifth plan, which has laid stress on the role of businessmen, now that the government has carried out the basic installations and the payment of subsidies and loans when those were needed. We now have a very

important sector of businessmen to whom great importance is attached and this conference has taken place in attendance by his majesty. Truly excellent working papers were presented at it and all the chambers of commerce took part in it. This conference, in my opinion, has become an organization which must prevail and take part in the kingdom's prosperity.

AL-YAMAMAH: What role do you consider is incumbent on businessmen in their dealings with foreign companies in the area of the media and publicity for the kingdom? Will the role of the Saudi merchant continue to be restricted to thinking about collecting profits, without exerting any effort on behalf of presenting the situation we have attained and prompting influential foreign companies to support the position and status of the kingdom in the minds of people abroad?

Al-Salim: I would like to stress and reassure our brothers that there are businessmen with whom we cooperate; they play their part in this area and spend money on it in this direction. Cooperation between these people and the ministry is continuing and they serve their nation and help serve the general policy of their nation.

AL-YAMAMAH: What about owners of capital who still up to now have been investing their money outside the kingdom?

Al-Salim: I believe that businessmen, as his majesty the king pointed out, are free as far as their money goes, but they must invest their money in the kingdom because investment in the kingdom is safer. Freedom and trust exist. This does not prevent businessmen from having investments abroad, so that the country can benefit from their revenues, but the emphasis and the basis must be inside the country.

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SAUDI ARABIA

VARIOUS RECENT ACTIVITIES OF NATIONAL GUARD DISCUSSED IN DEPTH

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[Article: "The Saudi National Guard"]

[Excerpts] Tactical Exercises in the National Guard

Before we address ourselves to this year's Lion's Den Exercises, let us first begin by giving a capsule summary of the previous exercises which preceded that, along with a description of what the training year consists of in terms of concept and application. With the development of the Saudi National Guard, thanks to the vigilance and care of its head, His Royal Highness Prince 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the crown prince and deputy prime minister, and also with its continuous acquisition of arms and its provisioning with the most modern weapons and equipment in the form of armored vehicles, rockets, artillery and other advanced modern combat materiel, that is, since 1974, the training plans, programs and goals have been growing and developing as the organizational structure of the advanced forces has grown.

The plans, programs and goals have gradually advanced from a stage of education in new weapons and equipment in terms of structure, tactics, operations, benefits and particular conditions to a stage of actual use in theaters which are as similar as possible to actual tactical theaters of operations.

The issues and goals of each successive exercise differed from the one that preceded it; these were to learn about the fighting capability of the unit taking part in the exercise and the extent to which it had absorbed the training it received in the course of a full year, the training year.

What Is the Training Year in the Saudi National Guard?

The training year in the Saudi National Guard is a complete training course covering a period of 2 successive years. This course ends and is capped off by a test tactical exercise, that is, an exercise in combat in hypothetical real conditions. Naturally, the programs and curricula change from year to year. The training year might include offensive, defensive or offensive-

defensive training which is determined in light of the general level of the unit trained. The choice of the training programs, which always culminate in tactical training with live ammunition (a maneuver), is dictated by the type of weapon and equipment and the level of the unit in terms of competence and fitness along with the results of the theoretical and practical training in the training year, that is, the training cycle.

Each tactical exercise reveals and discloses deficiencies and weak points in the people carrying it out and in equipment and outfitting. The command might turn to observers and impartial arbiters during various stages of the exercise to help evaluate effectiveness in the following respects:

Telecommunications competence and discipline and the extent to which they restrict themselves to instructions.

Competence in movement from positions of concentration to the theater of the maneuver and in determining breakdowns that might occur in machinery.

Competence in the control of forces.

The provision of military security at all stages.

The ability to move wounded persons and medical evacuation.

Competence in administrative affairs and the method of supplying units with water, fuel, food, medicines and ammunition and repairing breakdowns.

The extent to which the goals specified in the exercise are achieved.

Other matters.

The Maneuver

The maneuver consists of a group of tactical operations held in such a way that they will be as close as possible to actual war operations. It might be planned to have the maneuver proceed in accordance with steps, stages and locations known to senior officers and the management of the exercise, or it may proceed among hypothetical combatants in such a way that it will develop and proceed under the influence of sudden situations and decisions bearing on each command -- haphazard decisions which were not known to anyone previously.

In order to derive real benefit from this sort of tactical activity, all commanders at various levels must deal objectively with all details and disclose difficulties and mistakes clearly, not with the goal of holding the people by whose means they occurred accountable but with the goal of correction and rectification. These, in military thinking, are known as the lessons derived from all training.

Tactical Training in the National Guard

The advanced forces of the National Guard held six diverse tactical exercises with live ammunition, as follows, before the Lion's Den exercise we are discussing now:

1. The Najd Exercise in the Ha'il area in 1984, with the goal of:

Training commanders and staffs of the first and second armored brigades.

Providing training for units in the proper use of combat resources during and away from combat and in combat support services, with emphasis and assertion on the necessary coordination of joint service operations in effective fashion.

Testing supply and approvisionment capabilities and units in supporting the brigades these units belong to.

Testing the ability to perform combat oerations in rear areas.

Training supply and approvisionment base command personnel in establishing a forward supply base at least 500 kilometers from its fixed base.

Testing long-range communications equipment.

Training officers in the operations center in command and staff activities in the framework of two armored brigades.

Evaluating the abilities of the units and elements in the National Guard in terms of anticipated future missions.

2. The Dove Exercise:

This was held in the al-Qasim area in 1984. It was the first of its kind, since it took place through the directives and under the management of the office of the head of the National Guard at the level of the joint services brigade. This exercise was an objective in a combat maneuver of resistance and had the goal of:

Training the first mechanized brigade in deployment up to a specific area, in order to carry out tactical operations.

Training the brigade in carrying out reinforcement operations over a long distance from the supply base and also training the second supply and approvisionment battalion in supporting combat units over long distances.

Training staff command officers in command, control and the art of leadership.

3. The al-Dar'iyah Exercise:

This was southwest of Riyadh in 1982 and had the goal of providing training in the use of advanced telecommunications equipment and providing training for the brigade's operations command and staff:

In command within the brigade.

In evaluating the supply and approvisionment battalion's ability to support the brigade in operations taking place far from the base.

4. The Peninsula Headquarters Exercise:

In al-Hufuf, the Eastern Province, in 1981, with the goal of evaluating the activity of the command and staff:

In an armored brigade.

In an armored battalion.

In the supply and approvisionment battalion's ability to offer aid over long distances.

In determining training requirements for the combat units.

In evaluating callup and deployment procedures at the brigade level.

5. The Sunrise Exericse:

This was in the al-Aflaj area south of Riyadh in 1980. It comprised four joint forces battalions for the first time, for purposes of evaluation and training:

The joint forces battalion's ability in tactical and administrative action.

This battalion's ability to provide communications far from the base.

The staffs and units supporting action in the field.

6. The Good Beginning Exercise.

This was south of Riyadh in 1979 and was indeed a good beginning and a blessing since it was the first exercise to be carried out by an advanced unit of the National Guard, with the purpose of:

Ascertaining the extent to which the new organization of the joint forces battalion was suitable.

Coordinating the actions and activities of the joint forces in formation.

The Lion's Den Exercise

Assumptions and Purpose

The Lion's Den Exercise was a replica of a hypothetical actual battle of defense and resistance. Two mechanized brigades of the National Guard forces took part in carrying it out with the goal of testing the ability to move rapidly when requested and ascertaining the effectiveness of the forces carrying out the maneuver in a defensive resistance offensive in order to deter and eliminate a foreign attack.

The assumption behind the maneuver, as the chairman of the military agency in the National Guard and the director of the maneuver, First Brig Gen

Muhammad al-'Amr, described it, was that on 6 March 1985 a foreign enemy managed to establish a bridgehead on the coast of the kingdom on the Red Sea northwest of the city of Abha. This enemy managed to reinforce this bridgehead then take off from it toward the town and region of Bishah in order to isolate southern and southwestern Saudi territory from the remaining areas of the kingdom. This was the situation assumed.

Response to the Aggression

As soon as it learned that the aggression had taken place, the office of the head of the National Guard took the initiative of moving two armored brigades to confront the enemy with the objective of stopping its advance then destroying it. The two brigades skirmished with the forces launching the attack at the southwestern outskirts of the town of Bishah in a fierce battle which ended with the destruction of the enemy and the elimination of all its personnel. The final stage of this struggle was embodied in a severe, intensified onslaught of fire which the two Arab brigades carried out starting from a fire base with the participation of all their advanced weapons, among the most important of which were anti-armor Tow missiles, heavy 20-millimeter multi-barreled machine guns, mortars, and 50-, 105- and 155-millimeter cannons. The sight of this fire at the time of dusk inspired terror and pride both. There is no doubt that it would not have been in anyone's ability to survive if he had been exposed to such a bombardment and terrifying onslaught of fire.

This onslaught of fire, which had been planned with a proficiency that inspired amazement, surrounded all observers with the actual atmosphere of a phase of actual combat. It also realized its goals by highlighting the proper use of the new advanced weapons and equipment and ascertaining their effectiveness and competence in a theater which was as close as possible to a theater of real operations.

The Lion's Den Exercise was the seventh tactical exercise of its kind and the conclusion of the 1985 training year. It had the goal of testing the ability of the support and maintenance battalions and the joint forces of the two brigades which carried out the exercise and performed the abovementioned onslaught of fire.

A Final Word

It is worth mentioning and pointing out that we did not note the occurrence of any damage or breakdown of machinery. All persons in the National Guard are supposed to perform three functions well:

Drive.

Fire various weapons.

Use radio equipment.

It is also worth referring to the reassuring elegance, grace and appearance of good grooming which distinguished the persons in the National Guard, the

officers, noncommissioned officers and troops, in general, in addition to substantial morality, modest morals and devotion to vigilance in order to avoid anything that might harm the reputation of the guards, the comrades or the machinery.

We noticed with our own eyes the deep affection among everyone and the feelings of pride and glory, noted by the prince and head of the guard, Prince 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the crown prince and deputy prime minister, at being included under his leadership. His excellency is a captivating personality from whom only grace, goodness and cheerfulness shine on you, along with the feeling, at the same time, that you are in front of a strong, firm will and a liberal intelligence, so that you are dominated by a pressing desire to possess his confidence and approval.

On Formations and Expressions in the National Guard

The Saudi National Guard is an effective fighting force which is constantly developing and gaining strength. It is also a regular military force. However, for historic and emotional reasons, it uses formations and certain expressions whose history goes back to the days of the founder of the kingdom, the late King 'Abd-al-'Aziz, may God give him a peaceful rest. One of these particular features is that the expression "division" is used for a fighting force at the battalion level and brigades are made up of six "divisions" (battalions), four of which are combat battalions from the joint forces, along with an artillery battalion and a supply and approvisionment battalion.

The General Activities of the National Guard in Society

The Saudi National Guard has two missions:

A military mission.

A cultural mission.

1. The military mission:

This is the assumption of its role of defending the religion, the regime and its stability and the safety of the nation in cooperation with other military forces in the kingdom in the context of the country's general military plan, a plan which his majesty the king approves in his capacity as the supreme commander of the armed forces.

The National Guard, in executing and carrying out this lofty mission, accepts new recruits and prepares them militarily. Its schools also prepare and graduate officers, noncommissioned officers and professional soldiers. The secondary military school which belongs to the National Guard works to provide accreditation for students at the secondary education level so that they may enroll in the King Khalid Military College in the National Guard, which was officially opened on 16 January 1983, in order to graduate from that at the rank of lieutenant and serve in the ranks of the guard.

King Khalid Military College in the National Guard is considered one of the most advanced of military institutes. Its programs and curricula have been set out in accordance with international levels and in commitment to the values and teachings of the pure Islam and genuine Arab customs and traditions of gallantry, chivalry and self-denial. The first class of officers graduating from King Khalid Military College will be graduated this year.

In addition, the National Guard relies on modern methods of military training, from individuals, sections and detachments to high levels. The training year in the National Guard culminates in a military tactical exercise, that is, a maneuver, in the spring of each year which takes place with live ammunition and is in effect an annual test of the fighting competence of the National Guard, command, officers, troops and units. The Lion's Den Exercise was a test for the training year 1984-85.

2. The cultural mission:

The National Guard's cultural mission is no less important than the military one and is not separate from it. Rather, it proceeds alongside and parallel to it. It influences it and is affected by it. The two missions, in brief, are two aspects of a single entity, the National Guard.

Since the majority of the people belonging to the National Guard are people from the desert, with their inherited traditions, the guard is considered the laboratory in which they are forged, refined, modernized and prepared to embark on urban life. This is apparent in people's behavior, in the style of eating, in the manner of speaking and addressing supervisors, in the method of performance, in the commitment to schedules and the other things by which military life is distinguished. These acquired habits of behavior become innate qualities which shift these people into another social pattern.

In addition, many of these people become qualified for various technical occupations. When their voluntary service period ends, they do not go back to the desert. Rather, they pursue a new life in the towns. The National Guard participates:

In maintaining security and order at the time of the pilgrimage, with the general security forces.

In Tree Week, by planting seedlings and distributing thousands of the seedlings produced by the National Guard nurseries.

In Traffic Week.

In cultural exhibitions.

In local and international conferences.

The National Guard Projects

A. The complex of the Office of the Head of the National Guard.

Modern technical military circumstances have imposed complications on ways and means of administering military agencies. The proliferation of aides, the increase in specialists, the diversification of control techniques and decentralization of management have become established facts, and specific designs are now being imposed on the administrative complexes of military agencies.

Therefore the National Guard complex now conforms to the most modern designs, provides ease of performance and offers vertical and horizontal communications. His Highness Prince 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz laid the cornerstone for this complex on 31 May 1977. It occupies an area of 195,000 square meters, consists of four floors and can accommodate 2,500 persons. The late monarch King Khalid 'Abd-al-'Aziz inaugurated it on 14 November 1980.

B. The agreement to develop the National Guard.

His Highness Prince 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the crown prince, deputy prime minister and head of the National Guard, signed a contract on 19 November 1974 with the American government to develop the forces of the National Guard and turn it into mechanized joint service units armed with the most up to date defensive and offensive weapons. Work began in silence. The first stage of the agreement led to the formation of the command and units of the first al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud mechanized brigade, consisting of four joint service battalions, a supply and approvisionment battalion and an artillery battalion.

A start was then made in forming the second mechanized brigade. So far the following subsidiary units have been completed:

The fifth joint service battalion.

The sixth joint service battalion.

The second supply and approvisionment battalion.

The brigade command, which graduated during the Lion's Den Tactical Exercise.

C. The National Guard's military housing plan.

It was decided that military housing should be provided for the National Guard, including officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers, in suitable modern dwellings which are in keeping with Saudi Arab traditions. These residences have assumed the form of independent villas (houses) ranging from 400 to 1,000 square meters in area. They consist of two floors and are surrounded by a private garden. They are delivered to the individual furnished, ready and complete in terms of all their facilities.

In these military areas belonging to the people affiliated with the National Guard all facilities and services exist in the form of mosques, schools, playgrounds, parks and places of recreation and innocent sport. The contracts for the first stage of this project were signed as follows:

1. On 7 May 1981 a contract was signed with the French company DeMaize to build 4,576 villas for noncommissioned officers and soldiers in the National Guard in Riyadh for 3.26 billion riyals.

2. On 1 June 1981 four other contracts were signed, as follows:

With the Korean firm Sampo to build 2,288 villas for noncommissioned officers and soldiers in al-Ahsa' for 1.65 billion riyals.

With the (Bijal) company to build 1,155 villas for noncommissioned officers and soldiers in Jiddah for 825 million riyals.

With the Saudi firm Mapco to build 1,144 villas for noncommissioned officers and soldiers in al-Dammam for 825 million riyals.

Lastly, with the French firm Societe [sic] for the construction of 1,144 villas for noncommissioned officers and soldiers in al-Ta'if for 825 million riyals.

3. On 20 August 1981 the sixth contract was signed, with the French firm DeMaize, for the construction of 526 officers' villas in Riyadh for 700 million riyals.

4. On 27 August 1981 four additional contracts were concluded, representing contracts seven, eight, nine and 10; these were as follows:

The seventh contract, with the Saudi firm Mapco, to build villas for officers in al-Dammam for 126 million riyals.

The eighth contract, with the Korean firm Samho, to build villas for officers in al-Ahsa' for 317 million riyals.

The ninth contract, with the French firm Bijal [sic], to build villas for officers in Jiddah for 126 million riyals.

Thus the costs of the first stage of National Guard military housing come to 8.78 billion riyals, for the construction of more than 11,000 villas in all areas of the kingdom. Then on 13 December 1982 supplementary contracts were signed for 2 billion riyals; these were contracts for public buildings, services and facilities supplementing the first stage of the project with respect to Riyadh, al-Ta'if, al-Dammam and al-Ahsa'.

The final contract in the series of contracts for supplementary buildings for the Jiddah housing project was signed for 325 million riyals on 23 January 1983. On 6 March 1983 a contract was signed with a Korean company to construct the National Guard military personnel housing project in the Dayrab area southwest of Riyadh. The studies for constructing housing for

military personnel in the National Guard have been completed in the Northern and Western Provinces, Medinah and some other towns in the Western Province.

D. Culture and Education.

Adult education and anti-illiteracy schools, 38.

Intermediate night schools, 17.

Secondary night schools, three.

Kindergartens, 29.

Boys' primary, 32.

Girls' primary, 30.

Boys' intermediate, 11.

Girls' intermediate, nine.

Boys' secondary, seven.

Girls' secondary, seven.

E. Medical services.

The National Guard concluded an agreement with a group of Belgian companies to construct two medical cities and two hospitals, one in Jiddah and the other in Riyadh. Each hospital has a capacity of 500 beds and an examination and records center, and an integrated medical town to house doctors, pharmacists, technicians and employees working in the complex is attached to that. In September 1982 His Majesty King Fahd inaugurated the National Guard's King Khalid Hospital in Riyadh. There are bid envelopes for the construction of a similar hospital in the Eastern Province in al-Ahsa' to serve members of the National Guard and their families in this province.

F. The computer in service of the National Guard.

The principle of modernization has been adopted and a special computer department has been established in the National Guard. The department has acquired a system with a storage capacity of 250 million characters. So far 20 trainees have graduated with special training in this computer and they are working in the following sectors:

Storage of information bearing on the guard's files.

Storage of data bearing on spare parts in the maintenance and operations warehouses.

Preparation of organizational schedules bearing on the preventive maintenance of installations and maintenance and operation.

The storage of information bearing on the files of civilian employees.

The storage of information bearing on the files of retired persons.

The storage of vehicle inspection information.

The computerization of salaries of people belonging to the National Guard in Riyadh.

In another area, the office of the head of the National Guard in the Western Province has signed a contract to import advanced computers for the National Guard command in this province and train the personnel needed to operate and maintain this equipment as well as program it. The necessary studies are being made to seek the aid of computer services for the guard command in the remaining areas of the kingdom.

G. Other activities.

The work of the office of the head and the command of the National Guard in the following additional areas is continuing and unremitting:

The renovation of communications systems.

The establishment of military and technical schools to graduate National Guard officers and specialize in missiles, signals and mechanics. At the top of these institutes are:

The King Khalid Military Institute.

The Military Preparatory School.

The King Khalid Military Institute was opened officially on 18 December 1982. The first class graduated from that at the end of the academic year 1984-85. Other schools in the National Guard include the following specializations: instruction of memorization of the Holy Koran, maintenance, music, joint services, driving, culture and sports.

Among the departments with the longest history in the National Guard and the most important of these departments is the General Department of Religious Affairs. Among its most important exalted activities are:

The construction and outfitting of mosques and the provision of imams and prayer callers for them.

The appointment of religious guides to the units of the National Guard.

The teaching of memorization of the holy Koran.

The printing and distribution of holy Koran in quantity.

H. The cavalry.

The National Guard in 1970 completed the establishment of its cavalry, which now consists of 989 horsemen. In addition to its contribution to operations as a surveillance and reconnaissance force on behalf of the guard's battalions, this service includes the following tasks:

Participation in official festivities to receive and accompany the country's major guests.

Stimulation of sporting festivals, participation in recreational celebrations and performance of athletic exhibits.

The effort to produce horses in the National Guard and preserve the purity and genuineness of Arabian horses.

I. New athletic activity projects in the National Guard.

Work has been completed on the sporting center in Hishm al-'An, which is located 20 kilometers east of Riyadh and contains all necessary equipment for athletic, cultural and social activities. This includes:

A stadium accommodating 5,000 spectators including special boxes accommodating 180 major guests.

An enclosed sports auditorium for handball, basketball, racquetball, tennis, boxing, wrestling and judo which can accommodate 2,000 spectators. It has boxes for 180 major guests and facilities for 150 athletes and trainers, three baths and a gymnastics and weightlifting room.

A special section for major guests containing two rest areas.

A special section for guests containing a restaurant for 150 people, a stage and lecture hall and a reading and television room.

A services section containing a kitchen that can provide 250 meals and administrative offices.

A mosque that can accommodate 300 worshippers.

A number of outdoor playing fields.

In addition to the above, there is the National Guard Club and its olympic village, which contains 24 villas that can accommodate 24 persons. The village can accommodate 800 persons with full lodgings. There also is a dining room which can serve this number of people and there also is a mosque attached to the village which is adequate for the residents.

J. Public relations in the National Guard.

This department is indeed the crowning touch. It was established in 1969 and its activities are many and numerous. Among the most important of these are:

The assumption of activities dealing with morale, in terms of guidance, planning, curricula and application. In this regard it uses all well known modern audio-visual methods of information and guidance, seminars, lectures and meetings. The Public Relations Department consists of nine major departments:

1. The information department.
2. The photography and movie department.
3. The library department.
4. The recording department.
5. The planning and followup department.
6. The research and study department.
7. The department of ceremonial events.
8. The press and publication department.

In addition to the above, it has a central library containing 80,000 books and 27 subsidiary branch libraries in the units and sectors. On top of all these departments and branches, the General Public Relations Department has for 5 years been putting out monthly issues of the National Guard magazine in a new format, with articles on military education that are rich, interesting and copious.

Public relations in the National Guard are considered among the most productive and effective of national, social and human activities in comparison with any context. This success, thanks to almighty God, can be attributed to the support of the head of the National Guard and his assistant, His Highness Prince 'Abdallah Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz and His Highness Prince Badr Ibn 'Abd-al-Aziz, and to their approval of the energy, competence and sagacity of its general chairman, Shaykh 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Shutari, a dynamic personality who is brimming over with devotion, loyalty and self-sacrifice on behalf of God, the nation and the royal family. This noble family has been known for its proficiency in choosing aides and assistants. This is a primary distinction of major leaders and great commanders who have built countries and established nations.

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AFGHANISTAN

ARTICLE DEPICTS MUJAHIDIN'S DAILY STRUGGLE

Paris LE MONDE in French 19-20 May 85 pp 4-5

[Article by Catherine Chattard]

[Text] Playing Hide-and-Seek With Fear

Darker than the night, Sarbaz's shadow is floating ahead of the group of Afghan maquis, on the stony plain. We are walking steadily, silently, softly. No longer are we stumbling constantly as during our first night marches, leaning backwards, our muscles made tense by the fear of an invisible obstacle. We are no longer collapsing every 15 minutes, all pride forgotten and all willpower gone, ready to give up. After so many departures and alarms, so much hardship and that insane pace, I have become hardened. Now, we are moving on, taking a very simple pleasure in being so good at making out and going around the obstacles that are on our path.

Did he lose his way in this landscape without any landmarks? Sarbaz, our guide, is squatting, tense, on the alert with all his senses. Living in war, we sometimes forget about it and for a moment I believe he wants to embrace his country. In the north, the lights of Jallalabad--the fourth largest Afghan town, near the Pakistani border--form a halo that catches the eye. I had forgotten: from the airport, helicopters can overtake us in 10 minutes. I am weary at the thought of having to play hide-and-seek once again. All of a sudden, I am overcome with fatigue. Then, Sarbaz pushes away a few stones, throws himself on the ground and listens to the earth vibrations. And this ancient gesture in the face of the Soviet armada enables him to recognize the peculiar staccato of tank caterpillars.

With the greatest self-confidence, he informs us that a convoy of Soviet armored vehicles is moving toward C. That is precisely our next stop on the road back to Pakistan. Another hour and we were face to face. For a long time, we stay there, all eight of us, standing against the wind, holding our breaths, shivering.

Carried by the gusts of wind, the purring sound of the engines is getting louder. Flares, lures: helicopters are escorting the convoy and their powerful searchlights are exploring the dark. We retreat to the village we left that evening... We are almost running, breathless with panic,

craning our necks to watch the movements of the helicopters. At the village entrance, a man who could not sleep cheerfully greets us with the ritual words "zenda boshi," "remain alive"...

A few hours ago, some 30 fighters were saying goodbye to us here. We smoked a last cigarette together, I give you my watch, you give me your bracelet, "deck asti,"--"are you sad?," "when are you coming back?" Silent handshakes... The first steps backwards, dragging the feet and then... forward!

For nearly one month now, we have been going freely up and down the valley of S... in Afghanistan. Each day spent inquiring is a small victory, like thumbing our noses at the army of "non-occupation." Especially since the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan stated that "next time, phony reporters and the like will be eliminated; our troops will help the Afghan army take care of that." No, the Abouchar case has not knocked any sense into us... On the contrary, it has strengthened our determination to speak up.

Discretion and Fatalism

Curled up, three of us, under a blossoming shrub full of thorns that Providence has placed here on dry ground, we are waiting for the explosion to occur...Time is like at a standstill.

The helicopters go around the hill. A host of mujahidin that were hiding in the bushes rush toward a clump of trees. Four hundred meters to cover. If just one of us is still in sight before [as published] the helicopters turn around...

So, what about it! It's no big deal. What is going on is hopelessly commonplace; too commonplace to move the rebels who start off again, singing. That evening, at the mosque they will not even mention it. Yet, these men are not impervious to fear. They feel safe only in their own province. Often, we must go around a village because our group knows no one there or fears a clash with fighters from a rival political party. Some of our companions, inscrutable, serious, attentive faces, turn into live wires the moment we reach their valley.

The Afghans often affect a royal unconcern for war atrocities. They seldom unbosom, hardly ever complain. They have the discretion and fatalism that absolute confidence in the will of Allah implies. On the other hand, they can talk forever about their guerrilla operations. Repeated from village to village, the account of a mere brush with the government army turns into an epos as days go by. It is not that they do not think. More than ever, in 1985, they measure the difficulties on which the future of the resistance hangs; weapons of inadequate quality, internal divisions, danger of famine, weariness of the civilian populations, fighting methods poorly adapted to the Soviet military escalation, etc.

Simply, to offset their realism, there is the rough poetry and enthusiasm they show in all things. Besides, lacking any serious political work among civilian populations, these lively military reports that become a legend in their own time double as propaganda.

To tell the truth, the mujahidin no longer need to dramatize their war. The facts are there: villagers burned alive, undressed women thrown alive from an helicopter... Imagination flinches at finding worse. All these pictures would be the opening topic of the eight o'clock news if war correspondents could work in Afghanistan the way they used to work in Vietnam.

These tales are reserved for hours of leisure or quiet days. The fighters then spend hours cleaning their weapons, reading the Koran, looking dreamily at nature and picking flowers. However, the commander and his assistants are working without respite. They must send messengers to the four corners of the valley, on mule-back since they have no emitters-receivers, account for the ammunition, select the objective of the next operation, plan the attack, distribute the weapons, coordinate fighter groups, provide logistic support, realize once more, fuming, that they are going to get killed if they attack such a large garrison with so few weapons... and then select a more modest objective: for instance an outpost of the Afghan army.

The commander must also attend a funeral meal, offer his condolences to the family of a martyr, give his opinion on a quarrel between two villages, and a thousand other things. Then, suddenly, at nightfall, he must steal away so no one will know where he sleeps. We never slept twice in the same place.

"Commander Z..." and the Population

Z..., the military commander of the valley of S..., is only 23. He has acquired his prestige in the field in the past three years: harassing the Soviet-Afghan posts that surround Jallalabad; taking part with other commanders in the sabotage of pylons and water systems; raiding the airport at night, etc. But it is not enough to wage battle successfully to win the esteem of the fighters and the blessing of the civilian populations. It also takes insight, the strength to convince, piety, and above all much diplomacy with all the traditional officials of the valley: clerics, judges, former schoolteachers, landowners and all other influential individuals. Only then will the population accept to endure the Soviet reprisals that will follow any resistance operation.

Commander Z..., therefore, is involved in all domains of social life merely because he cannot do anything without the support of the population. This is why the Soviets want to empty the country through the terror of bombings: gone the civilian population, gone the resistance.

Z... regularly curses his party, headquartered at Peshawar, in Pakistan. The aid he receives in weapons, ammunition and money is insignificant compared to what he needs. He is cutting corners: no more cigarettes for the fighters; meat and rice once or twice a week... Then, his men take turns going to work in Pakistan or going back to their villages to till their fields. Z... is spending a lot of time solving small problems. For instance: where will the 50 fighters that accompany him take their meals today? That problem must be solved every day. If he asks too much help from one family, they may get tired one day and decide to emigrate to Pakistan. If he asks one family more often than the other, then there may be frictions. Under these conditions, how can he expect to turn the fighters into "professionals"?

The commander often feels quite lonely. He has no one to assist him effectively. If he were to die, it would be a great loss and a step backward for the resistance in the valley. The Afghan resistance cruelly lacks cadres. Z... himself completed two years of religious studies in Pakistan; no military training other than that which he acquired in fighting at the side of the best Afghan guerrilla chiefs.

"How Is Life Going?"

What he hopes is that foreign aid, Arab, Chinese or American, will reach him one day. Not the crumbs he receives through his party, but substantial aid: "The Soviets would not have one minute of peace."

While I was at S..., a base of 300 mujahidin set up higher up in the valley was under attack for four days. Three times, SU-25 fighter-bombers dive-bombed it. Then, helicopter-borne commandos were brought to the zone periphery. Every night, some people from S... would go up there to bring supplies: bread, water, cooked meat. Surprised by the attack, the semi-nomads of the village located below the zone left in a mad rush toward the lower end of the valley. But their possessions were plundered, their houses ransacked. Worse still: their herd, 120 camels, was machine-gunned at point blank range by the Soviet commandos. Within a few minutes, irreplaceable wealth was reduced to nought, so that these families will probably go into exile in Pakistan. At the end of the fourth day of fighting, the mujahidin ran short of ammunition, abandoned their positions and took away their wounded commander. Five helicopters were shot down.

Nagiaya, 18, a student and a resistance fighters during the holidays, went up there to check the conditions of the place. He went up slowly, for the Soviets have scattered thousands of anti-personnel mines on the access roads, and we heard them banging far away (and close by...) for days and days. He brought back a rucksack full of food rations abandoned by the commandos. On the menu: canned beef and peas "made in Bulgaria."

Only five years ago, the valley of S... was prosperous, verdant, pleasant. Affluent Kabuli had their country residences there. It must have been somewhat like our Pyrenees. Today, it is desolate. This wealth was based on agriculture and it did not survive. Every year, more fields lie fallow. Life is wasting away.

At midnight, as we enter unannounced into a house, to camp there, the patriarch, almost a centenarian, wakes up. He makes an effort to stand up, like an old dead tree. Hand on the heart, the commander greets him and asks: "How is life going?" The only answer is a wail and, in his eyes clouded with tears, nostalgia for the past.

Women With an Icy Stare

The Afghans are used to live in hardship. They have the tenacity generated by austere landscapes, cold starry nights, hot sand winds. But the French doctors who regularly go to Afghanistan since the start of the war report an increase in psychological troubles among civilians. All I know is the

icy stare of women when bombers are approaching, the cries of babies being tossed about, the frantic run to the shelter or the sugar-cane field.

Commander Z... is well aware that the population is tired. For instance, some peasants are reluctant to give one tenth of their harvest as a tax for the resistance. Yet, no one here questions the fighters' stubborn determination and uncompromisingness.

The new generation of commanders makes the best of its ridiculous weapons. They know their enemy, they have set up efficient intelligence networks, and little by little they are overcoming their rivalries to coordinate their operations.

The valley of S... has been subjected to only one offensive comparable in scope to the Panchir offensive. It was, in 1980, like a steamroller destroying everything on its way; a week of gloom: 1,000 dead. Today, Soviet tactics is more cunning; it aims at neutralizing the resistance at the least cost. It associates two types of operations: sudden attacks against mujahedin bases whose locations have been identified by reconnaissance planes and confirmed by intelligence services; and reprisals against villages, to dissuade them from supporting the resistance. This second method generates resentment against the fighters among the civilian population. The villagers will tend to put pressure on the fighters to make them keep quiet. If it were not that commander Z... has such good relations with the population, the resistance would certainly be paralyzed.

The Dozing Sentinel

Despairing of ever putting notions of discipline into the heads of his men, commander Z... has a fit of anger and then tries again, for the umpteenth time, to explain what makes a good sentinel: do not smoke, a fortiori do not smoke hashish; woe betide him who is found at dawn in that state of typical listlessness!; probe into the dark while you pace up and down, the charger engaged; provide for an orderly changing of the guard.

Young Ayub is in an awkward situation: last night, he dozed off... The others nod with the embarrassed air of children who are being scolded. Then, the lesson takes place: Z... is simulating the attack of a sentinel. Ayub starts walking, heavily, with an earnest air. Already, everybody is laughing. The commander, playing the role of the assailant, jumps on Ayub and brings him down in no time... General laughter...

A surprising harmony reigns within our small community. For days and days, the mujahidin are always together, and yet there is almost never any friction between them. It is as if there were no life more attractive and no nobler occupation than to fight the holy war. It brings each of them closer to the Prophet's life. The companionship of rebellion overthrows traditional hierarchies. Among us, there is Kari, at whom all are poking fun because he is harebrained and romantic; all adore him, for kindness is written all over his face. All day long, he looks as if he were reflecting on metaphysical problems, and in the evening he reads the Koran to himself. There is also a former non-commissioned officer who deserted from the Afghan army.

And the maulawi, a well-read cleric and famous fighter, a sort of nonchalant giant with a deadpan face. There is Yussof, Mohammad, Nawruz... craftsman, farmer, sanctuary warden. Anyone who feels depressed soon catches again the cheerfulness, sense of humor and warmth of the group.

For the foreigner, the other side of the picture is the lack of any privacy. In the morning, I wait until the men have finished their ablutions and gather at the mosk for the prayer; then, I go wash myself in the river or in an irrigation ditch. This is the only time when I am alone in this all-male society. Disguised as a youth, rebaptized with an Afghan name, my presence does not seem to offend the fighters. Certainly, my position is so far from their conception of the role and place of women that they forget that I am a woman... Simply, at the end of the trip, these awkward words thrown at me by way of a compliment: "You are more than a man."

"Do You Have a Husband, Children?"

Every time I go into houses, women do not believe their eyes. They welcome me so warmly that I feel as if I had always known them. They are curious about everything and begin right away with "basic" subjects: "Do you have a husband, children? Are you not getting bored of always being with the mujahedin? Are you not tired of walking? What do you do when you have your period? Do you know that medicine that prevents you from having children? We could use it, for we shall soon be unable to feed them properly. Shirin whom you see here, her baby was stillborn last week. Perhaps it is because of all the bombs that the Churavis (Russians) are sending us." When I mention the existence of armed women fighters in other Muslim countries, they remain pensive. Of course, there are no women among the mujahidin. But there are some who carry explosives under their chador or work as liaison agents, carrying messages into town.

Every evening, it is the same story: we silently enter a sleeping village. We settle down in a mosk. Immediately, two or three fighters go wake up the neighbors to get us a meal. They knock again and again on the wooden doors. They ask for bread here, for tea there, for grease broth at another place.

In the mosk, a cloud of acrid dust comes out of the straw. There is little ventilation. In the yard, 30 pairs of sandals, all identical. How do they manage to find their own? Sometimes, I forget that you must not smoke in a mosk, and the commander looks at me reprovingly for this offense to the holy place.

One storm lantern, three bent silhouettes: children collapsing under the weight of blankets. We are lucky! It is so cold! The procession goes on; men bring the jar of water to wash our hands and mouths; others, dishes hastily prepared by women roused from their sleep. "Gray beards" and young fighters come to hear the news. But no one is talking. The BBC broadcast in Persian announces that the Soviet are concentrating fresh troops in garrisons nearby, to close the border and cut off the resistance fighters from their rear bases in Pakistan.

All of a sudden, the atmosphere becomes feverish. Everyone comments the news, assesses the chances of the resistance--with the help of God, but still without ground-to-air missiles, without mine detectors, without transmission systems, sometimes without binoculars... "Often, during a confrontation, their soldiers will desert and come over to our side with their light weapons and even with canons. Most of our weapons were taken from the enemy. But access to urban objectives is becoming increasingly dangerous," commander Z... explains. And what does he think of the attempts at "pacification" made by the KHAD--the Afghan secret police--and the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities? For him, these rallyings are not to last: "These are people who easily turn coat." And what about the hundreds of children sent to the Soviet Union every year to be educated there?... Sigh...

"Infiltrated Agents"

For the moment, the main concern of commander Z... is to evade KHAD informers. For two days now, fighters have flown at low altitude over the villages where we stopped. Was not communication equipment found in the back shop of a merchant? Sometimes, the mujahidin know well who the "infiltrated agents" are; but they don't touch them for fear of starting a cycle of vendetta whose only result would be to weaken the resistance.

Concerned about our safety, the commander now wants us to leave the country. My travelling companion, on a humanitarian mission, is 23. He came to bring to the Afghans an aid of FF 150,000, a gift from French people collected by AFRANE.* The money was given directly to 276 families particularly afflicted by the war; they were selected by the representatives of each village. Many widows, old couples whose sons died under the bombs. According to this young volunteer unconcerned by political stakes, individuals must step in where states give up; we cannot watch the struggle of a people without undertaking anything.

We crossed again the mountains, encountered again the rotting corpses of camels, savoured the tea of miserable "chaikhanas" where the refugees rest and exchange news from all Afghanistan, crossed again these villages where, at night, there is no way to tell whether they are inhabited or deserted, except for the frenzied barking of the big dogs.

We have reached the last Afghan pass at the hour of prayer. Sarbaz is making his ablutions without water, mimicking the gestures. He rolls up his sleeves, lets an imaginary liquid roll from the hollow of his hand along his arms and moistens his face with sand. God is certainly his most familiar companion.

* AFRANE (French-Afghan Friendship), P.O. Box 254, 75524-Paris Cedex II--Postal Bank Account 1207758L (Paris). The French-Afghan Friendship Association was created early in 1980, as an answer to the military occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviets, to bring an aid to Afghan victims of the foreign intervention. A humanitarian aid organization, AFRANE, wants only to help the Afghans and has no connections with any political party.

BANGLADESH

ADVISER PREDICTS FALL IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 12 May 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] Finance Adviser to the President M. Syeduzzaman told BBC in London on Saturday that the foreign exchange reserve for Bangladesh next year would further fall to a level of over 30 crore dollar. The foreign exchange reserve was 520 million dollar last year and it would stand at 380 million dollar by the end of the current financial year, Mr. Syeduzzaman said. He, however, presumed that the reserve next year could be 45 crore dollar but after meeting the import bills debt servicing and repayment of short-term loan made for purchase of foodgrains the actual reserve position would be over 30 crore dollar.

In an interview with the BBC on his way back home from the Bangladesh Aid Consortium meeting, Mr. Syeduzzaman also admitted that the remittances from the Bangladeshi nationals abroad has also showed a decline. Elaborating he said, the amount was 60 crore dollar in 1982-83; 55.2 crore dollar in 1983-84 and 45 crore dollar this year.

The Finance Adviser was however optimistic that more 20 crore dollar aid might be made available to Bangladesh by countries or agencies who are not full members of the Aid Consortium. The figure by the year end is likely to go up to near 190 crore dollar. Bangladesh asked for 192 crore dollar, he said. At the meeting Bangladesh has got a pledge for an aid of 167.5 crore dollar for 1985-86 financial year Mr Syeduzzaman told his questioner that Bangladesh has suffered a loss of Taka 1000 crore (\$38 crore) due to the last devastating flood.

Mr Syeduzzaman felt that the aid pledged by the Consortium was satisfactory in view of the change in the aid policy of the change in the aid policy cies. But the position would improve by the end of the year as it happens generally. He said budgets of many countries have not yet been prepared and some agencies could not yet fix up the source of their funds. Mr Syeduzzaman said as a result the pledge of 167.5 crore dollar is considered to be the last figure the Consortium members could offer at the moment.

The BBC further said that the Financial Times in a report on Saturday said quoting high Bangladesh Government officials that Bangladesh might receive 20 crore dollar more than the amount pledged in the just concluded Paris Bangladesh Aid Consortium meeting.

BANGLADESH

PLAN TARGET OF REDUCING POPULATION GROWTH NOT MET

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 9 May 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] The growth rate of country's population could be curbed only 0.3 per cent in five years from 1980 to 1985.

The official sources admitted that the target for reducing the growth rate of the booming population to 1.7 per cent from 2.7 could not be achieved during the Second Five Year Plan that ends next month.

The sources referred to a number of reasons like structural weakness of the plan programme, lack of supervision, physical facilities and community participation responsible for not achieving the target.

The target for curbing the population growth rate of 1.7 in five years was described as an 'ambitious' one. A two-year action programme was launched after the review of the five-year plan by the Government by the end of 1982.

The sources also admitted that after Martial Law government came to power, only five per cent corruption cases could be detected in carrying out the mass-programmes for population control throughout the country.

Now the Government is contemplating to refix the target of curbing the population growth at 1.8 per cent from the existing 2.4 by 1990 under the Third Five-Year Plan beginning in July next.

CSO: 4600/1607

IRAN

COUNTRY TRAPPED IN WAR

Paris LE MONDE in French 15, 16, 17 May 85

[Article by Jean Gueyras: "Iran in the Trap of War"]

[15 May 85 pp 1, 5]

[Text] Despite all the attempts at mediation, the most recent being that of the secretary general of the United Nations, Iran still refuses to negotiate a settlement with Iraq, even though the latter has so requested, as long as President Saddam Husayn remains in power in Baghdad.

Iranian Prime Minister Musavi said on Monday, 13 May, that his country will not participate in the Security Council debate on the conflict as long as the United Nations has not "explicitly condemned the Iraqi aggression." Although sorely tested by nearly 5 years of war, Iran still intends to win a military victory. The head of the Tehran government has said -- even though on the land front, the situation has been calm since mid March -- that his army will go on the offensive "as soon as the opportunity presents itself."

Tehran--Nearly 6 years after the Islamic revolution, the United States still remains the . . . Satan.

Deboarding from the plane, a foreign visitor has the leisure in the airport lobby to contemplate at length -- while the bothersome searches are carried out -- an immense slogan written in red ceramic tile: "Down with America!" That same phrase will be heard throughout his entire stay in Iran, repeated in Persian like an obsessive refrain by the *hezbollahis*, who have made it their war cry, and by the *maktabis*, who use it as a sort of "amen" at the end of their prayers or their political speeches. It is also found written in capital letters in the halls of the big international hotels now guarded by the Islamic organizations. In certain ministries, and whether one likes it or not, one tramples the Stars and Stripes painted on the ground in indelible letters.

The "nest of spies," meaning the old American Embassy, has remained as it was at the time of the release of the hostages in January 1981. The thick walls

bristling with barbed wire surrounding the buildings are still smeared with inscriptions hostile to the Americans, while those of the Soviet Embassy have just been cleared, with the friendly authorization of Iranian authorities, following the recent rapprochement between Moscow and Tehran. The observation posts whence the "students following the Imam's line" exhorted the crowds with their loudspeakers give the whole scene the look of an abandoned concentration camp set up right in the heart of Tehran.

The old embassy buildings are far from deserted, however. Occupied by the Foundation of Martyrs, they have been partially turned into schools where the children of war victims wishing to enroll in the corps of *pasdarans* (guardians of the revolution) receive ideological and Islamic instruction. Whatever the case, newsmen are not admitted here, perhaps to prevent them, somewhere in the vast wooded grounds of the embassy, from running into some of the old "students in the Imam's line" who tirelessly continue their work of reconstituting confidential telegrams seized at the time of the embassy takeover in November 1979. Some 56 thick volumes have already been published and it would appear that the work of compilation is far from being completed, so prolific and careless were the American diplomats, who noted and classified not only their own observations and commentaries, but also all messages exchanged by their embassies throughout the world.

Paradoxically enough, American culture and way of life, officially harried with so much zeal, are beginning to make a timid comeback in the streets of Tehran, especially in the taxis, where the drivers, who never deprive themselves of the luxury of saying what they think of the regime, blast the ears of their passengers with the latest pop music cassettes sold illegally to the detriment of the hezbollahis. Fast food restaurants are proliferating at an astonishing rate.

Despite the decision of authorities in February to close some 150 boutiques specializing in what here they call "frivolities" (T-shirts with English writing or see-through blouses), the sale of such "merchandise of perdition" continues in other stores located downtown and especially in the northern section of the city, where what are now called the *taghoutis* (representatives of the old regime) once reigned.

And yet, the *taghoutis* had adapted to the Islamic regime, while partially maintaining their old way of life. Before the imposition of the blackout, which by sundown plunges the capital into total darkness, the evenings were apparently quite gay in certain northern districts, especially on Thursdays, when the young and not-so-young organized parties that were scarcely Islamic, without being the target of too much harassment on the part of the representatives of committees in charge of imposing respect for a certain austerity.

The situation has since changed. Iraqi bombings have literally plunged into war a people that had formerly observed from a distance and rather absent-mindedly, the conflict with Iraq on television during the dinner hour. Great panic then seized Tehran, in the north and the south. Many were those who went to sleep at the homes of relatives or friends who lived in what they thought were less exposed sectors. Or they spent the night together in their cars on the roads leading to the foothills of Alborz, which overlooks Tehran.

The northern section of the capital has been bombed only twice, on 11 and 14 March, and there were few victims. The poorer areas in the south where the *mostaza-fins* (the deprived) live were hit harder, at least 15 times, between 18 March and 3 April. And yet, it is impossible to draw up an accurate list of the losses suffered, since the authorities systematically minimize them in their communiques so as not to worsen panic and the growing discontent with continuation of the war.

Tested Methods

For this purpose, the authorities used methods that had already been tested in the bombing of cities located near the front. Each time a district was seriously hit, it was immediately isolated from the rest of the city while waiting for the bulldozers to go into action to get rid of the ruins. Once the ground was "cleaned up," a television crew went to the spot, but always preceded by a group of hezbollahis who, in front of the cameras, played the role of the inhabitants "who asked nothing more than to continue the war until victory," while the real occupants, in the midst of disaster, scarcely thought about uttering a peep.

Some even said that the provocative behavior of these hezbollahis was at the root of the incidents which, on Wednesday, 10 April, pitted the inhabitants of the 13 Aban district against the pasdarans. It is not yet possible to know exactly what happened that day in the area, so diverse are the accounts of the incidents.

What is certain, however, is that the 10 April demonstration in a district essentially settled by mostazafins -- who supposedly constitute the social base of the Islamic regime, was for the leaders in Tehran not only a shock, but also a warning. They apparently failed to take it into account and after a few days of embarrassed silence, preferred to blame the incidents on the "communist or fedayeen mojahedin plotters." The important thing for them was to show that the incidents had been provoked by "foreign elements" in the district, while the main characteristic of the movement was precisely its spontaneous nature, expressing a general groundswell in the face of economic difficulties worsened by the war.

According to the few witnesses, the demonstration that degenerated into a confrontation between the pasdarans and the residents of the district was partially provoked by the indifference of local authorities, who reportedly lent a deaf ear to the demands for aid of families hit by the disaster and who wanted to rebuild their destroyed or damaged housing. The women, ordinarily docile, are said to have taken over leadership of the movement and issued the first slogans against the war and the government.

One may well wonder what would have happened if the Iraqi bombings of Tehran had not ceased. Would there have been other 13 Abans or even a general uprising against the regime, as some of its adversaries claim? When questioned on this point, the authorities express a made-to-order optimism, stating that they "have experience with this type of reactions of passion," an obvious reference to the big cities of the Khuzistan subjected to Iraqi bombing long

before Tehran and that in the final analysis, the victims of the bombings "are mainly angry at those who drop the bombs."

It is obvious that by alternating selective repression and appeals to a lively patriotism, the authorities can limit the risk of explosion all the more easily because in Iran, there apparently exists no organized force of opposition capable of channeling the latent discontent and place the regime in difficulty.

Disappointed Hopes

Whatever the case, while there is definitely a loss of support of the mostazafins for a regime that has always boasted of being their protector, this is above all due to the deterioration of the economic situation, which seems to be irreversible. "The Iranian leaders are paralyzed," one intellectual who lives in northern Tehran told us, "by the contradictions that exist between their revolutionary affinities and phraseology and their conservative ideology and nature. Furthermore, they cannot create a just society because they cannot seize wealth -- which would be contrary to religious tradition -- to redistribute it to the poor. In addition, they have proved that they were incapable of managing production, even though they are past masters at the art of handling repression! They can therefore not respond to the hopes which they themselves generated among the population."

A few hundred meters away from the modest apartment of our interlocutor, four luxurious villas that had belonged to taghoutis have just been sold to *bazaris* (bazaar merchants). Despite their perpetual recriminations against the economic mess, the latter seem to be the main beneficiaries of the Islamic regime and those who have profited the most, along with certain regime officials, from speculation and the black market. Officially, the latter does not exist. There is rather talk of the "free market" where one can buy anything one wants provided, naturally, that one has the money. Thus, a kilo of rice, the basic food staple of the Iranians, costs 70 ryals (1 franc = 10 ryals) when one has ration coupons, but on the free market, the cost may go as high as 1,000. A kilo of sugar (35 ryals) costs ten times more on this market. The price of meat varies from 750 ryals to 2,000 ryals a kilo for the best cuts, without mentioning the products that one finds only on the free market, such as potatoes, for example, at at least 300 ryals a kilo.

Exodus to Big Cities

With an average wage of some 30,000 ryals -- a government employee receives 40,000 and a skilled worker nearly 60,000 -- and a rent which, in Tehran, is nearly equal to an average wage for two rooms, a large number of Iranians have been forced to reduce their standard of living. Some of the poorest people from southern Tehran are now down to a single meal a day including bread, cheese and fruit. An intermediate-level official who is the father of two children and who receives nearly 80,000 ryals a month told us that he has had to make big cuts in order to enable his family to live decently. He has just sold his car and adds that neither he nor his wife has bought new clothes for 5 years. Furthermore, they have "long since stopped inviting friends to the house for dinner."

This official from northern Tehran, who had enthusiastically welcomed the Islamic revolution, is not the only one to observe that his standard of living has deteriorated compared with what it was under the Shah. Some of the young radical deputies from Majlis do not hesitate to proclaim it from the rostrum. Voting in August against the proposed government budget, the deputy from Nadjafabad, Nadi Nadjafabadi, a mullah who has remained close to the people, said that the GNP had dropped by half since 1979, from 7.5 trillion ryals to 3.2 trillion, while money in circulation was three times greater than the volume of liquidities in 1979. He emphasized that in the last years of the Shah's reign, 40 percent of the urban population had 66 percent of all consumer goods and that in 1984, the proportion had scarcely changed, "even though we made the revolution to bring about social justice." Deputy Moussaviani, for his part, in order to better emphasize the deterioration of the economic situation in rural areas since the revolution, said that in 1973, a peasant could buy a gold piece with 72 kilos of wheat, while in 1983, it would have taken him nearly 1,500 kilos.

The deterioration in living conditions in rural areas has worsened the exodus to the big cities. Tehran, which in 1979 had 5.6 million inhabitants, has now exceeded 9 million. The population of the city of Karadj rose during the same period from 300,000 to 1.93 million; that of Qom from 200,000 to 2 million; of Ispahan, from 1.1 million to 2 million. The flow of peasants to the big cities, already packed with refugees from Afghanistan and the border zones, has contributed to uncontrolled growth of the shantytowns and worsened the lack of security in some peripheral districts of Tehran, already hard hit by unemployment. In fact, it is estimated that 64 percent of the Iranian unemployed, whose number varies between 5 and 6 million, are city dwellers. This caused the mayor of Tehran to say, in February 1984, that the danger of "immigration to the big cities was much more serious than the danger from Saddam Husayn."

Continuation of the conflict is naturally used by leaders in Tehran to conceal the real reasons for the regime's economic bankruptcy, but this interminable war, which at the beginning of the revolution served as a catalyst for the government, can no longer fulfill that role, so greatly has it drained the people.

[16 May 85 p 3]

[Text] The continuous deterioration in the economic situation due to the prolonged war has roused the protests of the poor vis-a-vis a regime that boasts of being their protector. And yet, there is no organized opposition force in the country capable of channeling and using the latent discontent in order to try to shake the government (LE MONDE, 14 May).

Tehran--"War, war, even with the United States!" With tens of thousands of faithful followers squatting in the courtyard of the University of Tehran taking up the chant, the phrase begins the series of "mobilizing slogans" launched by the master of ceremonies in charge of electrifying the crowd before the speech to be given by President Ali Khomeyni, who is at the same time the imam jome (Friday prayer imam) of Tehran.

The captive audience echoes the slogans they are prompted to shout more and more loudly: "This imposed war poses problems for Saddam Husayn"; "Saddam's regime is in trouble"; "We will never accept an imposed peace"; "We shall wage war until final victory"; "Our war is a defensive war"; "A people that does not fear martyrdom cannot be conquered!"

These are the themes that President Khomeyni will soon take up. On this 12 April, the crowd is particularly large. Perhaps the people want to hear the official reaction to the demonstration that took place 2 days previously in the 13 Aban district in southern Tehran and where, for the first time since the revolution, thousands of "deprived" decried "the war, Khomeyni and the pasdarans."

Nothing is left to chance in the organization of the *namaz jome* (Friday prayer). Since the 1979 revolution, this ceremony has become one of the essential means used by the clergy in power to take its political message to the far corners of the country. Endowed with a structured organization having a central committee installed in Qom under the chairmanship of Ayatollah Mechkini, the imam jome of the Iranian holy city and president of the assembly of experts in charge of planning for the succession of Imam Khomeyni, the *namaz jome* has become tentacular and now has an ultramodern telex system enabling him to receive detailed reports every Wednesday on the situation throughout the country so as to better work up the issues that will be developed at the Friday prayers.

Since resumption of the war in March with the bombings of the cities and Operation Badr in the Al-Howeiza marshes, the imams jome have devoted their sermons to the "inevitability of victory." "We have never been so close," they claim, taking advantage of the opportunity to denounce all those who want to "push us to conclude an unsatisfactory peace with the regime of Saddam Husayn, who is about to fall." In short, those who want to negotiate peace with Iraq -- and they are legion in Iran, although they dare not say so openly -- are said to be participating, consciously or unconsciously, in an American-inspired international conspiracy whose essential purpose is to deprive Iran of the victory which it is about to win and for which tens of thousands of *chahid* (martyrs) have died.

Cult of the Martyr

The organizers of the Friday prayers are past masters at the art of cultivating the cult of the martyr. In the vast university grounds, alongside the soldiers, the disabled, military corps, the pasdarans and the *bassidj* [translation unknown], "candidates for martyrdom" wear white shrouds bearing the inscription "We are here to suffer martyrdom." It is a reference to the faithful recently killed in this same university courtyard during an attack on President Khomeyni.

The *bassidj*, "volunteers for death" whose age varies between 15 and 75, unfailingly first make a visit to the University of Tehran before going to the front, in order to make their devotions and make those lukewarm about the war feel guilty. Wearing red headbands with the slogan *Labeyk ya Khomeyni* (Here we are, Khomeyni) written in white letters, they are the most assiduous in

reciting the verses of the Koran and in chanting the assembly's slogans, which they literally scream out: "War, war, until victory!" And: "Never, never, we would never accept it!" when the imam asks the crowd: "Do you think we should make peace?" Or: "Does the war bother you?"

The Friday prayer ceremonies in some ways resemble a high mass, with the priests exorcising the demons of peace with Iraq. Bazargan and his friends are regularly denounced for their "defeatism" even though their names are never pronounced. They are not the only adversaries of war, in fact.

It is a well-known fact that some 20 deputies in Majlis, members of the ultra-conservative brotherhood of the *hodjatiah* are hostile to the continuation of the fighting, even though no public statement has been made in that sense. Generally situated on the far right of the current Iranian political spectrum, the *hodjatiah* distinguish themselves from the "supporters of the imam's line" on several points. In particular, they oppose the very notion of the *velayate faguih*, which makes Imam Khomeyni the political and religious leader of the *ummah* (Muslim community). The brotherhood of the *hodjatiah* maintains that it participated actively in the war and that 70 of its members perished on the fields of battle. But their adversaries have a heyday when they recall a phrase pronounced in November 1981 by one of their leaders, Alavi: "The martyrs of the war are not martyrs; they are simply dead." The phrase is all the more sacriligious because the cult of the martyr has been elevated here into an intangible dogma toward which no one dares show disrespect. Furthermore, the *hodjatiah*, close to the bazaris, join the latter in condemning a conflict which, in their opinion, is at the root of the slump of the market and the economic and political stagnation of society. Finally, the *hodjatiah*, at the prompting of ayatollahs Qomi Tabatabaie and Khoi, believe that no one has the right to proclaim the *jihad* (the offensive holy war) before the re-appearance of the 12th hidden imam.

A similar statement attributed to Ayatollah Golpayagani was formally disclaimed by his office in Qom, but people here are convinced that the venerable dignitary OO he is over 85 -- shares the view of his two illustrious colleagues. Imam Khomeyni has in addition just confirmed the existence of "dissidence" within the clergy, stating that the dissidents were a minority and linked to those who, at the prompting of the United States, "want at all costs for us to make peace with Saddam Husayn, probably referring to Barzargan and his friends, who have repeatedly openly proclaimed the need for a "just and honorable solution" to the Iranian-Iraqi conflict.

It is said in Tehran, without decisive proof to back up the statement, that Ayatollah Montazeri would not be very satisfied with the way in which the war is being conducted. The fact is that the presumed successor to the imam has ceased to bring up this burning issue in public since the failure of Operation Badr. This has caused a great deal of ink to flow, revealing that Ayatollah Montazeri had for some time "shaded" his radical proposals on the war and repression.

Peace Worse Than War

Whatever the case, Imam Khomeyni is not a man to let himself be overruled by what he considers futile remarks. He is firmly determined not to deviate one whit from the path he has outlined. He said so and repeated it several times last month, particularly in a statement made on 13 April in PAYAM INQELAB, in which he affirmed that while he does not support "war for war's sake," he did not want a "peace worse than war." For him, refusing to pursue the war while Saddam Husayn is in power in Baghdad "is to deny Islam and dead it a blow from which it will not recover for a long time."

Khomeyni's stubbornness, persevering since the victory of Khorramshahr, which had nevertheless confirmed the rout of the Kraqi invasion, in trying to oust President Saddam Husayn, is difficult to understand without referring to the Messianic and visionary nature of the man. Those who know him say that he is definitely determined to achieve his objective, albeit at the price of a disaster for Iran.

Whatever the case, the imam and some of his military advisers are convinced that it is still possible to win the battle against Iraq, although that country obviously enjoys a superiority in weapons protecting it from any surprise. According to observers in Tehran, a new military offensive in the Howeiza marshes is not excluded, especially since Operation Badr in March was only an inch away from succeeding.

At that time, the Iranians had lined up nearly 150,000 men, but only 30,000 or 40,000 took part in the attack itself, overrunning in 2 days all the Iraqi fortified positions between their point of departure in the Majnoun Islands and Tigre. Crossing the marshes in flat-bottomed boats, they succeeded in establishing new positions on firm ground, situated at some 5 kilometers from Tigre and the main road linking Basra with Baghdad. A few units even succeeded in crossing the river thanks to pontoons placed near the village of El Hureiba and taking up a position for a few hours on the main road before establishing a bridgehead 10 to 15 kilometers wide further east. Raked by the Iraqi Air Force, which in 2 days made nearly 1,600 sorties, the Iranians, mainly pasdarans, obstinately held on to their positions.

Semi-Defeat

The Tehran staff perhaps hoped that the Iranian 3d Army stationed at Amara and the 4th Corps based nearly Basra would reduce the strength of their positions in order to reduce the bridgehead, thereby permitting a new Iranian offensive in the direction of Amara and Basra. But the Iraqis did not fall into the trap and called for reinforcements from Baghdad in the form of the Republican Guard of President Saddam Husayn and units of the people's army, thus totally changing the course of the operations. In order to avoid being surrounded, the guardians of the revolution, who had remained for nearly 2 days near the Basra-Baghdad road, suddenly retreated and it was during their hasty withdrawal that they suffered most of their losses, with nearly 15,000 killed. In February 1984, in the course of a similar offensive in the same sector, they suffered over 25,000 dead.

Operation Badr was not the victory that the authorities in Tehran daily claimed had been won. Nor was it the crushing defeat that the Iraqis said they had inflicted on the Iranian troops. Actually, it enabled the Iranians to expand by a few kilometers the bridgehead created in February 1984 on the Majnoun Islands, which for the past year had become a pistol aimed at the heart of Iraq and the hub whence all offensives aimed at cutting off Basra from the rest of the country departed.

Whatever the case, the operation roused a controversy within the Iranian regime that is far from over. The pasdarans constantly complain of having been abandoned, even betrayed, by the command of the traditional army, which did not move during the offensive and which did not even take the trouble to engage its antiaircraft batteries and its aircraft in the battle, if only to try to lighten the pressure put by Iraqi planes on the troops dug in along the Tigre. Some even claim that the military men of the traditional army are not at all dissatisfied with the failure of Operation Badr and that they are opposed to any repeat of the same type of offensive. There is increasing talk, in well-informed circles in Tehran, of an offensive that would depart from Abadan to take Basra or of a diversionary attack further north toward Mandali.

But before launching such an offensive, it would be necessary to find the means to stop the bombing of Iranian cities, especially Tehran, which the Iraqis will not fail to carry out in reprisal. Nor must one forget the fact that to date, the Iranian staff has not found any effective means to protect its soldiers against chemical assaults, which were decisive in the failure of Operation Badr and which in all probability will be used more and more frequently in the future, especially if the Iraqis feel threatened by a large-scale operation.

It was perhaps in order to resolve the problem of defense against chemical weapons that Rafic Dust, minister of the guardians of the revolution who is in charge of purchasing weapons for the pasdarans, went abroad at the beginning of April and was tempted to buy antiaircraft weapons, especially ground-to-air missiles, so as to protect Tehran. Nevertheless, it would appear that he returned from his visit empty-handed, despite the enticing financial proposals he reportedly made to different interlocutors. Whatever the case, the possible installation of an antiaircraft missile system would take months, which would delay the new Iranian offensive that long.

The latter will finally take place because Khomeyni still dreams of occupying Basra in order to trade it later for a peace based on the departure of Saddam Husayn. As long as there is breath in his body, he will probably not give up that dream. But what will his successors do when he is gone?

[17 May 85 p 5]

[Text] Given the determination of Imam Khomeyni, who intends to pursue the war against Iraq until Saddam Husayn falls, the opposition to the war, however widespread, does not dare to express itself openly in Iran. The imam and some of his military

are convinced, moreover, that it is possible to defeat Iraq militarily. A new Iranian offensive in the Howeiza marshes is therefore not out of the question, despite the failure of Operation Badr launched in March in that same sector (LE MONDE, 14 and 15 May).

Tehran--"Martyrs, sleep in peace; your victory will not be taken from you." These words from Imam Khomeyni decorate one of the main gates to the municipal cemetery of Behechte Zahra (the paradise of Zahra), the one leading to the Martyrs Fountain, where water tinted with red blood shoots out on crowded days.

The fountain is located at La Place du 7 Tyr, thus named in memory of the attack which, on 28 June 1981 (7 Tyr on the Persian calendar), left 72 dead under the ruins of the headquarters of the Party of the Islamic Republic (PRI), including Ayatollah Behechti, then the No 2 man in the Tehran regime, hodjatoleslam Montazeri, one of the leaders of the radical wing of the clergy, four ministers, six vice ministers and some twenty deputies from Majlis, all members of the PRI.

The 72 victims (actually, there were 84, but the figure of 72 was chosen to associate in the minds of the people the attack on martyr Imam Hussein, executed in Kerbala along with 71 of his companions in the year 680) lie not far from the red fountain, in the section dedicated to the martyrs, accompanied by those who joined them 2 months later, following the attack on the headquarters of the Council of Ministers and in the course of which the president of the republic, Radjai, and the head of the government, Bahonar, perished.

In this section of honor of Behechte Zahra, the tombs are covered with heavy slabs of green marble imported from Italy and surrounded by flowering bushes carefully tended and little windows displaying the portraits of the dead, along with the religious objects belonging to them and which prove, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that they were "exemplary Muslims." Other less illustrious martyrs rest nearby: those who were executed under the regime of the Shah or who died during the revolution and especially, the victims of the "imposed war." The latter has gobbled up human lives and the tombs of the young pasdaran or bassidj soldiers who fell in battle stretch as far as the eye can see around the 7 Tyr section.

At the beginning of the 1970's, in opening what has now become a vast cemetery, the authorities said that it had been designed to be big enough to meet the needs of Tehran "until the year 2020." They had not foreseen the Islamic revolution, with its extraordinary thirst for martyrdom, or the war with Iraq. For 2 years already, Behechte Zahra has been saturated and the municipal authorities are continually forced to encroach upon nearby grounds to ceaselessly expand its area.

Section of the Accursed

And yet, not everyone enjoys the same privileges. The dead from Evine Prison are buried in the so-called Laanatabad section (the section of the accursed),

which is not maintained, has no flowers and curiously resembles a common grave. Ordinary stone slabs cover some of the graves and they bear no inscription or date. These scorned tombs are regularly profaned by the hezbollahis, who throw all kinds of rubbish on them, turning them into a public dump.

Often the families of the dead are not warned of their execution until after the burial and they are not even told where the graves are. Some hoped that these inhuman practices would be eliminated after the removal of Ladjevardi, all-powerful warden of Evine Prison, in October 1984. But such was not the case and the former Islamic judge of Machhad, Razani, who replaced him, appears to be as merciless as his predecessor. Summary executions, ill treatment and torture continue, albeit on a lesser scale.

"Whatever the case," says one intellectual who does not want to be blamed for complacency toward the Islamic republic, "if the regime remains very harsh toward active opponents, there has for some time existed a tendency toward normalization and an effort to give repression a legal framework and a more human look."

Wailing Wall

Ayatollah Montazeri, once known for his radical options, has taken over the leadership of this movement whose essential objective is to improve the regime's image. When Khomeyni was ill at the end of 1984, the one now considered to be his likely successor handled current affairs. His house in Qom was gradually turned into a "wailing wall" before which, says one personage close to the clergy, "discontents of every stripe come to express their griefs and recriminations."

The imams jome, who by virtue of their functions are well-acquainted with the difficulties of daily life, travel to Qom to speak at length with Ayatollah Montazeri of problems they dare not bring up in the presence of the imam, so remote is the latter from the contingencies of daily life. On the other hand, the presumed successor to the imam, who is closer to the very poor than to the bazaris, is more and more interested in the concerns of the simple people. In particular, he believes that the blind continuation of repression only "creates more conspirators" and fattens the army of potential opponents of the Islamic republic.

Ayatollah Montazeri, one of whose duties is precisely to supervise and unify judicial power, has somewhat succeeded in neutralizing the Ladjevardi clan, which had become a veritable state within a state. However, he did not succeed, as he had wished, in "liberalizing" repression by putting an end to the summary trials and by emptying the prisons of those guilty of only minor crimes and against whom there are no precise charges. Five religious officials were named in December 1984 to draw up a list of persons who might benefit from amnesty.

Censored Imam

Drawn up with difficulty after endless debate, the list included nearly 3,300 persons whose imprisonment "could not reasonably be justified." The releases were to come at the beginning of February on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the revolution. They were postponed until 21 March for Norouz, the Iranian New Year, and never took place. It would appear that the lively debate that began within the regime on the subject of the timeliness of amnesties was decided by Khomeyni. On 2 February, in a speech broadcast by radio, he said that most of the prisoners pardoned had "escaped, thereby proving that one could not trust them."

It would appear that this little phrase of the imam was judged too peremptorily by his entourage because it was deleted from the text distributed on the next day by the Iranian news agency. But the decision had been made and the amnesty proposal was buried, to the great joy of the friends of Ladjevardi, who thus seem to have gained their revenge on the likely successor of the imam. Moreover, it is said in Tehran, in some well-informed circles, that several of the terrorist attacks at the time were organized by those who wanted to prove that the time had not come to demonstrate tolerance toward the "enemies at home."

Actually, the obsession with terrorist attack still haunts official minds. In Tehran, one can practically not get into any public building without being subjected to strict body searches, which are sometimes repeated. The harshness of such control is in contrast with the near absence of police measures visible in the streets of the capital. One sign of detente: The sentry boxes where the guards posted to protect the headquarters of the pasdaran have just been destroyed.

In Iran, the mojahedin of the people are still the most active organization of the underground opposition among those recommending the overthrow of the regime by armed struggle. However, decimated by a harsh and bloody repression, they no longer constitute a grave threat to the government. Their members have indeed been able to partially rebuild their underground networks, but the latter remain marginal and do not have their once formidable effectiveness. Above all, they no longer have the ability to organize spectacular attacks. In addition, the fact that their radio broadcasts from Baghdad and their annoying propensity to expand their activities out of all proportion.

To a certain extent, the current regime needs "subversive and terrorist" activities in order to discredit and harshly put down spontaneous and peaceful manifestations of discontent that are spreading throughout the country. Ayatollah Montazeri and his friends, for their part, believe that the groups opposing the revolution have lost the game politically and militarily, no longer represent a danger and that consequently, one must have the courage to "liberalize" power.

The positions of Ayatollah Montazeri in favor of the liberals, who recommend measures to democratize the regime and put an end to war by negotiation,

have irritated his adversaries. They have begun to shed doubt about the qualities of the presumed successor of the "revolutionary guide," invoking his "weak character," "lack of charisma" and his "political naivete." It is even said that the imam, who 2 years ago still had complete confidence in Ayatollah Montazeri, is now less sure of his choice and believes that his successor may make political blunders.

Ayatollah Montazeri will undoubtedly be the next *faguih*. But it is certain that beyond this spiritual role, he will never be able to replace the imam and will have to be backed by another religious leader who will guide him and will probably hold the essential political power.

"Political Animal"

If one is to judge by appearances, it will never be a question of anyone but the all-powerful president of Majlis, hodjatoleslam Hachemi Rafsandjani, a veritable political animal, who enjoyed the complete confidence of the imam, whose loyal disciple he has been since 1962, when he was his theology student in Qom. Close to the radicals, he has to date been the most hard-line of all those favoring continuation of the war "until Saddam's fall." He enjoys support among the guardians of the revolution, one of whose first leaders he was. Others say, however, that the president of Majlis is not as powerful as he seems to be because he derives most of his power from the imam and because when the latter disappears, he will be, like the other persons in the Islamic seraglio, forced to compromise in order to survive politically.

The leaders of the republic know how, moreover, to close ranks and blur their differences whenever the common interest demands it. When the health of the imam gave rise to great concern during the second half of 1984, the most influential members of the clergy set up a "council to take over the interim of the velayate *faguih*" in order to meet any eventuality. It was a kind of crisis team whose existence was never made public and which included the main religious leaders loyal to the imam's philosophy.

Today, the health of the "guide" seems better than it has ever been in the past 2 years and the council has been put on the shelf, while Islamic leaders continue their interminable fencing for power. This is apparently tolerated by the imam, who sees in it a means of ensuring his personal power and it will continue within certain limits, defined and accepted by all as long as he is alive.

It is not easy to untangle the rivalries. We do not yet know precisely why an and against whom the hezbollahis were demonstrating in mid April when they protested for nearly 10 days in the streets of Tehran in order to force people to dress according to Islamic norms in a city in which Puritanism, imposed by force, has become a rule rarely violated. Whom were they then trying to bother?

Some say that they were mainly after the head of the government, Moussavi, who has a reputation for being among the most radical members of the regime and who attracted the hatred of the bazaris by blocking imports and trying

to impose new, heavier taxation. In addition, criticized by those who blamed him for not properly managing the country's economy, Moussavi has apparently stayed in place only because of the political determination, shared by all factions, of not rousing a grave crisis that might harm the war effort.

The time has apparently not come for major confrontations and even the Majilis, which during the legislative session that ended last July had been most active, taking on the corruption raging in some circles of power, has given way to a somber sleepiness, becoming a kind of echo chamber. It is even likely that the next presidential election scheduled for July will be but a formality, with the different protagonists agreeing to reelect Khomeyni, still in the name of the sacrosanct principle of unity facing the Iraqi enemy.

The war paralyzes all attempts to bring Iranian society out of the immobility in which it is now plunged. The first task of the imam's successors will be to get Iran out of that trap.

11,464
CSO: 4619/56

IRAN

IRP ORGAN: 'MORE SPLINTERS' IN MOJAHE DIN-E KHALQ ORGANIZATION

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 25, 28 Apr 85 p 3

[Text] The latest reports from France indicate that in the course of this week, in addition to the previous splinters, two other splinters have been created in the hypocrite organization. Since the announcement of the marriage of Mas'ud Rajavi and Maryam 'Azadanlu, the wife of Abrishamchi, thus far, four splinters have been created within the hypocrite organization, and at present, this organization has five separate leaders. Complementary reports concerning the two recent splinters will be published in the next issue. The text of the communique of the splinter group of Parviz Ya'qubi, one of the distinguished members of the organization, which was published on 18 April 1985, follows:

It must be explained that, as we pointed out earlier, this was a 14-page communique, the complete text of which is available to us. In this issue, the first part of the communique concerns the opportunism, autocracy and corruption of the leadership of the organization (the Mas'ud Rajavi faction), the defeats of the organization one after another, the loss of the members and supporters, and political isolation. God willing, the remainder of the communique will be published in two parts (one part concerning the recent corruption of Rajavi's faction and related secret issues and another part on the viewpoints of the splinter groups concerning the future of the organization).

Communique on the Parviz Ya'qubi Splinter Group

In the name of God, the name of the brave people of Iran and the name of the martyrs on the path of freedom.

Dear compatriots, revolutionary and progressive forces, members and supporters of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization:

During its 20 years of magnificent life, our organization has suffered severe blows both from outside and inside and has each time risen more proudly and advanced to continue its path to

reach a monotheistic society devoid of any sort of injustice or subjugation. One of the deepest blows was the blow that the deviant (opportunist) leadership of the period 21 March 1973-20 March 1976 inflicted on the organization and, ultimately, on the movement, bringing it to the verge of total destruction. The opportunist leadership (of the 1973-76 period), by misusing the organizational positions under the secret and severe conditions of struggle of that time and misusing the brotherly trust which is one of the inevitable traditions of such an organization, contrary to all the revolutionary principles, under the pretext of new political and ideological necessities, the evolution of thought and ideology, and the eagerness to achieve the goal of new ideological unity and the new necessities of the revolution for a new qualitative period of change, engaged in basic changes in the ideological principles and recognized revolutionary traditions of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization of Iran, and under the pretext of rejecting the deviant, dependent and class positions, called the past reactionary ideas and incorrect viewpoints of the organization, until the time of its ideological evolution, reactionary and deviant. The profiteering of the authorities of the organization and the organizational resources placed the members of the organization on the verge of accepting the so-called evolution of the ideological thinking or leanings of the organization and through non-revolutionary methods would force them to submit to dismissal or inactivity and would kill or otherwise destroy the defenders of the monotheistic ideology and the revolutionary traditions of the organization or would abandon them without resources to fall into the hands of SAVAK. But still there were members, though few, who insisted on the ideological principles and revolutionary traditions of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization. The steadfastness and resistance of the members and supporters of the Mojahedin organization, both in the Qasr and Evin prisons and outside, prevented the total destruction of that organization and, as a result, the theoretic ideological gains and valuable organizational experiences which were the results of thousands of hours of intensive collective and group organizational work. After the blow inflicted by the opportunists, gradually during the period 21 March 1977-20 March 1978, part of these gains were recorded, and after the 11 February revolution, some of them were printed and made available to the public throughout the society. The resistance, steadfastness and political exposure of the members of the organization, the unlimited support of our brave people, and the revitalization and reconstruction [of our organization], and, on the other hand, the false operational processes of the opportunists and the revelation of their nature resulted in their being rapidly isolated. Hence, after the crushing blow against the organization, as a result of the movement of our people, the effects of which we are still witnessing, they themselves were also dispersed and burned in the fire that they had had a share in igniting. Now, after 10 years, once again, the opportunist

leadership of the organization, in a different dimension, with similar claims, such as the great ideological leap to promote the quality of the ideology and organization, deep internal changes, serious qualitative and evolutionary advancement, and burning the remnants of ignorance and the dogmas of the age of ignorance, have engaged in revising the ideological standards and revolutionary traditions of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization of Iran. The destructive blow of the deviant leadership of the 1973-76 period, the governing strangulation up to the 11 February 1979 revolution, then the velocity of the currents and events after the revolution, the joining of many people in the organization and the expansion of membership throughout the country, the lack of sufficient experienced and trained cadre to instruct in the theoretical gains and organizational experiences, the numerous attacks of the regime on the organization and the imposition of a sort of secrecy on the organization shortly after the revolution (particularly from 1980, when the Prosecutor's Office, in connection with the case of Sa'adati, issued orders for the arrest of several key members), the lack of the necessary awareness on the part of the members and the supporting masses of the regulations and organizational rights and particularly the brotherly trust in the leadership, and so on, provided the opportunity for the opportunist leadership of the organization (which was rooted in their very nature) to take advantage of all the above-mentioned factors in its own interests, failing to implement the regulations and general organizational principles (which were accepted and endorsed by all the true revolutionaries of the world and have also been and are accepted by the Mojahedin organization, as they are reflected in the instructional pamphlets of the organization, such as the instructional pamphlet on studying the possibilities for deviation in the central democratic leadership) throughout the organization. The opportunist central leadership, gradually and contrary to all the generally devised organizational gains, precepts and principles, promoted democratic centralism, self-criticism, and collective leadership to a centralism of unilateral criticism from above and below and changed collective leadership to the rule of one person. Although in talk and in the pamphlets, centralism, self-criticism, collective leadership and opposition to polarization are discussed or claimed, in practice the revolutionary democracy of collective leadership has lost its color and remained confined. Hence, the organization lacked a charter (which is a collection of the standards, rules and regulations governing organizational life), because elections and a congress, that is, the highest decision-making organ did not exist. The pragmatic leadership, through its false analysis (the system not becoming a single-based one until the end of the war), although it knew that at a particular phase armed struggle against the regime is unavoidable, not only did not engage in preparing the whole organization to enter a military phase, but by issuing a politico-military communique on 18 June, even gave a trump card

to the regime, and at a time when the organization was stepping into a new phase of its necessary readiness, it began an armed struggle without a clear analysis of the situation, without a step by step strategy, valuing unity with the liberals (absorbing the base separated from the system), devaluing the revolutionary forces (in connection with the principle of the unity of the forces), through simple-mindedness, abstract thinking, valuing itself and devaluing the enemy, imagining that within a month it can gain political rule with an overthrow strike plan, and by violating and ignoring the general organizational principles, without being informed of the whole organization, at his decision and his orders, and without a stage by stage strategy and readiness. The frequent moving to the right and the left at various junctures (according to the evaluation of the preliminary plan of the third stage), in three stages (last year) which resulted in nothing but military defeat and the loss of about 80 percent of the members and cadres and nearly all of the internal bases, and on the other hand, the opportunistic and pragmatic actions, have transformed the national resistance council into an accessory of itself and brought it to the verge of total destruction. In order to come out of the deadlock that it has created for itself and of which it is a cause, autocratically, without any organizational justification and contrary to the strategic lines and the independent history which relies on the people, it has changed the organization to a useful ally of the reactionary countries and petite bourgeoisie socialists of the West. At the same time, in order to save the opportunist leadership from the deadlock, under the pretext of revolutionary diplomacy and contrary to the strategic lines of the organization since its founding, it has adopted the line of attracting U.S. imperialism. (None of the forces that are trying to attract the United States in order to ensure their political power will ever be able to attract it without becoming similar to it in nature; a small force cannot absorb a large one.) In order to gain their support, they outstretch their hands towards them. But the support of a herd of the representatives of both the U.S. factions (whether Republican or Democratic), who are no different qualitatively from each other, and the European social democratic and conservative parties, which was gained by deviating from the strategic lines of the organization and separating and attacking the revolutionary and progressive forces, has not achieved anything thus far and the results that were intended by the governing opportunists (that is, achieving political rule through their support and help) have not been obtained.(1) (The story of Rajavi's beginning, the U.S. and British politicians and the support of a number of them for the hypocrite organization will be published, along with their names, in future issues at a proper time.)

We announce to all the members, supporters and core resistance members of the Mojahedin, wherever they are, to all the

progressive revolutionary forces, both inside and outside the country, and to our brave people that from 4 April 1985, that is, the date of the issuance of MOJAHED No 241, in which, whether by Mas'ud Rajavi or the communique on the new ideological positions, its organizational form and insignia have been determined and announced--and, as Mehdi Abrishamchi has said, "We are not now what we used to be, and are proud to be superior to those who did not follow this course"--all individuals and elements who have signed, accepted or for any reason or excuse justified the great ideological leap in the qualitative ideological organizational advancement, the deep internal change and the seriously qualitative and so-called evolutionary advancement, that is, the new positions and issued communique, are no longer members or supporters of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization of Iran. Hence, the Mojahedin members, supporters, and core resistance members must purge their ranks and their supporters as soon as possible and stop their contacts with those who belong to an opportunistic, heathenish, non-Mojahed current (excommunicated petite bourgeoisie socialists) with reactionary characteristics who are separate from the Mojahedin organization. Contact with the elements of the new faction should only be to transfer the resources of the organization, resolve rank-related issues (particularly involving the situation abroad), or expose them. The previous pragmatic, opportunistic, rightist leadership (the new movement with Mas'ud Rajavi as its god and prophet), by announcing its new positions, no longer, by any means, has the right to make use of the name and insignia of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization of Iran. The name and insignia of the organization belongs to those members and supporters who believe in the monotheistic ideology and the general regulations of the organization that have been reflected in its pamphlets, those who believe in an overall, revolutionary armed struggle against the regime, which is the tactic of the present stage, those who believe in fighting imperialism, "which is now employing the reactionary channel." Therefore, the new heathenish current has no right to make use of the insignia and the name of the organization, must not make use of the resources of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, and must hand over all the resources without any ifs ands or buts to the members and organizational cadres or supporters of the core resistance members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq of Iran. The Mojahedin-e Khalq believe in the Islamic ideology based on a monotheistic world view which guides the society, through revolutionary methods, towards the total elimination of subjugation and the establishment of a monotheistic (equity) system. Hence, under every historical situation, it essentially relies on the most oppressed, proud forces and social classes (the oppressed), accepts the devised general organizational principles and regulations of the organization, and believes in the overall struggles, both political and military, revolving around armed revolutionary struggle, which is the tactic of the present stage,

against the governing reactionism and fighting imperialism, as the main enemy of the masses. While dividing its lines and not cooperating or having contact (except in the cases mentioned above) with the heathenish current, it will continue its struggles independently, and by observing all the security issues, it will try to establish contact with core and other members to form an elected congress of the members of the cadres on a large scale, or if not possible, on a limited scale, in order to devise the charter, study the process of events of the past few years, completely analyze the new opportunistic and heathenish current, elect the central cadre, devise a stage by stage strategy to overthrow the regime and fight imperialism.

(Note: The experience of martyr Sharif Vaqefi and martyr Samadiyyeh-Labbaf must be taken into consideration in connection with the new current and the division.) This deviant (rightist, opportunist) current has created no change in our essential conflict. Members, supporters and core resistance members, wherever they are, must, until the formation of the congress, the devising of the charter and the election of the new leadership, preserve their independence and, by relying on the theoretical and practical experiences of the organization, based on the existing competence and their own initiatives and creativity, in accordance with the Koranic verse, "Counsel each other in affairs and then decide by relying on God" [Arabic], by using the method of consultation and counsel among themselves and employing the democratic, revolutionary principles, continue their struggle, seeking help from God and stronger reliance on the indefatigable force of our brave masses, without the slightest hesitation or weakness. The core resistance members and supporters of the organization must, by relying on monotheistic revolutionary principles, engage in exposing more than ever before the members of the new position and their pragmatic, opportunistic nature and must fight and destroy this new current with its heathenish ideas. Also, they must seriously avoid any sort of nonessential physical contact which they may try to establish, so that, while exposing their nature, the dominant and defeated counterrevolutionaries will not be able to use such deviation and the blow that has been inflicted on the organization by the new current and the movement of our masses more than they already have. Our efforts must be used to isolate the leadership of the new current and, on the other hand, to prepare their sincere albeit uninformed followers so that after self-criticism, they will be able to join the ranks of the Mojahedin once again. Since the perpetuation of this rightist deviant current can delay the victory of the movement, misguide it, and result in wasting the people's forces and other blows on the movement, in the new current and its consequences, the problem is not only a problem of concern to the Mojahedin, but one which concerns the entire movement, that is our people and other revolutionary and progressive forces. No one and no force, including the progressive revolutionary forces, will be safe from its evil

consequences. (Note the experiences of the leftist opportunists and the Tudeh Party). Therefore, it is the duty of all progressive revolutionary forces to take a position against the opportunistic current as soon and as decisively as possible, especially some of the groups, Marxists, nationalistic and Muslim elements, both in the Council and outside it, who, by their direct or indirect support and irresponsible actions and positions, have caused and are causing the increased growth and strengthening of this new current, severely condemn, from before, any irresponsible position and action (by any force) to present and spread these reactionary, undemocratic ideas, viewpoints, interpretations, and actions as those of revolutionary Islam and as a result, the ideology of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization of Iran. We consider it a simple-minded reaction detrimental to the movement and the front of the people, because such ideas are essentially unrelated to Islam and the ideology of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization of Iran. Irresponsible dealing with this issue is like mistaking the ideas, interpretations and actions of the pseudo-leftist opportunist currents, the Tudeh Party and the majority faction for those of revolutionary Marxism and considering them a part of it. The communique determining the positions of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization of Iran against the opportunistic (deviant, pseudo-leftist) current (fall 1972) can be a model for the members, supporters and core resistance members of the organization, and its directions, which conform to the conditions and the new current, can be used.

10,000
CSO: 4640/596

IRAN

EDUCATION MINISTER: CRITICISM NOT COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 17 Mar 85 p 17

[Text] The seminar of authorities of the public relations offices of education and training of all the provinces for the discussion and exchange of views regarding the future organization of the public relations offices of the provinces began yesterday with a speech by the minister of education and training and the participation of a group of responsible officials of this ministry.

In yesterday's session, Seyyed Kazem-Akrami, the minister of education and training analyzed various dimensions of public relations and said: "Public relations must use all its efforts to show the fact, especially in the field of education and training which is in contact with all the Iranian families in the remotest villages of the country. Therefore, with the extension of education and training, public relations will have a very serious duty.

He said: "Public relations officials must evaluate themselves and their activities both from their own and other people's perspective. We must not construe those who criticize us as counterrevolutionary. We must separate counterrevolutionary statements from the statements of critical friends. The proper authorities must have patience in their contacts with people. We have paid very little attention to this matter since the revolution, and we must not concentrate on keeping the people silent but we must make an effort to convince them."

The minister of education and training in referring to the hypocrites who placed a bomb at the Friday prayers and the resistance of the heroic people in facing the danger of the enemy's air raid by continuing their prayers said: "In the history of Islam, the incident of the Friday prayers was a second Ashura (death of the third Imam) and we must serve those beloved and martyr-giving people in the same manner that they have contributed to the occurrence of our revolution." He added: "We must be patient in our work and refrain from branding all critics as counterrevolutionaries." He reiterated: "Public relations offices must have continuing relations with all the organs and organizations and in this connection they must report every event or incident that occurs in their jurisdiction to the officials as soon as possible. They must give the people a chance to discuss their problems freely with the proper authorities without any fears."

Seyyed Kazem-Akrami added: Public relations offices must discuss weak points and criticisms with the proper authorities and inform them of all the occurrences." Then he referred to the slogans on the walls of offices and the ministries and said: "These slogans must be fresh and new." He also stated: "Unfortunately in the ministry's correspondence there are some spelling errors. In order to overcome this deficiency the general offices could organize special classes during office hours for secretarial staff and use experienced tutors to teach these classes." He added: "Whoever works in the Ministry of Education and Training must study at least 2 to 3 hours everyday and improve his education."

At the conclusion of this speech, the minister of education and training during a short interview explained the activities of education and training during the imposed war and said: "Two months ago we tried to reinforce the support and relief headquarters. For this purpose we sent a circular to the general office of the provinces and organized the relief and support headquarters in Tehran under the supervision of the undersecretary of coordination. Sometime ago a seminar was organized for this purpose in order to study the mechanics of this activity. In this seminar, Mr Rafiq Dust, the corps minister, Sham-Khani, the deputy commander-in-chief of the revolutionary corps and Colonel Kia, the representative of the joint chiefs of staff were present. Also to facilitate the education of those individuals dispatched to the war fronts, we organized high school classes at the war fronts and did the same in the small provinces." In continuation of this interview regarding the school situation in the war region and Iraqi targets in the western part of the country he said: "We have authorized the administrative offices of the provinces to act according to the condition of the region and if possible to hold the second term examinations; otherwise they are empowered to take the necessary action to cancel the examinations." He also stated: "We have officially ordered the administrative offices to use the people assigned to this project in hospitals to help the injured." In conclusion, he announced: "A large group of school teachers and school authorities are going to the war fronts during the school holidays in order to fulfill their duties during the war like other people of the society."

9815
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IRAN

MONTAZERI: WE HAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO SERVE PEOPLE

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 8 May 85 p 2

[Text] Monday, on the occasion of the blessed birthday of the Imam of the Age and the universal day of the oppressed, large groups from various strata of the people, members of the families of martyrs, and a number of clerics and religious scholars from provincial cities, including the Friday and congregational imams of Western and Eastern Azarbajian and the members of the families of [Lebanese] martyrs, a group of Sunnite clerics, hundreds of students of the military academy, members of the five committees of the seminar on Islam and the oppressed, and a number of personnel of the gendarmerie, met with Grand Ayatollah Montazeri.

In this meeting, in which Ayatollah Shirazi, the Friday imam of Mashhad; Ayatollah Malakut, the Friday imam of Tabriz; and the Friday imams of Bushehr, Zahedan, Khalkhal and Iranshahr, as well as Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi, the speaker of the high Islamic revolution assembly of Iraq, were present, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri offered congratulations on the occasion of this great birthday to all the Muslims, the oppressed, and the Shi'ites of the world and said: His holiness 'Ali refers in Sermon 150 of "Nahj ol-Balagheh" to the events and conspiracies of the final era, and at the end of that sermon, he refers to the Imam of the Age and the spiritual signs of his holiness during the time of his occultation and says: At this time, when many conspiracies from various directions are carried out against Muslims and they are faced with severe problems and tests, one group of people leans to the right and another to the left, deviating from the true, straight path of Islam. At this time, that small group remaining steadfast to the true and just path are subject to receiving the hidden attention and spiritual aid of his holiness, the Guardian of the Time, and the plots and conspiracies of the enemies of Islam become neutralized and ineffective against them.

He pointed out: According to many of the reported traditions available, his holiness, the Guardian of Affairs, is active in two ways: originating and regulating. The originating activities of his reverence are the great presence and

originating role existing in the regime and has been interpreted as the core of the existing world and mediation to attain God. According to those reported traditions and prayers available, we are even indebted to the existence of his holiness for the rainfall, the movements of the earth and the heavens, and other divine blessings. In some of our reported traditions, the signs of the presence of the Imam of the Age have been compared to the sun hidden behind the clouds; although it cannot be seen, its blessings and signs are proven and revealed to the creatures of the world and the people. But the so-called regulating activities of his holiness involve the scientific, political and judicial leadership of the society and the people. Although on the surface his holiness is not among the people to personally take over the three important responsibilities, there is proof that these responsibilities never cease during the period of the occultation of the Guardian of Affairs. During the time of occultation, these three responsibilities are conferred on the religious jurists and the committed religious scholars, who must carry them out in the best possible manner and prepare the grounds for the presence of his holiness and his universal uprising.

Grand Ayatollah Montazeri then referred to the correct meaning of awaiting the deliverance and appearance of his holiness, the Guardian of the Time, which has been so emphasized in Islam, and said: Awaiting his holiness does not mean sitting in a corner of a room, abandoning all political and social responsibilities and merely praying with out tongues for the appearance of his holiness. Rather, to correctly await his holiness is to prepare ourselves, the people and the society for self-sacrifice and generosity at the side of his reverence.

He emphasized: The magnificent Islamic revolution in Iran was a turning point in history. It can be said that it is a great step taken towards preparing the people for the appearance of his holiness. Today, our beloved young people in Iran, Lebanon and other places display such a spirit of self-sacrifice and generosity, and his holiness, the Guardian of the Age, needs such forces. It is our responsibility to train these forces, to prepare them, until the time his holiness appears and makes the earth prosper with justice.

Then, telling the story of one of the companions of Imam Sadeq, who insisted to his holiness that there were many loyal, self-sacrificing forces for the uprising of Imam Sadeq, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri said: According to this report, Imam Sadeq pointed to a herd of sheep which was on the road where he and his companions were going and said: I swear to God, if I had faithful, self-sacrificing people equal to the number of sheep in this herd, which is 10, I would create an uprising.

In conclusion, he referred to the issue of extremism in absorbing individuals for responsibilities and tasks and said: Sometimes it is heard that some people imagine that the standard for the selection of individuals is commitment alone and being a member of the Hezbollah, without consideration for competence and expertise and some only consider specialization as the main standard for carrying out a task. However, both these ways of thinking are false and devoid of Islamic and revolutionary logic. The standard for selection in everything and for every responsibility must be commitment to Islam, the revolution and the fundamentals of religion in addition to expertise. Commitment without specialization and specialization without commitment are useless. But in the same way that commitment without expertise will not help the revolution succeed, we must not neglect the danger of experts who are not committed and do not believe in religion and the revolution. Such individuals will sell out the country and the revolution in the end. Therefore, we must not submit to reactionism and extremism, for both will be detrimental to the country and the revolution.

Addressing the officials of the country and the organizations, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri pointed out: You must know the value of this self-sacrificing and patient nation. Despite all the problems of the war, the shortages after the revolution, and the economic embargo of the superpowers, they are present on the scene as before. You must note that the oppressed classes and the laboring strata have been and are still tolerating the imposed war on the fronts and behind the fronts, in the demonstrations and marches, and in other tasks of the revolution. Hence, we must all consider it our duty to serve them and not to cause discontent for them in the organizations and offices.

10,000
CSO: 4640/588

IRAN

MONTAZERI: REQUIREMENT OF COMMITMENT, KNOWLEDGE

Tehran BURS in Persian 9 May 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] On the occasion of the blessed birthday of the Imam of the Age and the worldwide day of the oppressed, Monday, large groups from various strata of the people, members of the martyrs' families and a number of clerics and religious scholars from provincial cities, including the Friday and congregational imams of Western and Eastern Azarbaijan and the members of the families of Lebanese martyrs, a group of Sunnite clerics, hundreds of students of the military academy, members of the five committees of the seminar on Islam and the oppressed, and a number of personnel of the gendarmerie met with Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. In this meeting, in which Ayatollah Shirazi, the Friday imam of Mashhad; Ayatollah Malakut, the Friday imam of Tabriz; and the Friday imams of Bushehr, Zahedan, Khalkhal and Iranshahr, as well as Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi, the speaker of the high Islamic revolution assembly of Iraq, were present, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri offered congratulations on the occasion of this great birthday to all the Muslims, the oppressed, and the Shi'ites of the world and said: In Sermon 150 of "Nahj ol-Balagheh," his holiness 'Ali refers to the events and conspiracies of the final era and at the end of that sermon, he refers to the issue of the Imam of the Age and the spiritual signs of his holiness during the time of his occultation and says: At this time, when many conspiracies from various directions are carried out against Muslims and they are faced with severe problems and tests, a group of people lean to the right and another to the left and deviate from the true, straight path of Islam. At this time, that small group remaining steadfast on the true and just path are subject to the hidden attention and spiritual aid of his holiness, the Guardian of the Time, and the plots and conspiracies of the enemies of Islam become neutralized and ineffective against them.

He pointed out: According to many available reported traditions, his holiness, the Guardian of the Affairs, is active in two ways: originating and regulating. His originating activities are the

great presence and originating role that exists in the regime and has been interpreted as the core of the existing world as well as mediating to attain God. According to available reported traditions and prayers, we are even indebted to the existence of his holiness for rainfall, the movements of the earth and the heavens, and other divine blessings. In some of our reported traditions, the signs of the presence of the Imam of the Age have been likened to the sun hidden behind the clouds. Although it cannot be seen, its blessings and signs are proven and present for the creatures of the world and the people. But the so-called regulating activities of his holiness involve the scientific, political and judicial leadership of the society and the people. Although on the surface his holiness is not among the people to personally take over the three important responsibilities, there is proof that these responsibilities never cease during the period of the occultation of the Guardian of Affairs. During the time of occultation, these three responsibilities are conferred on the religious jurists and the committed religious scholars, who must carry them out in the best way possible in order to prepare the grounds for the presence of his holiness and his universal uprising. Grand Ayatollah Montazeri then referred to the correct meaning of awaiting the deliverance and appearance of his holiness, the Guardian of the Time, which has been so emphasized in Islam, and said: Awaiting his holiness does not mean sitting in a corner of a room, ignoring all political and social responsibilities and merely praying aloud for the appearance of his holiness. Rather, to correctly await his holiness is to prepare ourselves, the people and the society for self-sacrifice and generosity at the side of his reverence. He emphasized: The magnificent Islamic revolution in Iran was a turning point in history. It is a great step that has been taken towards preparing the people for the appearance of his holiness. Today, our beloved young people in Iran, Lebanon and other places display such a spirit of self-sacrifice and generosity, and his holiness, the Guardian of the Age, needs such forces. It is our responsibility to train such forces, to prepare them, until his holiness appears and makes the earth prosper with justice.

Then, telling the story of one of the companions of Imam Sadeq, who insisted to his holiness that there were many loyal, self-sacrificing forces for his uprising, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri said: According to this report, Imam Sadeq pointed to a herd of sheep which was on the road where he and his companions were going and said: I swear to God, if I had the same number of faithful, self-sacrificing people as are sheep in this herd, which number 10, I would make an uprising.

In conclusion, he referred to the issue of extremism in absorbing individuals for responsibilities and tasks and said: Sometimes it is heard that there are people who imagine that the standard for the selection of individuals is commitment alone and being a

member of the Hezbollah, without consideration for competence and expertise. And some only consider specialization as the main standard for carrying out a task. However, both these ideas are false and devoid of Islamic and revolutionary logic. The standard for selection in everything and for every responsibility must be commitment to Islam, the revolution and the fundamentals of religion along with expertise. Commitment without specialization and specialization without commitment are useless. But in the same way that commitment without expertise will not help the revolution succeed, we must not neglect the danger of experts who are not committed and do not believe in religion and the revolution. Such individuals will sell out the country and the revolution in the end. Therefore, we must not suffer from reactionism and extremism, for both will be detrimental to the country and the revolution. Addressing the officials of the country and the organizations, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri pointed out: You must know the value of this self-sacrificing and patient nation. Despite all the problems of the war, the shortages after the revolution, and the economic embargo of the superpowers, they are present on the scene as before. You must note that the oppressed classes and the laboring strata have been and still are tolerating the imposed war on the fronts and behind the fronts, in the demonstrations and marches, and in other tasks of the revolution. Hence, we must all consider it our duty to serve them and not to cause discontent for them in the organizations and offices.

10,000
CSO: 4640/588

IRAN

ARTICLE EXAMINES TRADE EXPANSION WITH CHINA

Tehran BURS in Persian 10 Mar 85 pp 1,8

[Text] The trip of high-level Chinese economic officials to Tehran and the negotiations between the members of this mission and Iranian political and economic officials marks the beginning of expanded trade and economic cooperation between Iran and China, and its results will be manifested in future years. The negotiations between the two countries took place in a very friendly atmosphere. Both parties referred to the old relations between Iran and China and consistently pointed out the possibilities for every aspect of trade expansion between the two countries.

According to the mutual memorandum of understanding which was signed at the conclusion of the negotiations it was agreed that a joint committee at ministerial level be organized to regularly examine trade, economic and technological cooperation between the two countries and suggest various means for the expansion of relations. The Chinese mission, which recently left the country, was the most important economic mission to travel to Iran since the revolution. In an interview, the head of the Chinese mission said: "China and Iran intend to establish lasting friendly relations. The results of our mutual memorandum of understanding will be completely manifested within two years."

Mr Aqazader, the deputy prime minister who accompanied the mission to the airport for its departure said: "The volume of trade between Iran and China has reached its highest point since the revolution and is equal to 600 million dollars. China purchases cast iron, chromite, mineral ore, agricultural products and oil from Iran. Iran imports agricultural equipment, machinery and textiles from China. Certainly we must admit that 600 million dollars worth of trade is not a high figure, considering the fact that China has a vast market and it has increased its industrial products immensely in recent years and could absorb more and is also willing to purchase more goods from Iran. Surely this matter depends on further studies and will be discussed in the joint committee of ministers of both nations. In the meantime, marketing and study missions must be sent to Peking and Tehran in this regard. Besides, Iran must increase its production level in all areas in order to make trade expansion possible since Iran needs a considerable variety of goods to export to foreign markets. Unfortunately, at present we do not have enough products except for oil, which is why our

economy is called a one-product economy. Recently the international market for oil has become unstable and the oil producing members of OPEC, who were the largest oil exporting countries in the world, are facing many problems. Therefore, in order to overcome the one-product economy and expand our foreign trade with China and other countries of the world, we have to use our efforts to increase non-oil production above the level of self-sufficiency and make it reach export levels. This work requires accurate planning and all the economic forces of our country must concentrate on more output and exports, since the future of the oil market is uncertain and the increase of oil production and sales by non-OPEC countries has completely disrupted the previous oil markets."

9815

CSO: 4640/504

IRAN

ECONOMIC MEASURES EXPECTED TO ALIENATE BAZAARIS

Paris MOUVEMENT 'IRAN LIBRE' in French 6 May 85 p 1

[Paris MOVEMENT 'IRAN LIBRE' in French, weekly published by Azadeh Shafiq, daughter of Ashraf Pahlavi]

[Text] Iran is currently suffering from a major economic crisis. In order to find a precedent to its present difficulties, it is necessary to go back to the 50's when the aggressiveness of the Mossadegh government led to a total boycott of the country.

There are many causes for this crisis: First, the war which forces the regime to purchase arms anywhere, at any price. But the conflict is not sufficient to explain the slump. The catastrophic management of public affairs has had disastrous consequences, such as a growing unemployment (there are now 4 to 5 million job hunters), excessive imports and failure of the nationalizations. The 1984-1985 budget was originally drawn with a deficit of 300 billion rials (1 French franc equals 12 rials). It had to be revised during the year, the deficit being 420 billion. Yet, some experts believe that it finally reached more than 1,200 billion rials. Let us recall that it was 180 billion for fiscal year 1982-1983 and 1,135 billion for 1983-1984. These figures speak for themselves.

So often in the past the king had been accused of megalomania because, under his regime, military expenses had accounted for 17 to 22 percent of the budget, depending on the year, (the other resources being appropriated for the financing of large-scale territorial development works, improved public health and primary education. As it now stands, national defense absorbs one third, some even say one half, of the state budget.

The fact that revenues did not follow the inflationist curve makes the situation worse. The state was counting on earning \$18 billion from its petroleum revenues. Only two-thirds of this amount will enter the coffers of the nation, some months having been dramatic from the standpoint of sales. Iran even went as far as offering its petroleum on the open market of Rotterdam where, in the framework of barter agreements from country to country, it accepted rates defying all competitions, with a price of \$18 per barrel. Consequently, the foreign debt continued to grow over the months. Currently, monetary reserves may not be more than \$2 billion (in 1978, they amounted to \$25 billion).

According to London experts, the balance of payments deficit now totals, for the past 6 years, more than \$10 billion and the curve remains upward for the first quarter of 1985.

In view of this, the Islamic government is forced to take draconian measures. Imports are now limited, prices watched and commercial transactions hindered in thousands of ways. However, by so doing, the regime runs the tremendous risk of alienating the bazaar, up until now its best ally. Let us remember that it is the bazaaris who, by uniting with the rebel mullahs, originally made the overthrow successful. At the time, they were accusing the imperial government of threatening their privileges. They continued to support Khomeyni for several years because they could, with impunity, engage in all sorts of illegal trafficking, on the black market in particular, from which they made huge profits. However, the lack of money and the economic paralysis will certainly deprive them, in the near future, of even these opportunities.

At this point, they will not fail to react violently. For 2 months already they have been vaguely uneasy, aware of the signs they can observe: Small savers have been ruined, civil servants' pay is being delayed, shortages increase and the lines are growing longer in front of the shops. For years, it has been the custom to say in Tehran: "When the bazaar sneezes, the whole country catches cold." As it stands, in ayatollah country, colds are usually fatal.

6857

CSO: 4619/51

IRAN

AGRICULTURE MINISTER DISCUSSES LAND TRANSFER TO FARMERS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 15 May 85 p 4

[Interview with Minister of Agriculture Dr Zali by ETTELA'AT; date and place not specified]

[Text] With consideration for the political and social problems, land must be transferred to farmers, to the extent that it is possible, and if the owner has a legitimate right, he should be provided with resources.

A farmer cannot work with his situation unsettled from year to year.

After nearly two and a half years, yesterday morning, the legislative proposal on the revitalization and transfer of cultivated lands was once again discussed in the open session of the Majlis to eliminate the problems pointed out by the Council of Guardians. The proposals of the representatives were also discussed concerning this important, destiny-making plan, which will certainly play a determining role in the agricultural situation of the country.

In explaining the importance of the above-mentioned proposal, it is sufficient to point out that at present, about 800,000 hectares of agricultural lands have not been decided about. This issue has been pointed out frequently by the Majlis representatives, the operators and officials for agricultural affairs, and particularly the minister of agriculture, and solutions have been sought.

On the other hand, the report of the special committee on the proposal for the revitalization and transfer of agricultural

lands, which was discussed in the open session of the Majlis yesterday, indicates that numerous sessions were held between the members of the committee and the representatives of the Council of Guardians as well as the minister of agriculture and the representatives of the land transfer committees to exchange views with him concerning the above-mentioned proposal. The parliamentary service of ETTELA'AT reports today on the complete text of the proposal under discussion, the amendments made by the special committee, and, finally, the letter of the Council of Guardians in this regard.

Hence, in order for our readers to become more familiar with the issues discussed in this proposal, the parliamentary reporter for ETTELA'AT in an interview with Dr Zali, the minister of agriculture, asked his views on the proposal under discussion, which follows in detail.

Mr Zali said: The Ministry of Agriculture has been pursuing a decision concerning the temporary cultivation of lands and in this connection, it discussed a bill in the Cabinet. At present, we have about 700,000 hectares of land for temporary cultivation, concerning which every year contracts are signed with farmers.

We believe that this "temporariness" cannot continue in this form and a decision must be made about these lands, and that with consideration for the political and social problems, land must be transferred to the farmers whenever possible. Also, if the owner has legitimate rights, we should be given resources in other places to be able to engage in agricultural activities rather than buying his land and transferring it to the farmers.

This was a method the Ministry of Agriculture has been pursuing.

Dr Zali said: Of course, along with this bill, two or three single articles concerning the cancellation of the deeds of barren and uncultivated lands were offered.

Now, in Mazandaran, Gonbad, Gilan and most cities, the best agricultural lands are turned into establishments and non-agricultural affairs.

Of course, this has been included in the proposal on the revitalization and transfer of agricultural lands and Article 6 states: The situation of undetermined lands must be settled so that a person who works on the land knows where he stands.

Then, emphasizing that a farmer cannot continue to work with his situation unsettled from year to year, the minister of agriculture added: As I mentioned before, these undetermined lands are some of our best lands, but under these circumstances, they do not have a desirable output. Hence, this proposal, in any case, will determine the situation of these lands and, on the whole, the agricultural lands in general. In this case, both the landowners and the farmers will know where they stand. The farmers especially will feel that they are laboring for themselves.

On the other hand, the lack of security that has been created in agriculture will be eliminated.

In another part of this interview, concerning the "legislative proposal on the forests and pastures of the country," which was recently ratified in the Majlis, Dr Zali said:

One of the characteristics of the above-mentioned proposal is that it provides legal grounds for seeking the help of the people to revitalize and make use of the pastures and forests.

The minister of agriculture added: Of course, preventing the destruction of forests and pastures is a problem that is not solved by one proposal alone, but the social conditions and the cultural understanding of the people are effective in this connection. In other words, on the one hand, the problems of the villagers and forest dwellers must be taken into consideration and, on the other, they must be reminded that the destruction of forests and pastures is neither in their interest nor that of the country and the people.

Therefore, while this law can prepare the grounds for the prevention of further destruction, it must be accompanied with cultural work.

In conclusion, Dr Zali referred to the consequences of the "legislative proposal on forests and pastures" for the villagers and forest dwellers and pointed out: [Remainder missing]

10,000
CSO: 4640/590

PAKISTAN

DEFENSE BUDGET CRITICIZED AS U.S. INFLUENCED

Karachi AMN in Urdu 24 Apr 85 p 2

[Article by Jumma Khan: "Opposition Always Distorts Government Reports"]

[Excerpt] Our government always announces that its foreign policy is satisfactory, internal affairs in good shape, defense impregnable and finance in super condition. It tells the nation that we are on very good terms with the United States, have an exemplary friendship with China, have improved relations with India, get along very well with Iran and are on the verge of finding a political solution to the Afghanistan problem with the help of the United Nations.

Other countrymen, including some retired army officers, politicians, scholars and journalists, who are not a part of the government show us the other side of the picture. They ask: How can we expect the United States to help us in the future when it ignored us during the wars we fought in 1965 and 1971? Why would Iran start the war with Iraq after our repeated appeals as a friend, and why is it importing more goods from India and refusing to increase trade with us? As for India, its 1984-85 report on foreign relations will be published next month for distribution all over the world. This report accuses Pakistan of interfering in East Punjab by helping the terrorists in hijacking airplanes. This will set our relations with India way back. Additionally, the U.S. help in the form of ultramodern weapons to Pakistan is the major reason for the rift between India and Pakistan. I am not aware of any action our government has taken on the Indian foreign ministry's report accusing us of aiding terrorists while claiming to be friendly at the same time. This report, however, does indicate that our relations with India are not so warm. As for our internal affairs, we are told that all is well and at the same time informed that crime is on the increase and people are forced to guard their livestock themselves. We are all aware of what happened when there was one traffic accident in Karachi. In Punjab, locomotive sheds and other industrial undertakings are working only to 50 percent of their capacities, and agricultural production is also suffering. We had to use the army to destroy factories producing heroin in tribal regions. The sad state of all government employees suffering from inflation is common knowledge. The so-called impregnable defense cannot do anything about the aggression in Afghanistan and loses all the battles fought in Kashmir. Retired General Tikka Khan, Retired General Naseer Allah Khan,

Retired General Sarfraz Khan, Retired Air Marshal Ashan Khan, Maulana Shad Ahmad Noorani, Ulama Shah Ahmad Amroti, Maulana Fazal-ul Rehman, Mufti Wali Hasan, Khan Wali Khan, Ghaush Baksh Bizanjo, Malik Qasim and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, in addition to some well-known journalists, do not agree on the success of foreign, internal, economic or defense policies of our government.

According to news reports, Wali Khan has said that dogs belonging to the big shots in Islamabad are bathed with shampoo daily while people in villages cannot even get clean drinking water. Professor Khursheed Ahmad has declared our economic policy destructive. Ghaush Baksh Bizanjo has said that the provinces will declare independence if they are not given the autonomy due them according to the constitution. Retired Air Marshal Asghan Khan, after carefully analyzing various available statistics, has summed up the government's action in the following words: "Seventy-six percent of our national budget is spent on defense and payment of the national debt, 10 percent each is spent on the police and bureaucracy. The remaining 4 percent is left for education, medical aid and development plans."

Let us think for a moment. If according to the government reports our relations with India are improving, we are on good terms with Iran, and China is our close friend, then why do we have to spend 76 percent of our national budget on defense? A possible answer is that we have to be prepared for the danger posed by the Russian army in Afghanistan. General Zia, however, has admitted that this problem cannot be solved by the military and he is working on solving it with help from the United Nations. Also, the USSR has promised safety to Pakistan. In this situation, what reason do we have to spend 76 percent of our budget on defense? Billions of rupees are spent on defense each year and the country is told that we have no problem on our borders. We are told that we have no enemy and we have no reason to have an enemy. If we call the USSR and Afghanistan our enemies, then is there any country to prove its friendship to us by helping us beat these countries? Anyhow, we are still spending billions of rupees on arms, but these arms cannot help us defeat a superpower. We have to use our head. China is opposed to the USSR and, even though it possesses atomic weapons, it does not challenge the USSR. Neither the United States nor any Western European country is willing to fight the USSR. Why are we so suicidal? Even before Pakistan was conceived, Turkey and Iran had common borders with the USSR. The USSR, however, never annexed even an inch of their territory. Today, Iran is much weaker than it was during the era of the shah. Its military strength is all but sapped out because of the long war with Iraq. In military language, it can be said the Iran's navy and air force are devastated. The USSR can easily take over Iran in a couple of hours. If the USSR had any expansionist designs, it would have been easier and more beneficial for it to annex Iran rather than Pakistan. It can have access to the warm water ports in the Gulf and dominate all the Arab countries. It can also control Iranian oil and endanger oil supply to the West. Taking over Pakistan is not as beneficial to the USSR.

China, despite its border problems with the USSR, India and Vietnam, has announced the reduction of its army by one million soldiers. Pakistan does not even have that big an army. China will save at least 200 million rupees

by this step and still remain a strong country. Every healthy person is given military training in China. The one million soldiers recently let go can be called back to serve if needed. The Chinese government has apparently realized that, at this time, no country can afford to attack another country and no long-term war can be fought. It also knows that it is easier to work out differences by talks. So it is using the money originally reserved for defense for development and welfare plans. We can also solve the Afghanistan problem with political talks. If the Simla Pact could be sealed in one week, then by a few days talks we could have avoided fighting India and have become friends with it. We will only need less than 25 percent of our national budget for defense. We will have 56 percent, instead of the present 4 percent, of our national budget to spend on development and welfare projects. This is not possible, however, as long as Pakistan is under the influence of the United States.

7997

CSO: 4656/126

PAKISTAN

REPORT ON PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 20 Apr 85 pp 1, 2

[Article by Ilyas Shakir in the column "Karachi Diary": " Amidst the Intellectuals"]

[Text] During the past 8 years, politics had to pass through such a period that the door for constructive thinking remained closed. The political process came to a halt, and politics shrunk to such a level that it was restricted to repeating the very same newspaper statements over and over again. Now that the political process has begun, many people feel it like a breath of fresh air. The common perception also is that the speed of the return of this democratic process is very slow, and that the circle of its operation is considerably limited. Nevertheless, the possibility of the existence of spring is there. Recently, to take advantage of this opportunity, and to analyze the movement, rather the characteristics of the restoration of democracy, the chairman of the National Thinkers Forum, Javed Ahmad Siddiqi, held a meeting concerning thinking and thoughts. In this gathering of "Meet the Thinkers," the thinkers asked themselves questions from the well-known politicians of the country. They cross-examined their answers, and in front of a packed gathering, appropriate for the occasion, they let out a secret also.

Like every other meeting, in this one, too, the question asked repeatedly was, "Has the MRD failed? What will be the modus operandi of the politicians now?" Javed Ahmad Siddiqi opened the session with a question. Following is a summary of the lengthy discussions held on this occasion.

Khwaja Khairud-Din: Just see!!! Mahmudul Haq Usmani is continuously under arrest. Recently, he tried to unite the new and the old Sindis. Did the administration dislike this effort of his?

Maulana Nurani: This was a grand program of Usmani Sahib. This campaign was started at the time when the MRD movement was in progress. The reason why we and our party played an active role in the establishment of the unity board was because we learned that certain government officials thought that the sole method of making the MRD movement a failure, was that the new and old Sindis living in Sind should be made to clash with each other, so that the attention of the participants of the movement might be diverted. After

such circumstances, we toured Sind along with Shah Faridul Haq. On this occasion, we learned in Hyderabad that an axe-bearing demonstration of Sindis was coming from Hala, that would cause havoc in Hyderabad. We thought of it as mischief by the government. Therefore, we went to Hala to investigate the situation.

The people of Hala welcomed us. We were led in a procession. The people told us that the climate of peace and order in Sind was poor. A similar effort was made in Shahdad Pur also. But the people rendered it unsuccessful. If this conflict had spread, the entire Sind would have had burned in the fire of calamity.

Shah Faridul Haq: Pakistan has become a strange country. Islam here is most helpless. What do you think? When will these people lift martial law?

Dr Hamida Khoru: They should lift martial law soon now. Shah Sahib, in your opinion, when will martial law be lifted?

Shah Fardul Haq: We do not know anything about it. You should ask the members of the Assembly about this!!

Maulana Nurani: Doctor Sahibah! If you had gone to the Assembly, you would certainly have done something about it.

Shamim Khan: Perhaps martial law will be lifted on 14 August.

Shah Faridul Haq: Right now, these people are watching the situation through telescopes. Again, there is the issue of the budget, too.

Khawaja Khairud-Din: There is a rumor that one provincial assembly member has said that he would resign if martial law is lifted.

Shah Faridul Haq: Yes, he is the individual from Hyderabad.

Javed Siddiqi: In this election, people accepted many things and also rejected many. The individuals, on the whole, proved themselves to be the nation-lovers, from which the rulers had kept the nation apart.

Maulana Nurani: Now, we will have to end the differentiation between the local and non-local; otherwise, we cannot live. All of us will have to join together and struggle unanimously. If we fail to do that, this country will be destroyed. Just look at the circumstances. The rulers are not ready to transfer power. They have already said that they are willing to include partners in power... We do not wish for any resistance against the elected members of the National Assembly. None of the politicians of Pakistan has said anything against them. If they wish to prove worthy of some task, they should definitely go ahead and do it.

Javed Siddiqi: The people have high hopes about them.

Maulana Nurani: But they are not prepared to hand over power, and they won't do it. According to the constitutional amendments, no one can argue

about the 8-year period of reign, nor can the elected members give their viewpoint in this regard. Parvez Shah Faridul Haq is present in this very meeting. He has been teaching about the constitution for a long time. He says that even the U.S. president has no right to dissolve the parliament. There are fifty countries in the world that have this type of system. Nowhere can this example be found.

How can it be possible that the Assembly elected on the basis of adult franchise is dismantled by the president, while his own position remains intact? If the prime minister does the same thing, he, too, is sailing in the same boat.

Shah Faridul Haq: The current assembly also is not entitled to carry out legal proceedings, because the president can hold on to any bill for 45 days. Since none of the meetings of the National Assembly can continue for 45 days, the rulers will keep on making laws of their own choice. The prime minister has said that laws will no longer be enacted by decree. In practice, however, this is impossible. They will make laws when the need arises.

Maulana Nurani: For how long can the U.S. president keep a bill with him?

Shah Faridul Haq: He has to make a decision within 10 days.

Dr Hamida Khoru: In order to keep the assembly on correct lines and for the gradual restoration of the democratic process, it is essential that there be some pressure from outside the assembly, too. Nur Khan is now trying to become the leader of the opposition.

Maulana Nurani: He should! In contrast, however, let us analyze the dangers confronting Pakistan. At present, Pakistan is faced with three dangers. They are the dangers from India, Afghanistan and martial law!

Shah Faridul Haq: Still, we do not wish there to be a campaign going on all the time. It is impossible to see people being shot.

Javed Siddiqi: There should be definite planning, so that a way out could be found without pursuing the path of conflict.

Maulana Nurani: Who desires to clash with them? What does the nation have with which to fight? The rulers, however, take some measures, as a result of which a conflict arises. We believe that the role of the armed forces that has been outlined in the constitution should be acted upon. The task of the army is to safeguard the country's borders. Just study Islamic history. The army did not take over during the circumstances that followed after the martyrdom of Hazrat Umar. If the army had played any role in the struggle for the independence of Pakistan, one would have taken into consideration. So far, the bureaucracy and the Army, Incorporated are in power.

Javed Siddiqi: In the brief history of our country, there are examples also where the civilian government used the army for its own purposes.

Maulana Nurani: Whatever steps the civilian regime took, they were in the interest of the country and the nation. The civilians are authorized for this, because, through the elections, they acquire the right to take such measures which they consider better in the interest of the country. The responsibility of the elected government is to protect the ideological frontiers, while the army is responsible for the protection of the geographical boundaries. Today, however, it is the other way around.

Khawaja Humanyun Akhtar: Maulana Nurani Sahib!! Is it essential to take the people to the streets.

Maulana Nurani: For the time being, there is no need to take the people to the streets. Very soon, the rulers will do something, and the people themselves will take to the streets. God willing, the leaders of the country will take to the streets before the people do so. The people took to the streets against Bhutto. The United States did not play any part in this. It is possible, however, that the United States was involved in the incident of 5 July.

Professor Ghulam Mustafa Shah: The defunct Jamaat-e Islami, too, has played a role in the prolongation of martial law. It has become an old tradition of the Jamaat-e Islami that they support every ruler.

Maulana Nurani: These days, the JI people are busy in the Afghanistan struggle.

Ghulam Mustafa Shah: All people must work together; otherwise, there is no way out.

Javed Siddiqi: In order to create a harmony among the different factions of Sind, it is essential to organize a united force.

Ghulam Mustafa Shah: This force is already being formed in Sind.

Mualana Nurani: The cruelties of the police, too, are increasing in Sind. There is no one to ask them about that.

Professor Ghafur Ahmad: In order to put pressure on the administration, there is need for the people's pressure from outside, too, besides that inside the National Assembly. If the nation has some life, it should do something. I believe that there is plenty of life in the nation.

Ghulam Mustafa Shah: We should not despair. Hopelessness is a sign of death.

Shah Faridul Haq: It is relying on this very hope that a generation will come to an end.

Dr Hamida Khoru: The people should be presented with clear goals. They want democracy and the termination of martial law.

Shah Faridul Haq: The people are already aware of this fact.

Dr Hamida Khoru: Then the nation should be organized.

Javed Ahmad Siddiqi: The usual glamour of the political parties that could be witnessed previously has vanished now.

Ghulam Mustafa Shah: Nur Khan has also said the same thing.

Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari: We cannot justify what is happening today. If the politicians possessed no image, why were the rulers restless? It would have been all right, if, in the elections, people had disliked us and had rejected us through votes. Unilateral propaganda continued. If the political parties had been permitted to participate, and the people had been granted the freedom to listen to their manifestoes, the elections certainly would have been fair. They were said to be free elections, but the politicians and the political parties were restricted.

Nafees Siddiqi: At this point, the question also arises that during the 25 February elections, the people had the right to form a government of their own choice. When one person was already the president for the last 5 years, how could the power be transferred, and to whom? The aim of this election was that I am already the president. Come now, and present me your proposals. Again, during these elections, none of the candidates talked about the national issues, foreign affairs and the economic conditions. The manifestoes of the candidates were on a ward basis. In the history of the world, it happened for the first time that the elections of the parliament were held on the level of local bodies.

Dr Hamida Khoru: Under such circumstances, therefore, organization was extremely essential, so that the strength of the people could be organized, and the public opinion could receive true guidance.

Sherbaz Mazari: Now that the elections are over, the climate will clear up, and a good leadership will come into existence.

Maulana Nurani: So far, only Islam is being exploited. It is being defamed.

With that, the dinner reception started, and the phase of thinking was postponed until the next meeting.

9779

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26 June 1985

PAKISTAN

ENDING MARTIAL LAW URGED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 1 May 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Next Step: Lifting Martial Law"]

The first phase toward democratic rule was completed when provincial cabinets in Sarhad [NWFP] and Punjab were sworn in. This task took a long time. Elections of national and provincial assemblies were completed on 25 and 28 February respectively. Except for three seats held by female members [?], all senate assemblies seats were filled by the third week of March. It took, however, 2 or 3 weeks more to elect provincial chief ministers. An equal time was spent by these ministers to fill in their cabinet positions. The main reason for this delay was the non-party system of elections. We hope that this delay will not be repeated in transferring power to the new civil government and lifting martial law. It is hoped that attempts will be made to complete this phase soon after the budget session. It would be best to finish this all before the 8th anniversary of martial law on 5 July 1985. This way the democratic government established on 23 March will be able to function without the crutch of martial law.

Ending martial law after establishing civil governments at provincial and federal levels is important to end the dichotomy. Prime Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo, after getting a vote of confidence from the federal assembly, had openly said that he had informed General Zia about the inability of the two governments to work side by side. General Zia also told newsmen in Peshawar recently that martial law would be lifted at the appropriate time, the same way the referendum and elections were held. The president also said that he would act on the advice of the newly-elected prime minister. The prime minister has also expressed a desire to handle the issue of martial law on his own. In other words, the martial law issue rests with the prime minister, and we should look to him for action. The president also said that the appropriate place for discussing the martial law issue is the Senate and provincial assemblies. Most members of these assemblies have expressed desire for lifting martial law. When regular meetings are held after the budget session, we can expect to hear about this issue. So far, the delay has been limited to appointing federal cabinet and provincial ministries. Martial law can be enacted overnight, but during its rule elected representatives disappear, and it takes time to bring back democracy gradually. However, it is hoped that this graduated plan is not used as an

excuse for unnecessary delay in ending martial law. Therefore, it is not invalid to demand priority for ending martial law by the elected legislators when they begin to consider various national problems. Only then can people feel that power is in the hands of their representatives, who are working for their welfare and the enactment of democratic rule. People took part in the election zealously for this reason. Members of the federal cabinet and provincial ministries were elected individually, but now they are expected to work as a team to establish an ideal regime.

The new budget will give us an idea of new programs. Since the elected representatives have very little time to discuss the budget and since martial law has been in effect for about 8 years, we expect very little change in the budget. Even during the martial law regime the practice of limiting tax issues, which began during the "common era," to the federal budget continued. The most important aspect of provincial budgets was the lack of any new tax. Actually, each year the federal budget imposed so much tax burden on people that inclusion of a new tax in any provincial budget was out of question. Now that martial law is expected to end, it is hoped that this practice will stop. The provinces should have the rights due them. At the same time, the provinces will be expected to do their required duties. They should not be dependent on the federal government's instructions, guidance and approval on every issue. They should be allowed to solve their own problems and develop and coordinate their own resources. In order to foster self-confidence among the provinces, it is essential that martial law be lifted, because a martial law regime is of such a nature that provincial governments, regardless of how independent they claim to be, are dependent upon and at the beck and call of the federal government.

7997

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PAKISTAN

CURBING ANTI-GOVERNMENT TALKS URGED

Peshawar MASHRIQ in Urdu 26 Apr 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Stop That Wicked Talk"]

[Text] Our politcains are using the privilege of freedom of speech for making fanatic statements. Some politicians in their zeal make statements that are detrimental to out country's unity. Politicians have a right to free speech and they should exercise this right in an honest way to communicate popular demands that are important for the welfare of the country. Some politicians demanding an immediate end of the martial law regime have started scaring people with slogans of a confederation. Some are threatening that in 3 or 4 months people will forget the slogan of a confederation and several samll regional governments will be formed. Some leaders opposing our goverment's stand on the Afghanistan issue are trying to scare people with the USSR taking over, attacking and cutting off all routes from the Suleiman Mountains to Balakh. Some of the leaders are frightening us with possible destructive rebellions in Sarhad and Baluchistan Provinces.

This reckless spate of statements has worried even some moderates in the MRD. Leaders of the People's Party have also started to express their disgust at this fanatic tirade. Haseen Ahmed, a prominent leader of a faction of Jamiat-e Ulema-e Islam, now a part of the MRD, threatened to leave the MRD if it does not stop this practice of spreading controversial rumors about confederation, provincial independence and Afghanistan. In a recent meeting of the new executive committee of the PPP, its members and prominent leaders like Mumtaz Bhutto and Hafiz Prizada passed resolutions condemnning the spread of vicious rumors about establishing a confederation. Chulam Mustafa Khar, a leader of the London based PPP, whole criticizing the proponents of the Sind-Baluch-Pakhtoon Confederation, commented that this plan was just to disintegrate Pakistan. He added that it is even worse than Sheikh Mujib Rehm'n's Six-Point Plan, since Mujib wanted to keep the confederation a part of Pakistan. Air Marshal Asghar Khan also called this slogan a hoax and promised to fight it. This disgraceful dialogue is a sign of danger to our country. The enemies of Pakistan's unity were afraid to talk openly until now. It appears that some foreign influence is encouraging them to scare people with Russian attacks and the Red menace. Some people believe that this confederation tactic is only being used as a pressure on the government to end martial law. We do not consider this tactic justifiable since we

all know that martial law is here only for a few months.. If they could afford to wait for 8 years for it to end, then why cannot they be patient for a few months more? It is unbelievable that they are ready to risk Pakistan's unity just to get rid of martial law. Why are they viewing Pakistan as a sand castle which can be destroyed by the USSR or a handful of its agents? Pakistan is the home of 90 million people who have sacrificed a lot to establish it. Its proud citizens are determined to defend every inch of its earth from the Khyber to Makran. This land is not a playground for some adventurous politicians to play their dirty games. These people trying to harm our national unity by abusing some political and economic issues must be living in a fool's paradise. Our patriotic people will tolerate neither a foreign intervention nor allow a few agitators to play with the country's future.

Against this background it behooves us to criticize our politicians for making fanatic statements. We not only recognize their political and constitutional right to express opinion, but respect it. No patriotic Pakistani, however, will allow them to risk our country's unity by making overzealous remarks about martial law and the Afghanistan problem.

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PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

ASGHAR ON 1977 MOVEMENT--Sargodha, April 28: Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan, the Chief of Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, said here today that NPA had launched their movement against the rigging in the polls and not for the enforcement of Nizam-e-Mustafa. He was talking to his party workers and the MRD delegates. Explaining his point of view he said we do not want mullaism but we want islam in its true spirit. Criticising the present regime the Tehrik Chief said, it was exploiting Islam for the last eight years. He said Islam ensures all facilities to the poor and this, he added, remains our goal. Talking about the defence position, he said, we should not live in a fools' paradise. The country, he said, was facing internal and external dangers. He said the MRD would restore democracy with the help of the people. The Tehrik Chief said the government functionaries are living luxuriously on the taxes of the poor people. It is the right of every citizen, he said, to demand an account the way their money is being spent by the bureaucrats. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 29 Apr 85 p 8]

OFFICIAL SAYS REMITTANCES DOWN--Karachi, May 3: Remittances from overseas Pakistanis, which once reached Rs. 3.2 billion annually, have now gone down but are still a big source of foreign exchange earnings for Pakistan", it was stated by M. M. Usmani, Director General, Bureau of Immigration and Overseas Employment, here last night. Speaking as chief guest at a dinner hosted by Overseas Employment Promoters, Karachi, Mr. Usmani said the real problem was promoters' own image in the public eye, which deteriorated over the past few years. What is of utmost importance is that they should try to improve and better that image and strive towards this end collectively, he advised. However, he said promoters must try to tap new sources of immigration and new avenues where Pakistanis, both skilled and unskilled, could be absorbed. He also suggested the press media should not call unlicensed agents as "fake recruiting agents" since nothing like a 'recruiting agent exists. The only official term for the purpose is "Overseas Employment Promoter.. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 4 May 85 p 8]

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